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Abstract 
As institutionalists have assumed, institutions are supposed to shape the behaviours 
of actors towards collective objectives and better prospects. For this purpose, the EU 
has established an institutionalised framework for developing security and defence 
integration. This institutionalised framework not only provides ‘rules of games’ for 
conducting common security and defence affairs, but is supposed to make member 
states become socialised and embedded in European integration. However, the role 
of member states cannot be ignored.  
In fact, the institutionalisation process from the EPC to the CSDP is affected by 
institutionalism and intergovernmentalism. In other words, although the CSDP has 
an institutionalised framework which offers rules and procedures for member states 
and EU institutions to implement a common security and defence policy, it also 
operates on the basis of intergovernmental co-operation. The different effect of 
institutionalism and intergovernmentalism can also be discovered through analysing 
the very distinct attitudes of Britain and Germany in this institutionalisation process.  
This thesis aims to investigate the institutional development and practice of the 
security and defence integration of the EU, and examine the role of member states 
in the process. Britain and Germany are chosen as comparative cases because these 
two countries have presented quite different preferences and attitudes towards the 
developments of European integration. This thesis concludes that although the 
institutionalisation process can affect member states in structuring behaviours and 
national interests, their political will is nevertheless the most important key to 
determining whether an institutionalised CSDP can fulfil the collective end of 
security and defence integration in the EU. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Introduction 
1.1 An Institutionalised Attempt at Conducting Common Security 
and Defence Affairs in the EU 
To launch the project of European integration has been a complicated and strenuous 
task. As one of the most stunning achievements in the twentieth century, the project 
of the European Union, has attracted much attention around the world. Since to 
drive the project of integration requires close co-operation and co-ordination among 
the states participating in it, an institutionalised framework for European integration 
has been gradually created since the 1950s. During this process, the European Union 
(EU) has been established with a highly institutionalised system which combines 
supranational institutions and intergovernmental mechanisms.  
European integration started with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
the 1950s and now the EU covers very broad issues, including economic and 
monetary affairs, foreign and security policies and justice and home affairs. More 
and more institutions have been created to support the increased work of the EU, 
and a more institutionalised framework contributes to enhancing consistency and 
consolidation among member states and EU institutions. Meanwhile, the 
institutionalised framework of the EU would be broadened and deepened through 
the process of constant integration between member states and institutional actors 
of the EU. 
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Regarding European security and defence affairs, an attempt at developing an 
institutionalised framework is also ongoing in the EU, although compared to the 
progress that has been made in economic integration, the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) is nevertheless a relatively young policy area in the EU. The 
European Political Co-operation (EPC), which was launched in the 1970s, had 
established an intergovernmental basis for the political and foreign affairs dimension 
of European integration, and this intergovernmental basis had been applied to the 
development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP; was European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
before the Lisbon Treaty). 
The intergovernmental framework is maintained because it encourages member 
states to participate in security and defence integration, and member states do not 
have to concede power to a supranational authority. However, in order to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of common policies, an institutionalised framework 
is nevertheless important to improve co-ordination and consistency in this policy 
area. Therefore, since 1999 when the Cologne European Council decided to establish 
the ESDP, the EU has gradually developed an institutionalised framework for security 
and defence integration and built deployable military and civilian capability to 
implement crisis management missions. Besides, the development of the CSDP also 
creates an opportunity to develop a distinct role to undertake security and defence 
affairs, especially because the CSDP places an emphasis on the civilian dimension. In 
order to understand the EU role in world security issues, it is important to explore 
how the institutionalised framework has been built and how this framework affects 
the EU in playing this role.  
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1.2 Thesis Motivation 
This thesis aims to investigate the institutional development and practice of the 
security and defence integration of the EU, and examine the role of member states 
in the process. It derives from two concerns.  
The first concern emerges from this question: ‘How does security and defence 
integration affect the EU and member states conducting security and defence 
affairs?’ Security and defence affairs have been the most sensitive concern for nation 
states because they are crucial parts of sovereignty. Security and defence affair 
co-operation is therefore usually the most difficult to handle. The sensitivity 
attached to powerful political issues sometimes leads to the lowest level of 
co-operation among nation states. However, a more complicated, changed and 
globalised world encourages nation states to tackle common issues together. 
Consequently, a new security environment will inevitably push nation states to 
consider possible co-operation on security and defence affairs. Because the EU is the 
largest political and economic multilateral institution in the world, if it can play an 
effective role in security and defence issues it would definitely contribute to world 
peace and stability. Moreover, member states will have stronger incentives to 
support the CSDP if the EU is considered a successful and effective mechanism. 
The second concern comes from this question: ‘How can an institutionalised 
framework assist the accomplishment of security and defence integration of the EU?’ 
Although the CSDP is developed on a basis of intergovernmental co-operation, it also 
has an institutionalised framework which helps to define the connections between 
member states and EU institutions, and offers rules and procedures to implement 
the CSDP. As is argued by Brigid Laffan and also by William Richard Scott, institutions 
usually provide regulations (laws and institutional mechanisms), a normative system 
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(values and norms) and a cognitive framework (symbols and identity) (Laffan, 2001; 
Scott, 2008); therefore, institutions can influence the behaviours of actors (Peters, 
2005, pp. 18–19). 
Besides, during the institutionalisation process, actors will become more engaged 
and socialised in this institutionalised framework, because this framework provides a 
stable and reliable environment for working together. Therefore, as Michael E. Smith 
has argued, ‘institutionalization improves the prospects for cooperation’ (M. E. Smith, 
2004a, p. 18). The process of developing and implementing the CSDP also provides 
illustrations about how member states utilise the CSDP to tackle security and 
defence issues, and become involved in this institutionalised framework. However, 
the socialisation effect will not happen suddenly, and it takes a long-term historical 
process to enact. Therefore, it is also critical to investigate the historical process of 
developing an institutionalised CSDP and then to examine how this framework 
affects EU security and defence integration. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
The institutionalisation of the CSDP originated from the efforts which had been 
made in respect of the EPC, CFSP and ESDP. Although research on the development 
of the EPC, CFSP, ESDP and CSDP is abundant, it still lacks substantial discussions 
about the mutual effect between member states and the development of an 
institutionalised framework for security and defence integration in the EU.  
The relevant research can be considered in three aspects. The first aspect focuses on 
the external role of the EU in security affairs. Some authors treat the EU as an 
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international actor and stress how the relationship between the EU and other states 
or international organisations affects the EU developing a security role (Farrell, 2009; 
Franklin, 2009; Howorth, 2010; Moens, 2001; Ray & Johnston, 2007; 
Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002; Toje, 2011). The second deals with the internal relations 
between EU member states and EU institutions. Some research argues that policy 
interests, security values and various cultural traditions affect the relations between 
member states and EU institutions and the development of EU security and defence 
integration (Bjoerkdahl, 2008; Devine, 2009; Dryburgh, 2010; Gross, 2007; Larsen, 
2009; Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra, & Maurer, 2010). The third research strand examines 
and evaluates the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP on specific issues (Ehrhart, 
2006; Holland, 1995; Jasper & Portela, 2010; Justaert & Keukeleire, 2010; Klasnja, 
2007; Mattelaer, 2010; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; Tardy, 2007).  
The characteristics of member states cannot be ignored in this process. It is because 
the EPC, CFSP, ESDP and CSDP are all founded on the basis of intergovernmental 
co-operation that member states still play a dominant and rather independent role 
in the processes of institutional development and decision-making. On the other 
hand, although the connections between member states and EU institutions have 
been enhanced and present a phenomenon of ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ (H. 
Wallace, 2005, pp. 87–89), we cannot ignore the fact that these intergovernmental 
connections are also developed on an institutionalised basis. Because the factors 
both of intergovernmentalism and of institutionalism exist in the development of EU 
security and defence integration, it is necessary to accentuate the two factors in 
relation to relevant historical processes. In other words, in order to understand the 
development and influence of the CSDP, one has to deal with the institutional factor 
and the intergovernmental factor at the same time. However, research has to date 
not been able to present a realistic picture of this phenomenon. 
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1.4 Research Objectives and Questions 
Arguing that the institutionalisation process plays a decisive role in shaping and 
regulating the behaviours of actors, this thesis will focus on the historical process of 
developing an institutionalised framework for security and defence integration in the 
EU. Specifically, in order to clarify the extent to which member states affect or are 
affected by relevant developments, it will examine British and German cases to 
explain how national interests of member states are involved in this 
institutionalisation process. 
The most prominent development in security and defence integration in the EU 
occurred during the 1999 Cologne European Council through the launching of the 
ESDP (see: Presidency Conclusions, Cologne, 1999) and, at the 1999 Helsinki 
European Council, through the setting of a target for defence capabilities (see: 
Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 1999). The former confirmed the establishment of 
the ESDP; the latter defined military capability targets of the EU. The foundation of 
the development of security and defence integration in Europe can, however, be 
traced back to the 1950s when the European Defence Community (EDC) initiative 
was proposed. Although the EDC plans were aborted, member states learnt the 
lesson that supranational frameworks may not be appropriate to the EPC, CFSP, 
ESDP and CSDP. 
In order to probe the origins of security and defence integration in the EU and 
provide a more comprehensive picture of its implementation and influence, this 
thesis will start by examining the initial project of the EDC and include the latest 
developments of the CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty.  
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Four primary research questions are proposed to understand the development and 
performance of security and defence integration in the EU: 
Question 1. How did the development of security and defence integration emerge 
from the grand European integration project? This thesis will investigate the 
exogenous and endogenous factors that drive this process and explain why an 
intergovernmental, and also a partially institutionalised approach, was accepted to 
develop security and defence integration in the EU. 
Question 2. Which characteristics of the institutional framework for security and 
defence integration in the EU can be recognised? This thesis will clarify the legal and 
substantial foundations that support the institutional framework of the security and 
defence integration in the EU, and identify the capabilities and instruments the EU 
possesses to fulfil its objectives. 
Question 3. What are the dynamics between member states and EU institutions in 
the development of the institutionalised EU security and defence framework? This 
thesis will investigate British and German cases and explain how member states 
participate in and affect relevant developments. The reasons Britain and Germany 
are chosen as cases will be explained in section 1.6.2. 
Question 4. How effective is the operation of the EU’s existing institutional security 
and defence framework in practice? This thesis will investigate the performance of 
the EU in coping with the crisis in Kosovo, which reached a climax in 1999 and 
resulted in a NATO air campaign from March to June of the same year. The thesis will 
also examine the crisis that occurred in Libya in 2011, which led to the collapse of 
the Gaddafi regime in the end of the same year. The reasons for choosing these two 
events will be explained in section 1.6.3. 
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The discussions below will illustrate the theoretical and empirical frameworks that 
the thesis will use, and explain the reasons for choosing those methodological tools. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure (1): Methodology of the Theoretical 
Framework  
This thesis consists of theoretical and empirical frameworks. In the theoretical 
framework, this thesis applies intergovernmentalism and institutionalism 
perspectives to explain the development of security and defence integration in the 
EU. Although functionalism and neo-functionalism perspectives have been popularly 
applied to explain the economic integration of the EU, both of these perspectives 
have restrictions when applying them to explain security and defence affairs 
integration. An alternative approach is necessary. The section below will introduce 
the methodology applied in this thesis and explain the reasons for choosing it. 
1.5.1 The Perspectives and Restrictions of Functionalism and 
Neo-functionalism on Explaining Political Integration 
Generally speaking, the perspectives of functionalism and neo-functionalism are 
considered as being able to provide strong explanations for integration in 
Community affairs (Cini & Borragan, 2010, pp. 71–85; Rosamond, 2000, pp. 31–42, 
50–65). The term ‘ramification’, offered by David Mitrany (1966), and the term 
‘spill-over’, put forward by Ernst B. Haas (1965), have contributed to illustrating how 
the effect of integration transfers from one economic sector to another and 
eventually leads towards deeper economic integration through widespread 
co-operation in functional affairs. 
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Although functionalists or neo-functionalists sometimes consider that the role of 
governments might not be that eminent in the integration of functional and 
technical co-operation, Haas also admits that the ‘spill-over’ effect would not 
automatically occur, because certain conditions might be needed to promote further 
economic integration or even a political unity. The conditions he has mentioned 
include ‘background conditions’, ‘conditions at the time of economic union’ and 
‘process conditions’ (Haas & Schmitter, 1964, p. 711-716), which are applied to 
explain why the EEC can achieve a consolidated union but others cannot.  
Unlike the integration of economic and functional affairs, progress on political 
integration is even more difficult to explain using the terms ‘ramification’ or 
‘spill-over’. Although neo-functionalists believe that ‘political integration is a more or 
less inevitable side-effect of economic integration’ (Rosamond, ibid., pp. 65–68), 
political spill-over is hard to reach because it is difficult to persuade national 
governments to transfer their political authority to a supranational institution. 
Moreover, the Eurozone crisis signifies that even the pooling of sovereignty in the 
area of economic policy-making is difficult to achieve, with member states having in 
the past resisted subjecting themselves under the budgetary rules of the EMU 
Stability and Growth Pact. Integrating political affairs, especially in the area of 
defence and security, requires stronger commitment and political will from national 
governments. Therefore, a special concern with the factor of sovereignty will be 
accentuated in order to research relevant topics. 
1.5.2 Intergovernmentalism Perspectives Explaining the Political 
Integration of the EU 
As regards the concern about how national governments achieve consensus on ‘high 
politics’ issues, intergovernmentalists provide an alternative perspective to explain 
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those factors driving integration, and also accentuate the dominant role of national 
governments in the relevant process.  
Stanley Hoffmann argues that differences in domestic environments and world views 
will lead to diverging foreign policies, and that the establishment of a political 
community will merely deepen these divergences. Moreover, these divergences will 
cause a fragmented international system, with it being unlikely that a political 
community will be integrated beyond the nation state (S. Hoffmann, 1966).  
Hoffmann’s argument explained why the establishment of the EDC encountered 
more obstacles than the development of economic integration because member 
states were reluctant to make concessions on security and defence issues since the 
differences were difficult to reconcile. However, a pure intergovernmental argument 
cannot explain why EU member states have been able since the 1990s to improve 
the convergence of security and defence affairs and work in an institutionalised 
framework of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP. Even though, during the period of the EPC, 
which lacked an institutional framework and did not have the capacity to employ the 
necessary instruments for member states to have common positions or actions, it 
was considered as playing a consensus-forming role among member states so as to 
avoid the ‘humiliating silence of complete inaction’ (Hill, 1992). In other words, 
nation states are possible to work together to achieve security and defence 
integration and an institutionalised framework for such purpose is also possible.  
In order to clarify the considerable institutional factors that operate in the field of 
political integration in the EU, Andrew Moravcsik, a liberal intergovernmentalist, 
offers a moderate approach to explaining why national governments accept 
co-operation and integration regarding political affairs (Moravcsik, 1997, 1998, 2001). 
Moravcsik argues that the preferences of states in the process of European 
integration are mainly determined by the following factors: international 
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interdependence, opportunities for international economic exchange, and dominant 
economic interests within domestic societies. Hard bargaining among member states, 
which is strongly influenced by economic elements, will result in substantive 
integration outcomes; meanwhile, governments would be strengthened at home if 
they successfully defend their national preferences in an inter-state bargaining 
process (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 3–9; Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 49). Therefore, on the 
basis of rational choices, Moravcsik tried to explain why governments surrender 
sovereignty to supranational institutions. 
Intergovernmentalism perspectives provide more appreciable arguments for 
explaining the dominant role of national governments when conducting political 
integration in the EU. However, the progress of integration does not consist merely 
of a compromise among states regarding national interests. Although to 
intergovernmentalists, as Pierson has indicated, the process of European integration 
is essentially a forum for inter-state bargaining and member states remain the only 
important actors at the European level (Pierson, 1996, p. 124), the progress of 
integration is not completely the result of inter-state bargaining. Sometimes 
member states are affected or disturbed by the external environment. Britain may 
serve as an example. The Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did not 
favour new treaties and legal documents to reform the EC. In a speech delivered on 
20 September 1998 at the College of Europe in Bruges in Belgium, she was still 
opposed to adopting new documents for the EC (Thatcher, 1998, repr. Nelsen & 
Stubb, 1998, p. 54). However, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold 
War changed the overall environment in Europe and also in the world. This new 
situation pushed the succeeding Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, to sign 
the Maastricht Treaty and take part in building the EU, something unforeseen by 
Thatcher. 
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In sum, intergovernmentalists have demonstrated that nation states play 
predominant roles in the development of political integration in the EU, but they do 
not have much focus on the role of EU institutions. Since new positions and offices 
are introduced to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the CSDP, the role of 
EU institutions cannot be ignored.  
1.5.3 New Institutionalism Perspectives Explaining the Political Integration 
of the EU 
The institutional developments and practical implementations of the security and 
defence integration of the EU represent a long historical process. Member states 
occupy a dominant position driving this process, with EU institutions also becoming 
more participative than before in the institutionalised framework to achieve a 
common security and defence policy. Therefore, to understand EU security and 
defence integration, besides examining member states, an approach to examine the 
role of EU institutions is also necessary.  
Institutionalism emerges from an interest in institutions structuring the behaviours 
of individuals towards collective purposes and better ends (Peters, 2005). The first 
discussions of ‘old’ institutionalism arose during the 1880s and examined the formal 
institutions and bureaucratic frameworks of US government. At that time, the 
approach of old institutionalism was applied to studies of comparative politics and 
formal government institutions and laws. While the behavioural revolution occurred 
from the 1950s to bring a new research paradigm with a different methodology, 
ontology and epistemology, old institutionalism, being not theoretical and too 
descriptive, declined (Peters, ibid., pp. 12–15). 
Institutionalism was brought back by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, who 
emphasised the significance of collective actions and argued that there should be a 
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reciprocal relationship between collective political actions and socio-economic 
environments (March & Olsen, 1984). New institutionalism reintroduces a concern 
about institutions, collective entities and common activities and has been applied 
popularly to political science (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Shepsle, 1989; 
Weaver, 1992), international relations (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999; Pierson, 1996, 2000; 
Ruggie, 1998), economics (North, 1998; Williamson, 1985) and sociology (Achen & 
Shively, 1995; Scott, 2008). Accordingly, the reason new institutionalism has 
attracted scholarly attention is that it concentrates on ‘institution’ itself (Aspinwall & 
Schneider, 2000, 2001, p. 5). 
Three reasons are considered in this thesis for choosing the new institutionalism 
approach. Firstly, adopting this approach will increase the institutional dimension of 
EU security and defence integration and complement the intergovernmentalism 
approach, which has a peculiar preference for national governments. Secondly, 
because new institutionalism considers institutions as whole entities, it is concerned 
with reciprocal interactions between institutional frameworks and actors so that it 
can explain the dynamic development of an institutionalised framework. Thirdly, 
although when compared to old institutionalism, new institutionalism does not tend 
to provide so many normative analyses, it is concerned with values shaping 
individual behaviours and preferences (Peters, 2005., pp. 24–45). Accordingly, this 
thesis will apply new institutionalism perspectives to explain the historical 
developments of the institutionalised framework for accomplishing EU security and 
defence integration. 
According to diverse understandings about how institutions exert influence upon 
individuals, different schools of new institutionalism have been identified by authors 
(Ansell, 2008; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hay, 2008; Mackay & Waylen, 2009; Peters, ibid.; 
Scharpf, 1997), with all institutionalists agreeing that ‘institution matters’ and that 
‘institutional configurations have an impact upon political outcomes’ (Rosamond, 
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2010, pp. 109–113). Nevertheless, because focusing on the historical process of 
institutional developments and aiming to explain how this process contributes to 
deepening and broadening EU security and defence integration, this thesis will 
especially rely on historical institutionalist arguments and examine whether path 
dependence has happened in this process.  
The term ‘path dependence’, coined by Douglass North, it indicates that in political 
processes, individuals prefer to follow present institutions or patterns instead of 
creating others because they have invested resources and efforts in present 
institutions, with this ‘inertia’ pushing them to provide stable support for present 
institutions (North, 1990). Moreover, Paul Pierson applies the term ‘path 
dependence’ to explain how decisions in the past have the ‘lock-in’ effect of 
restraining choices in the future and constraining individuals from withdrawing from 
present institutions (Pierson, 2000). Pierson also illustrates how short-term decisions 
undermine member states’ long-term control by introducing the idea of ‘unintended 
consequence’ (Pierson, 1996, p. 156). The terms ‘path dependence’ and ‘unintended 
consequences’ refer to similar consequences, where individuals will continue to 
invest in institutions to maintain the sustainable development of those institutions. 
1.5.4 Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism Methodology 
Since influence from institutions on individuals is not boundless, the active role 
played by individuals cannot be ignored. Regarding the process of developing EU 
security and defence integration, it still largely depends on the initiatives of member 
states in establishing and reforming institutional frameworks. However, the Lisbon 
Treaty has also made some changes, and, especially, increased the capacity of the 
High Representative to conduct the CSDP and chair the Foreign Affairs Council, 
including making proposal (Article 18, Title III, The Lisbon Treaty). Although regarding 
the CFSP and CSDP, the European Council and the Council will still act unanimously 
15 
 
(Article 24, Title V, The Lisbon Treaty), the Treaty offers more space and capability 
for the High Representative to make progress with the CSDP. Therefore, a mixed 
intergovernmentalism and historical institutionalism approach will help explain the 
interactions between member states and EU institutions in the CSDP. 
Historical institutionalism arguments will help clarify three key issues involved in the 
process of developing security and defence integration in the EU, as follows: 
 Firstly, how the development of security and defence integration by the EU 
derives from a long-term historical process of European integration. The 
development of the CSDP is associated with the EDC, EPC, CFSP and ESDP. 
Specifically, from the EPC it continues an intergovernmental stream and is still 
the most crucial characteristic of the framework of the CSDP. Therefore, this 
thesis will investigate the long-term historical developments from the EDC to the 
CSDP, and then examine whether path dependence occurs during this process. 
 Secondly, why member states provide stable support to develop security and 
defence integration in the EU. The long-term participation in European 
integration also enhances the consensus of member states regarding this 
objective. Therefore, this thesis will explore how member states are motived to 
participate in this process and also how they achieve their national interests in 
this process.  
 Thirdly, whether an institutionalised framework of the CSDP will embed member 
states within this framework and become more dependent on the CSDP when 
they pursue national interests. This thesis will examine whether member states 
recognise the CSDP as a primary means for them to tackle relevant issues.  
The arguments of intergovernmentalism will contribute to explaining the role of 
member states, especially Britain and Germany, in the process of conducting and 
shaping the progress of the security and defence integration of the EU. Two key 
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issues will be resolved in this thesis by applying the perspectives of 
intergovernmentalism:  
 Firstly, why an intergovernmental model has been maintained since the 
development of the EPC. Because the implementation of common security 
and defence policy in the EU largely relies on the political will of member 
states, it is important to examine the extent to which intergovernmental 
factors affect achieving EU security and defence policy. 
 Secondly, whether individual member states play a specific role in the 
process of EU security and defence integration. To address this issue, this 
thesis will discuss British and German roles in this process and examine their 
influence upon the development and implementation of EU security and 
defence integration. Especially because Britain and Germany have very 
distinct attitudes towards military options, it is important to investigate their 
role in this institutionalisation process. More detailed explanations for 
choosing these two countries will be presented in section 1.6.2.  
This thesis considers that intergovernmentalist and institutionalist perspectives are 
complementary rather than contradictory because they focus on different 
dimensions in the process of developing security and defence integration in the EU, 
instead of being concerned with the same target using different interpretations. 
Therefore, this thesis will consider the development of EU security and defence 
integration as a process of compromise between intergovernmental and institutional 
factors. A mixed intergovernmentalism and historical institutionalism methodology 
will present a more comprehensive picture about this institutionalised, but also 
intergovernmental, framework of the CSDP. 
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1.6 Thesis Structure (2): Empirical Framework Methodology 
The arguments above concerning historical institutionalism and 
intergovernmentalism provide theoretical explanations about how the 
institutionalisation process enables member states and EU institutions to be 
embedded in the project of EU security and defence integration. This thesis will also 
undertake empirical investigations into how the existing institutional framework 
achieves the EU’s objective implementing a common security and defence policy. 
Accordingly, in the empirical framework section, this thesis will examine three issues: 
(1) the existing institutional framework of the CSDP; (2) the participation of Britain 
and Germany in developing EU security and defence integration; and (3) the 
implementation of the CFSP and CSDP during the crises in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya 
in 2011. 
1.6.1 Investigation of the CSDP Institutional Framework 
A consistent and reliable common security and defence policy depends on the 
efficient and effective implementation of the CSDP and proper coherence among EU 
member states and EU institutions. Although there was concern that the three-pillar 
structure of the EU introduced in the Maastricht Treaty might hinder the EU from 
exerting consistent and coherent policies (Andersson, 2008; Eeckhout, 2004), an 
institutionalised framework would help to improve the consistency and coherence of 
the CSDP. 
The structure of the CSDP has a complex institutionalised framework because it not 
only has an intergovernmental decision-making process but also provides increasing 
competence to EU institutional actors. The existing institutional framework of the 
CSDP presents a hierarchical structure which consists of representatives and senior 
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officials from individual member states, and independent technical and specialised 
staff. The upper level develops strategic guidelines and decision-making, while the 
lower level is responsible for carrying out the decisions made by the upper level and 
providing suggestions and recommendations.  
This hierarchical structure represents a model of multi-level governance. The EU 
institutions regarding the CSDP are allocated to three levels in this hierarchical 
structure according to their different duties. The top level is that of strategy-making 
bodies, including the European Council with the President and the Foreign Affairs 
Council with the High Representative of the Union (HR) for Foreign and Security 
Policy. They are the most important bodies in the EU as regards defining the CSDP. 
The middle level is the suggestion- and initiative-proposing bodies, including the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
and the Committee of Permanent Representative (COREPER) under the Foreign 
Affairs Council. They are charged with providing information and recommendations 
to the Council to made decisions. The bottom level is policy-supporting bodies, and 
of course national governments’ administrations, in order to implement the CSDP. 
These institutions work together to provide political directions, policy suggestions 
and situation evaluations for member states. Their work is also supposed to 
strengthen the connections between member states and the EU. Although, in terms 
of security and defence affairs, it is unlikely to present the phenomenon of 
‘Brusselsisation’ put forward by John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg (1999, pp. 
246–249), the implementation of the CSDP should contribute to improving 
convergence between member states and the EU when undertaking common 
security and defence issues.  
In order to explore the specific roles of different EU institutions in the policy-making 
process of common security and defence policy in the EU, the researcher conducted 
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interviews with six senior officials working in this area. However, because one 
interviewer asked to be anonymous, the information below lists only five of these. 
 Ms Riina Kionka: the personal representative for human rights (CFSP) of the 
Secretary General and High Representative Javier Solana. A 20-minute 
interview was undertaken on 3 November 2009 in Ms Riina Kionka’s office 
located in the Justus Lipsius Building, Brussels. A record was not available but 
Ms Riina Kionka permitted being quoted in this thesis. 
 Ms Reis Alda Silveira: the head of the defence policy and capabilities unit of 
the Council. A 15-minute interview was undertaken on 5 November 2009 in 
Ms Reis Alda Silveira’s office located in Avenue de Cortenbergh 158, Brussels. 
A record was not available but Ms Reis Alda Silveira permitted being quoted 
in this thesis. 
 Dr Steven Everts: the personal representative for energy policy of the 
Secretary General and High Representative Javier Solana. A 20-minute 
interview was undertaken on 6 November 2009 in Dr Steven Everts’s office 
located in the Justus Lipsius Building, Brussels. A record was not available but 
Dr Steven Everts permitted being quoted in this thesis. 
 Mr Pierre Séailles: was a policy co-ordinator from the security policy unit of 
the European Commission. A 40-minute phone interview was undertaken on 
25 November 2009. A record was not available but Mr Pierre Séailles 
permitted being quoted in this thesis.  
 Mr Brian Toll: was a programme manager for CFSP operations in the 
European Commission. A 40-minute phone interview was undertaken on 2 
December 2009. A record was not available but Mr Brian Toll permitted being 
quoted in this thesis. 
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1.6.2 Examination of British and German Roles  
This thesis will examine the roles of Britain and Germany in the development of EU 
security and defence integration, and whether their preferences, interests and 
activities have been affected in this process. Britain and Germany are chosen for this 
thesis for three reasons. Firstly, because Britain and Germany present distinct 
motivations towards EU security and defence integration (Longhurst & Miskimmon, 
2007), it is important to understand why they have different motivations and 
whether these differences affect their roles in this process. Especially as regards 
their attitude towards enhancing the capabilities in order to implement the CSDP, 
Britain and Germany represent an interesting comparison because Britain has an 
interest in the military dimension of the CSDP while Germany puts more focus on the 
civilian dimension. 
Britain, on the one hand, has traditionally been an awkward or reluctant actor in 
European integration. However, because it is a major military power, Britain has a 
special interest in developing military co-operation. Under the leadership of the Blair 
Government especially, Britain expressed more enthusiasm for developing EU 
military capability. Blair argued that Britain should start ‘winning arguments rather 
than running away’ from Europe (Blair, 1998a). Besides, in Blair’s notable speech in 
Chicago, he declared the prospect of making Britain a bridge between Europe and 
America and promised to strengthen EU defence capability in order to enhance the 
transatlantic alliance (Blair, 1999a). Even though the present Cameron Government 
has returned to taking a resistant and reserved attitude towards EU affairs, such as 
vetoing the reform package of the Lisbon Treaty, it also signed a bilateral defence 
co-operation treaty with France, just as Blair did with France in the St Malo 
Declaration. No matter whether this treaty may become a framework for further 
defence integration in the EU, it at least illustrates that Britain has the intention of 
enhancing defence co-operation with European countries. 
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Germany, on the other hand, usually has aspirations to develop European 
integration, and has maintained a commitment to multilateralism and 
institutionalism since 1949 when the Westpolitik policy was introduced. However, 
where military issues are concerned, Germany is hesitant and more critical. Although 
Germany supports enhancing capability of the EU in order to implement crisis 
management operations and has developed the Eurocorps with France, it is not a 
traditional military power and does not have an ambition to be one. Military issues 
are not a German priority. Since the end of WWII, Germany has developed the 
definite characteristic of being a civilian power and is very careful about using 
military options. The concept of civilian power, developed by Hanns Maull, refers to 
those the countries which have strong political power but use multilateralism, 
non-military instruments and peaceful means in pursuit of foreign policies (Maull, 
1990, p. 92–93). Although since 1994 Germany is allowed to deploy its military 
abroad once this is approved by the Bundestag (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfGE 
90, 145, 1994), it still does not have the intention of developing a strong military role. 
This hesitant attitude can be seen in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ against Iraq and in 
the Libyan crisis. 
The second reason is that Britain and Germany are two major member states in the 
EU, and therefore whether they can achieve consensus is important for the 
development of the CSDP. Besides, their influence is also presented in relation to 
affecting agenda-setting or the decision-making process when co-operating with 
other EU states. For example, Britain has taken a strategy of opting out with 
Denmark to resist further European integration (Adler-Nissen, 2008), as well as 
initiatives to develop civilian capabilities to underpin the CSDP by Nordic countries 
also having support from Britain and Germany (Jakobsen, 2009). Therefore, because 
both Britain and Germany have political resources to conduct EU defence and 
security affairs, it is useful to examine how these two countries affect the 
development of common security and defence policy in the EU. 
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The third reason is that Britain and Germany are both strong supporters of NATO, 
and therefore, more than other countries in the EU, these two countries especially 
have to cope with whether the development of common security and defence policy 
in the EU undermines transatlantic relations. This is more serious for Britain, because 
traditionally Britain has a special link with America and does not want to run the risk 
of weakening it by contributing to developing independent EU military capability. 
Investigating how Britain and Germany take the NATO factor into account in the 
process of developing EU security and defence integration will provide important 
insights into how European countries balance commitments to NATO and the EU in 
relation to military affairs.  
This thesis does not choose France as a case to examine because traditionally France 
has a similar stance to Britain on military affairs, since both countries yearn to play a 
strong military role, and firmly insist on their national interests. This also stems from 
their legacy as colonial powers. Both countries still show a tendency to regard 
themselves as Great Powers, something which is completely alien to the post-1945 
German self-perception. On the other hand, France and Germany shared the same 
history of European integration, and this offered them a similar experience in the EU. 
Therefore, the difference between Britain and France, or the difference between 
France and Germany is not as obvious as the difference between Britain and 
Germany. Since one of the objectives in this thesis is to examine whether the 
institutionalisation process affects member states, it is important to compare 
whether the institutionalisation process improves convergences between Britain and 
Germany and whether their divergences hinder the development of the CSDP. 
Besides, since France can co-operate with Britain or Germany, if these two countries 
can reach consensus on the same issue, it will be easier to persuade France to join in 
agreement. The fact cannot be ignored that British–Franco co-operation without 
Germany, or a Franco–German motor without Britain, is not realistic. In other words, 
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if Britain and Germany can co-operate, they will face few problems attracting France 
to join. Then, the ‘Big Three’ together will be very likely to achieve further 
institutionalisation and progress in security and defence integration in the EU, and 
this was why the ESDP could produce progressive developments in the early 2000s. 
Traditionally, Britain and Germany have different approaches towards European 
integration, with concern for British–German relations being relatively limited 
compared to studies on Franco–German or British–French co-operation. Although 
there was a concern that Britain and Germany should become closer because of 
existing common interests and policy convergences in the EU (Bulmer, 2007; Grabbe 
& Munchau, 2002; Turner & Green, 2007), how they responded to the Libyan crisis 
signifies that the divergences between these two countries are still strong. As a 
result, it is important to examine whether these divergences will hinder them from 
further co-operation on security and defence affairs and impact upon the 
development of CSDP.  
In order to explore the specific roles of British and German positions on the 
development of security and defence integration in the EU, the researcher has 
undertaken interviews with two British MPs, two German MdBs and one German 
Bundestag staff member, as follows: 
 Mr David Heathcoat-Amory: served the Conservative Party in the House of 
Parliament from 1983 to 2010 and was Minister of State at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office for the Major Government in 1993. A 30-minute 
interview was undertaken on 14 July 2009 in Mr David Heathcoat-Amory’s 
parliamentary office in the Westminster Building, London. A record was 
available and Mr David Heathcoat-Amory permitted being quoted in this 
thesis. 
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 Mr Paul Keetch: served the Liberal Democratic Party in the House of 
Parliament from 1997 to 2010 and was the Liberal Democrat spokesman for 
foreign affairs from 1999 to 2001 and for defence from 1999 to 2005. A 
20-minute interview was undertaken on 24 November 2009 at Portcullis 
House, London. A record was available and Mr David Heathcoat-Amory 
permitted being quoted in this thesis. 
 Mr Andreas Henne: political assistant of security policy for Mr Bernd Siebert, 
who has served with the CDU/CSU in the German Bundestag from 1994 to 
the present. A 40-minute interview was undertaken on 25 August 2009 in Mr 
Andreas Henne’s parliamentary office in Berlin. A record was available and 
Mr Andreas Henne permitted being quoted in this thesis. 
 Mr Rainer Arnold: has served the SPD in the German Bundestag since 1998. 
He has been the spokesman for the SPD on defence affairs since 2002. A 
30-minute interview was undertaken on 7 September 2009 in Mr Rainer 
Arnold’s parliamentary office in Berlin. A record was available and Mr Rainer 
Arnold permitted being quoted in this thesis. 
 Dr Hans-Peter Bartels: has served the SPD in the German Bundestag since 
1998 and is a member of the Defence Committee. A 25-minute interview was 
undertaken on 3 March 2010 in Dr Hans-Peter Bartels’ parliamentary office in 
Berlin. A record was available and Dr Hans-Peter Bartels permitted being 
quoted in this thesis. 
1.6.3 Evaluation of the EU’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis and the Libyan Crisis 
In evaluating the performance of the EU in implementing the CFSP and CSDP, this 
thesis will explore how the EU was involved in the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the 2011 
Libyan crisis. The Kosovo crisis in this thesis specifically refers to the escalating 
conflicts between the Serbian Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) and armed Albanians forces in Kosovo since late 1998. This case is important 
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not only because it became a catalyst for the EU to establish the ESDP, but also 
because it was the first time that Germany was actively involved in a NATO 
out-of-area combat mission. Accordingly, the Kosovo crisis was a turning point for 
both the EU and Germany. 
The Libyan crisis in this thesis refers to the civil war in Libya, started in February 2011 
when Libyan citizens were encouraged by protests in Egypt and Tunisia and held 
anti-government demonstrations to protest against the long-term dictatorship of 
Gaddafi, asking for political reform. Regarding this issue, the EU was unable to 
deploy a crisis management mission other than to impose diplomatic and economic 
sanctions against the Gaddafi Government. The result showed that although the EU 
has developed military capability since 1999 and the Lisbon Treaty also provided a 
more coherent framework for enhancing the external role of the EU, the EU could 
neither adopt a coherent stance nor take strong action to resolve this crisis. This 
result also implied that NATO is still prominent in intervening in military situations.  
In order to evaluate whether the EU can play an effective role in implementing the 
CSDP and whether an institutionalised framework of the CSDP will help the EU to 
implement common security and defence policy, the crisis in Kosovo and Libya will 
be discussed in this thesis. 
1.6.4 Empirical Framework Research Methods 
The empirical framework research methods in this thesis will be separated into three 
parts: historical analysis, documentary survey, and interviews with relevant 
politicians and officials. The timeline of the research will start from the 1950s when 
ECSC countries attempted to develop the EDC. Although the EDC was aborted 
eventually, it had a crucial influence upon the successive development of such 
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attempts. The timeline for this research will end in October 2011, when Gaddafi 
died. 
Historical analysis is used to unfold the historical developments of the security and 
defence integration of the EU. This thesis will review the EU archives concerning 
relevant intergovernmental conferences, treaties, documents and reports that have 
contributed to establishing and reforming the institutional framework for this system 
in order to establish a historical context and evaluate its influence on this topic.  
The documentary survey relies on two document types. The first-hand materials 
derive from policy papers, working papers and public statements by leaders, senior 
officials or members of parliament in Britain and Germany. The second-hand 
materials consist of academic work to date on this topic. A more specific literature 
review will be presented in Chapter 2. 
Brief information about the people interviewed on this topic is given in sections 1.6.1 
and 1.6.2. The following will introduce the process used to prepare for the 
interviews.  
For the purpose of investigating the participation of Britain and Germany in security 
and defence integration in the EU and the operation of this system, the researcher 
invited British MPs, German MdBs, MEPs and senior officials of the CSDP to take part 
in an interview. The background of the researcher and the purpose of this thesis 
were stated in an invitation letter. Eleven people agreed to be interviewed, the 
interviews being undertaken from July 2009 to March 2010 in London, Berlin and 
Brussels. The invitation lists and processes are listed below. 
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In Britain:  
 17 MPs working on the Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee 
and with political interests in European affairs and security issues were 
invited. 
 Mr David Heathcoat-Amory for the Conservative Party and Mr Paul Keetch 
for the Liberal Democratic Party gave face-to-face interviews.  
 8 members working in the UK Permanent Representation to the EU were also 
invited, but none of them wished to be interviewed.  
In Germany: 
 74 MdBs working on the Committee for the Affairs of the European Union, 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Defence and with a 
political interest in European affairs and security issues, were invited. 
 Mr Rainer Arnold for the SPD, Dr Hans-Peter Bartels for the SPD and Mr 
Bernd Siebert’s political assistant Andreas Henne for the CDU/CSU gave 
face-to-face interviews.  
 4 members working in Germany’s Permanent Representation to the EU were 
also invited, but none wished to be interviewed. 
In the European Parliament: 
 34 British and German MEPs working in the Sub-Committee on Security and 
Defence in the Foreign Affairs Committee were invited, but none of them 
wished to be interviewed. 
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In the CSDP’s institutional bodies:  
 6 personal representatives of the CFSP High Representative were invited. Ms 
Riina Kionka, working as a personal representative for the SG/HR for human 
rights in the area of CFSP, and Dr Steven Everts, working as a personal 
representative for the SG/HR for Energy Policy, gave face-to-face interviews. 
 17 senior officials in the Policy Unit of Departments attached to the 
Secretary-General/High Representative were invited. Ms Reis Alda Silveira, 
head of the unit for political and defence capabilities, gave a face-to-face 
interview. 
 18 senior officials in the Security Policy Unit in the European Commission 
were invited. Mr Pierre Séailles, policy co-ordinator from the security policy 
unit of the European Commission, and Mr Brian Toll, programme manager for 
CFSP operations in the European Commission, consented to phone 
interviews. 
 12 military staff in the EUMC, EUMS, and EU civil and military planning cell 
were invited. An anonymous senior staff of civil–military cell gave a 
face-to-face interview. 
 Three chief executives from the European defence agency were invited, but 
none of them consented to being interviewed. 
 The director of the European Union Institute for security studies and the 
commander of the civilian planning and conduct capability were also invited, 
but neither wished to be interviewed.  
The interview questions were all open questions and were designed to investigate 
the interviewees’ personal experiences of participating in the decision-making 
process within their own countries or in the EU. The interview questions can be 
separated into three:  
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 General questions which aimed at capturing interviewees’ perceptions and 
interpretations about the institutionalised framework of the CSDP. 
 Evaluative questions which aimed at investigating how interviewees 
recognised the performance of the CSDP. 
 Personal prospect questions which aimed at investigating the expectations of 
the interviewees in terms of whether they had a blueprint to improve an 
ideal institutional framework for the CSDP and achieve further security and 
defence integration in the EU.  
Most of the interviewees asked to finish within 20–25 minutes, and in most cases, 
they were not able to answer all the questions. If they did not have enough time to 
answer all the questions, the general questions were prioritised. The results of the 
interviews will be analysed using a qualitative method of analysis, according to the 
content and context of each interviewee’s answers.  
 
1.7 Thesis Contribution 
The previous sections describe the current literature on the topic of European 
security, but the current literature lacks a comprehensive study on the historical 
developments of security and defence integration in the EU and the effect upon 
member states. Besides, existing academic works rarely compare the roles of Britain 
and Germany when analysing British–German relations in this process. Moreover, 
since the Libyan crisis only happened last year, it still lacks detailed academic 
references. 
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Therefore, this thesis aims to fill in the gap in existing academic references by 
exploring the historical developments of an institutionalised framework for security 
and defence integration in the EU and examining the participation of Britain and 
Germany in this process, as well as their participation in Kosovo and in Libyan crisis. 
The contributions of this thesis can be clarified in four ways.  
Firstly, it provides a historical institutionalism perspective in order to 
comprehensively explain the developments of security and defence integration in 
the EU. This investigation forms a fundamental basis for explaining how the process 
of institutionalisation is shaped by member states and how member states are 
affected by the result of institutionalisation.  
Secondly, this thesis also accentuates intergovernmental factors in this process. As 
both the effect of institutionalisation and the dominant role played by member 
states cannot be ignored, this thesis utilises a methodology that incorporates 
historical institutionalism and intergovernmentalism to explain the mutual influence 
between member states and institutional developments associated with security and 
defence integration by the EU. 
Thirdly, the interviews provide first-hand information to illustrate the attitudes of 
member states towards the relevant institutional developments, as well as direct 
personal experiences of personal working in the EU for the implementation of 
common security and defence policy. 
Fourthly, the research on the Kosovo and Libyan cases provides more substantial and 
recent evidence about how the performances of the EU in the situations of crisis 
management and how member states take part in the decision-making process. This 
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research will also provide evaluations and suggestions for further developments to 
achieve a more integrated security and defence policy in the EU. 
 
1.8 Thesis Overview 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The remaining chapters can be briefly 
described as follows.  
Chapter 2 is a literature review that examines the results of present studies in 
relation to the research targets of this thesis, and evaluates their achievements in 
order to support and refine the objectives of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 tackles the historical development of the security and defence integration 
of the EU by separating this historical process into five stages: (1) the EDC in the 
1950s, (2) the EPC from 1970 to 1990, (3) the CFSP in the early 1990s, (4) the ESDP 
since 1999, and (5) the reform on the CSDP since 2009. By reviewing the historical 
process, this thesis will explore the factors driving and changing this process. 
Chapter 4 presents the British case. This chapter will describe how Britain 
participates in EU security and defence integration and examine its influence in this 
process.  
Chapter 5 presents the German case. This chapter describes how Germany has 
transformed itself from a semi-sovereignty position to a leading member in the EU 
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through taking part in European integration, and examines the role of Germany in 
the development of EU security and defence integration.  
Chapter 6 examines the Kosovo case. It investigates the process of implementing the 
CFSP mechanisms to resolve this crisis, and evaluates the effectiveness of the CFSP 
mechanisms in the case. 
Chapter 7 describes the Libyan case. It also investigates the participation of EU 
institutional actors, Britain and Germany, in implementing the CSDP mechanisms in 
resolving this crisis and evaluates the effectiveness of this case. 
Chapter 8 concludes the research results about the British and German roles in the 
developments of common security and defence policy, evaluates the impact of 
institutionalisation on the future development of the security and defence 
integration of the EU, and describes future work. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to clarify basic notions and understand academic investigations of this topic 
to date, this literature review will present the findings of current studies, and 
examine how current literature resolves the following three questions: 
 What does the notion ‘institutionalisation’ mean? 
 How should we understand the developments of common security and 
defence policy in the EU? 
 How do member states play their roles in this process? 
The first question emerged from the concern about how institutions matter in the 
political process. Competitive perspectives provide understanding about the effect 
of institutions upon the behaviours of actors and help to form the fundamental basis 
that underpins the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
The second question originates from the concern about what factors are 
fundamental in driving the developments of common security and defence policy in 
the EU, and whether the experiences derived from the EDC，EPC and CFSP before the 
establishment of the ESDP have an effect upon the developments. Clarifying the 
factors driving this process will contribute to building an analytical background to 
explain the long-term historical developments of security and defence integration in 
the EU. 
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The third question arises from the concern about how national governments regard 
European integration and then shape their policies to take part in this project, 
especially in accordance with the developments of EU security and defence 
integration. Relevant research will contribute to understanding the input from 
member states in this process.  
 
2.2 Conceptualising ‘Institution’ and ‘Institutionalisation’ 
As a theoretical approach to balance a behaviour-oriented perspective in political 
science and comparative politics studies in the 1950s and 1960s, and to emphasise 
the influence of collective institutions upon the behaviours of individuals and 
political processes, new institutionalism has been revived in academic communities 
since the 1980s.   
2.2.1 Discriminating between Old Institutionalism and New 
Institutionalism 
Although they emerge from similar interests in institutions, old institutionalism and 
new institutionalism concern different research targets. On the one hand, old 
institutionalism is applied popularly to comparative politics studies and has a specific 
focus on formal government institutions and laws. Formal institutions and legal 
frameworks are their main targets. Consequently, old institutionalism provides an 
approach dealing with legalism, structuralism, holism, historical factors and 
normative analyses (Peters, 2005, pp. 6–11). On the other hand, to balance the 
behaviouralism perspective, new institutionalism has been proposed to reaffirm the 
impact of collective actions. Therefore, compared to that of behaviouralism, the 
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research emphasis of new institutionalism is on the ‘collective’ rather than the 
‘individual’, and compared to old institutionalism, new institutionalism has a more 
flexible definition of ‘institution’. 
New institutionalism raises concerns about institutions, but is not an exclusive 
approach in political science studies. As was mentioned in the Chapter 1, besides the 
subject of political science, the new institutionalism approach is also popularly 
applied to other social science subjects, such as international relations, economics 
and sociology. However, although new institutionalism raises concerns about 
institutions, collective entities and common activities, it neither aims to make 
normative suggestions about political processes nor has theoretical preferences 
towards specific political issues and forms of co-operation. Theoretically speaking, 
the new institutionalism approach can be applied to general research topics which 
have institutional implications. The re-emergence of new institutionalism can be 
considered an echo of the call by the behavioural revolution for systematic and 
scientific research approaches, and provides a balanced perspective to accentuate 
the role of institutions in political processes. 
2.2.2 Defining ‘Institution’ and ‘Institutionalisation’ 
Regarding how institutions matter, it is important to identify what ‘institution’ and 
‘institutionalisation’ mean. In political science, the literal meaning of 
‘institutionalisation’ refers to dense institutions in a space or region, with the EU 
considered an area of high institutionalisation (Choi & Caporaso, 2002, pp. 492–493; 
Gourevitch, 2002, p. 309). Institutionalisation is also defined by Shmuel Eisenstadt in 
terms of norms, sanctions and organisations being set up as a basis for a large and 
complex variety of social situations where policies are upheld and applied (cited in 
Bandelj, 2008, p. 66). Moreover, according to research on political parties, Steven 
Levitsky discerns that there are three phenomena that can be used to identify 
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whether institutionalisation occurs: (1) whether electoral organisations become 
stable, (2) whether values are infused via expanding organisations, and (3) whether 
rules and procedures within organisations are routinised (Levitsky, 2003, pp. 15–16). 
According to these definitions, institutionalisation can be referred to as a 
phenomenon where institutions are centralised in a geopolitical area or a political 
system that may have an effect on maintaining a stable environment for actors. Of 
course, how to identify whether the process of institutionalisation is happening 
largely depends on how an institution is defined.  
The term ‘new institutionalism’ is introduced by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. 
March and Olsen argue that the emphasis on the relative autonomy of political 
institutions should become the basis for theoretical research to help understand 
modern politics (March & Olsen, 1984). They consider ‘formal organisations’ and 
‘institutions of law and bureaucracy’ as the major actors in modern economic and 
political systems, and indicate that there is an increasing literature on legislatures, 
public policymaking, local governments, political entities, nation states and 
corporatism (ibid., pp. 734–735). Although March and Olsen do not have a specific 
definition of ‘institution’, their research has an implication for governmental 
institutions and formal organisations. 
The general definition of ‘institution’ is firstly provided by Douglass North, who 
argues that ‘institutions’ are seen as ‘rules of the game’ of a particular social group, 
or ‘a set of norms’ to shape behaviour in a social space; therefore institution can 
define and condition the choices of individuals (North, 1990, p. 3). North’s definition 
expands the concern of institutionalists to any collective forms that can affect or 
shape individual behaviours, which has inspired research on the impact of such 
collective forms upon political outcomes. 
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Regarding different interests and understanding how institutions matter, there are 
different schools of new institutionalism. Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor firstly 
divide diverse arguments on new institutionalism into historical institutionalism, 
rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
Although they have similar concerns about the impact of institution in political 
processes, the three schools of new institutionalism define ‘institution’ slightly 
differently: 
 Rational choice institutionalism: Rational choice institutionalism research 
arises from the study of American congressional behaviour and pays more 
attention to ‘cross-national coalition behaviour, the development of political 
institutions and the intensity of ethnic conflict’ (Hall & Taylor, ibid., p. 944). 
Moreover, the rule-bound interactions also encourage individuals to form 
formal rules and systems (Rosamond, 2000, p. 115). Therefore, the research 
targets of rational choice institutionalism concentrate on how formal and 
governmental entities emerge from rational calculations of actors on the 
basis of a particular purpose, and examine whether institution can meet that 
purpose. Therefore, institutions will not definitively continue to develop, and 
they are likely to either succeed or fail.  
 Sociological institutionalism: Sociological institutionalism breaks down the 
conceptual divide between ‘institution’ and ‘culture’ and presents the 
broadest definition among the three schools of an ‘institution’. An institution 
is defined to indicate ‘not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the 
symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the 
“frames of meaning” guiding human action’ (Scott, 1994, cited in Hall & 
Taylor, ibid., p. 947). This definition leads sociological institutionalism 
research to focus more attention on the cultural and normative dimensions 
of institutional influence.  
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 Historical institutionalism: Historical institutionalism defines an ‘institution’ 
as ‘formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy’ 
(Hall & Taylor, ibid., p. 938). The definition of an ‘institution’ presented by 
historical institutionalists is a result of compromise between rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, because the importance of 
informal rules is admitted but the definition of institution mainly refers to 
tangible rules or procedures in political systems. 
According to different definitions of ‘institution’, the three new institutionalist 
schools have distinct perspectives in interpreting ‘how institutions matter’. Rational 
choice institutionalists adopt a hypothesis that human behaviour is based on 
strategic and rational calculation, arguing that institutions provide a platform for 
individuals to evaluate the costs and risks of interactions. Accordingly, Hall and 
Taylor conclude four contributions that the theoretical approach of rational choice 
institutionalism has made: giving a set of behavioural assumptions that argue that 
individuals always seek to maximise interests and depend on benefit–cost 
calculations; alleviating collective action dilemmas in politics; shaping the rational 
calculations of individuals by providing information and enforcement mechanisms; 
and explaining how institutions originate from voluntary agreements made by 
individuals (ibid., pp. 944–945).  
Rather than focusing on rational choice thinking, sociological institutionalists 
accentuate the cultural dimensions of an institution and argue that it provides a 
moral and cognitive background against which individuals form ideas and beliefs. 
Hall and Taylor also identified three contributions made by the theoretical 
framework of sociological institutionalism, including redefining ‘culture’ itself as an 
institution, borrowing the notion from social constructivism and then illustrating 
how institutions are able to construct the identities of preferences and interests, and 
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also applying the idea of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘social appropriateness’ to explain the 
origins of and changes to institutions (ibid., pp. 947–950). Taking the concept of 
‘communicative action’ introduced by Jürgen Habermas, a scholar of the Frankfurt 
School, as an example, actions by participators are oriented through their acts of 
understanding, instead of through egocentric calculations of success (Habermas, 
1981, cited in Risse, 2000, p. 9). Accordingly, dialogues between actors can be a basis 
for negotiation in the EU, with progress becoming more likely if actors share a 
common worldview. By stressing the cultural factors behind an institution, 
sociological institutionalism arguments provide an alternative to explain under what 
conditions institutions can maintain long-term developments. 
Historical institutionalists, accepting the concepts suggested by rational choice 
institutionalists and sociological institutionalists, and following historical analyses, 
contend that history is driven by the developments and practices of institutions. The 
idea of ‘path dependence’, which applies the physical notion of ‘inertia’, explains 
why individuals in political processes prefer to follow existing institutions and 
patterns, rather than creating others. This idea is proposed by North to explain how 
the force of ‘inertia’ leads individuals to maintain their participation in an existing 
institution, instead of changing or abolishing it (North, ibid.).   
Paul Pierson develops the idea of ‘path dependence’ to explain why institutional 
development has a persistent characteristic, arguing that the decisions made in the 
past will have a ‘lock-in’ effect upon the choices made in the future, as well as 
locking individuals into a special policy development route (Pierson, 1993, 1996, 
2000). Historical institutionalists also indicate another feature emerging from 
institutional developments, called the ‘unanticipated consequence’. This refers to a 
scenario where ‘the short-term preoccupations of institutional designers have led 
them to make decisions that undermined long-term member-state control’ (Pierson, 
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1996, p. 156). These notions are applied to explain how institutions maintain 
persistent and stable developments through a long-term historical process.  
There are other new institutionalism schools, based on different research concerns. 
Besides those mentioned above, Guy Peters presents another two, namely 
normative institutionalism and empirical institutionalism. The former emphasises the 
normative effect of an institution, while the latter focuses on the impact of 
governmental institutions upon individuals (Peters, 2005). Moreover, there also exist: 
actor-centred institutionalism to supplement current structure-oriented discussions 
(Scharpf, 1997); constructivist institutionalism to explain the innovation, evolution 
and transformation of institutions (Hay, 2008); network institutionalism to examine 
how networks shape stable and recurring patterns of behaviours (Ansell, 2008); and 
feminist institutionalism that emphasises gender factors within institutions (Mackay 
& Waylen, 2009). The arguments of the different new institutionalism schools 
illustrate the variety of dimensions associated with institutions and provide distinct 
understandings about how institutions affect political behaviours and processes.  
In summary, different new institutionalisms share a similar basis, that institution has 
an impact on political processes. Since this thesis concentrates on the influence of 
the institutionalisation process upon the development of EU security and defence 
integration, a theoretical approach which emphasises historical factors and considers 
institutional developments as a persistent and stable process will be a more 
appropriate approach to explain the research targets of this thesis. Accordingly, 
historical institutionalism perspectives which have similar concerns with the impact 
of historical process upon institutional developments are an ideal approach for this 
thesis.  
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2.2.3 The Theoretical Approach of Historical Institutionalism Being 
Applied to Study the EU 
The historical institutionalism approach has been applied to the research of 
European integration and explains why the EU has achieved massive progress on the 
process of institutional developments. As has been argued, institutional 
developments have their own historical path, making it difficult for individuals to 
control or dominate the institutionalisation process. By placing the development of 
European integration in a larger historical environment and considering this 
development as a historical process, a theoretical approach that emphasises 
historical factors may usefully investigate how institutions and institutionalisation 
affect the progress of European integration and the connections between member 
states and EU institutions. Research by Anil Awesti, Simon J. Bumer, J. Jupille and J. A. 
Caporaso, Paul Pierson and Michael E. Smith on this topic has provided the 
inspiration to tackle this study. 
Simon J. Bumer applies a perspective of historical institutionalism and comparative 
public policy to study how the EU shapes the model of governance (Bulmer, 1994). 
He is attracted by the rapid growth of institutions in the EU since the mid-1980s, 
arguing that there is a multi-tiered system emerging in Europe. Bulmer’s research 
offers a framework of governance regimes by analysing policy-specific or sub-system 
levels in the EU. He then classifies the distinction between institutions of governance 
and instruments of governance in the EU in order to distinguish effects that EU 
institutions may have through different institutional mechanisms. By reviewing the 
overall institutional framework of the EU and analysing the diverse features of EU 
institutions, Bulmer’s work confirms that an institutional analysis can appropriately 
be applied to study the EU. 
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Jupille and Caporaso also suggest applying the institutionalism approach to EU 
studies. They distinguish two dimensions of institutional analysis to identify different 
institutionalist approaches in a fourfold classification. Federalism, spatial analysis 
and network approaches are classified in the same category with the focus of 
exogenous institutions and preferences; the rational institutional choice approach 
concerns endogenous institutions but exogenous preferences; the sociological new 
institutionalism argument concerns endogenous preferences but exogenous 
institutions; the structurationism argument considers that both institutions and 
preferences are endogenous (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999). Jupille and Caporaso’s 
research contributes to clarifying different institutionalism approaches by reviewing 
how these approaches define institutions and explain individual behaviours, as well 
as guaranteeing the legitimacy and appropriateness of applying an institutional 
analysis to study the EU. 
Moreover, Anil Awesti applies an institutionalist perspective to explain how 
multi-level governance in the EU challenges inter-governmental policy-making 
(Awesti, 2007). Awesti argues that an analysis of multi-level governance contributes 
to capturing ‘the institution-dependent nature of polycentric governing in the EU’, 
and also views the EU as a political system instead of a process of integration; the 
structure of the EU is therefore considered to be a stable factor in a multi-actor 
environment (ibid, pp. 2, 5). Moreover, he argues that a historical institutionalist 
analysis can contribute to explaining how multi-level governance is derived from a 
process of path dependency, which may deviate from the initial objectives of 
member states (ibid., pp. 14–15). Awesti’s research identifies the presence of 
multi-level governance in the EU and also stresses the significance of an 
institutionalist approach when studying the EU. 
Furthermore, applying the notion of ‘historical’, Pierson also applies a historical 
institutionalism analysis to explain the historical path of development in the EU 
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(Pierson, 1996). He argues that political processes and developments are embedded 
in institutions. Accordingly, he focuses on the long-term consequences of 
institutional developments and considers it difficult for individual actors to control 
the entire institutional evolution. Although Pierson considers that member states are 
usually restrained by path dependence and the unintended consequences of this 
process in the historical development of the EU, especially in the part of the EC, he 
does not deny the role of member states. Actually, Pierson admits that member 
states are still decisive in initiating institutions, but he also highlights the fact that 
the complex agendas of shared decision-making in the EU undermine exclusive 
control of member states. 
Concerning political integration in the EU, Michael E. Smith provides an inspiration to 
understand the process of institutionalisation from the EPC to the CFSP (M. E. Smith, 
2004a, 2004b). By reviewing the development of the EPC becoming CFSP, Michael 
Smith argues that co-operation in the field of foreign affairs has been changed from 
‘a defensive or passive approach’ to ‘a more positive, proactive one’ (ibid., 2004a, pp. 
3–5), and the reason member states agree to break the ‘taboos’ (such as security 
issues) depends on a long-term process of ‘progressive adaptation in the midst of 
continuity’ (ibid., 2004b). By reviewing the process of institutionalisation from the 
EPC to the CFSP, Michael Smith concludes that EU member states become used to 
co-ordinating their foreign policy and taking joint action via policy adaptation of the 
EPC and the CFSP practices (ibid., 2004a, p. 123). Michael Smith’s research examines 
the impact of institutionalisation on the EPC and CFSP, so its analytical framework is 
an important reference to explain how the institutionalisation of European foreign 
policy affects EU member states in tackling common foreign affairs.  
To summarise, the studies mentioned above not only provide a fundamental basis 
for identifying diverse focuses of different institutionalist approaches, but they also 
offer important background knowledge for studying the EU using an institutionalist 
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perspective. In particular, the literature reviewed in this section has identified the 
institutional characteristics of the EU and is fundamental for follow-up studies 
derived from an institutionalist perspective when studying the EU. Although there is 
little literature regarding the affairs of EU security and defence integration, some 
notions and analytical frameworks proposed by the current literature are important 
for this thesis in order to discern the role and impact of EU institutions on this topic. 
2.2.4 A Reflection on the Intergovernmental Perspective to Supplement 
Institutional Analysis Used to Study the EU 
The literature on new institutionalism provides a distinct perspective for researchers 
to consider how institutional dimensions affect individual behaviours and political 
outcomes, and indeed institutional actors sometimes have superior influence in 
some policy areas in the EU, especially in Community affairs. However, in the field of 
security and defence affairs, or regarding internal issues of member states, EU 
supranational actors do not have much capacity to intervene. Because this thesis 
investigates the developments of EU security and defence integration where 
member states are maintaining rather independent sovereignty to conduct the 
process of institutional developments and policy-making, intergovernmental factors 
shall be taken into account.  
The most notable concern of intergovernmentalists about the development of the 
EU comes from the liberal intergovernmentalist Andrew Moravcsik. In arguing states 
are actors and are rational, Moravcsik considers that European integration is a result 
of a series of rational choices by member states (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, 
pp. 68–69). He also argues that the reason states create an institution is based on 
the consideration of a rational choice about whether an institution can contribute to 
reaching a ‘collectively superior outcome’ and reducing uncertainty in the 
behaviours and preferences of states in the future (ibid., p. 72). Since an institution 
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can provide an ‘information-rich’ environment to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with transnational co-operation, states will voluntarily participate in 
intergovernmental bargaining (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 498).  
Therefore, Moravcsik does not deny the importance of institution since institution is 
a result of rational choice by member states, and even admits historical 
institutionalism can validly explain the occurrence of unintended consequences 
(Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, ibid., p.75). Although intergovernmentalism and 
institutionalism may be considered to be impossibly united (Puchala, 1999, p. 330), 
Moravcsik argues that it is still possible to synthesise the liberal institutionalism and 
historical institutionalism arguments, since both of them share rationalist 
foundations and historical institutionalism can be an extension of liberal 
institutionalism rather than an alternative to it (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, ibid., p. 
84). This perspective is supported in another way by Michael Smith when he argues 
that intergovernmentalism should be supplemented by insights into institutionalism 
(M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 64). 
Indeed, intergovernmentalism and institutionalism perspectives can emphasise 
different dimensions of the EU and should be supplementary to each other. For 
example, Wolfgang Wagner applies an institutionalist perspective to explain the 
intergovernmental framework of the CFSP (Wagner, 2003). He argues that because 
the CFSP field involves co-ordination and co-operation among member states, there 
is little need for a supranational institutional framework; on the contrary, an 
intergovernmental framework with qualified majority voting is more acceptable for 
the purpose. Moreover, placing European integration within a long-term historical 
process, Wagner presents how member states share authority with EU supranational 
actors in order to gain benefits from collective actions and common policies.  
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To understand developments in EU security and defence integration, both 
institutional and intergovernmental factors are crucial to help explain this process 
and its impact. By introducing and reviewing literature on new institutionalism and 
liberal intergovernmentalism focusing on the EU, a theoretical analytical background 
for this thesis may be provided. 
 
2.3 Approaching Security and Defence Integration in the EU 
The literature review in this section aims to understand how current studies define 
developments in European common security and defence policy and whether the 
experiences of learning from the past before the establishment of the ESDP offer 
insights into the developments of the ESDP and CSDP. Since European countries do 
not follow the neo-realist John J. Mearsheimer’s prediction about viewing each other 
as threats which hinder the progress of co-operation after the end of the Cold War 
(Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 47-48), but accelerate the expansion of the EU to more 
political affairs, including security, it is sensible to clarify the factors that drive this 
process. This will contribute to building an analytical framework and to exploring the 
empirical background to explain the long-term historical developments associated 
with EU security and defence integration. 
The literature review in this section will undertake three issues in turn: (1) how 
current literature investigates how an initial institutionalised framework for EU 
security and defence integration has been built since the establishment of the CFSP; 
(2) how relevant research examines the attempt of the EU to consolidate a common 
security and defence policy; and (3) how these studies evaluate the impact of the 
ESDP/CSDP. The literature review provides a more factual picture for understanding 
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the historical trajectory associated with developing security and defence integration 
of the EU. 
2.3.1 Understanding the External Ambition of the EU via the Formation of 
the CFSP 
Studies regarding the political integration of the EU have increased gradually in line 
with the institutional developments of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP, seeing significant 
progress since the 1990s. Besides Michael E. Smith’s work mentioned above, 
Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan also introduce the overall historical 
developments and institutional frameworks of the CFSP and argue that the CFSP has 
built a multi-pillar and multilevel system with complicated multilocational networks 
to connect member states and EU institutions (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). 
John Peterson and Helene Sjursen collect critical perspectives to examine whether 
the CFSP is able to underpin the EU so as to be a global actor (Peterson & Sjursen, 
1998a). Although, since the establishment of the ESDP in 1999, the EU has gradually 
strengthened security and defence dimensions, some of their perspectives are still 
valid for explaining the shortfall of the CSDP. For example, the notion of a 
capabilities–expectations gap, proposed by Christopher Hill (1998) and developed by 
John Peterson (1998) in this book, still exists in the CSDP today and hinders the EU 
from tackling military and defence issues. In the Conclusion chapter, although 
Sjursen argues that the CFSP may become ‘a pivotal dimension’ in which member 
states of the EU can define foreign policies, Peterson indicates that none of the 
authors in this book considers the EU has a ‘truly common or comprehensive foreign 
policy’ (Peterson & Sjursen, 1998b, pp. 169, 178–179). Take the crisis in Libya as an 
example. Because the EU was unable to form a coherent position about whether to 
intervene militarily, it showed that, even with a more institutionalised framework of 
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the CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty, sometimes EU member states are still unable to 
overcome divergences.  
Regarding the criticism that the EU is unable to speak with one voice, David Allen 
argues that the biggest obstruction comes from member states because they intend 
to preserve their authority in making foreign policy (Allen, 1998). Moreover, Sjursen 
argues that owing to internal divisions, and a lack of commitment towards additional 
defence budgets and concerning the relationship with America, EU member states 
do not have a strong political will to develop a security and defence policy for the EU 
(Sjursen, 1998). Although these perspectives were proposed in 1998, the problems 
identified still remain unresolved in the CSDP today. It is because member states still 
reserve rather independence to take part in the CSDP. Besides, EU countries are not 
willing to increase defence spending, especially when the Eurozone crisis was 
emerging. Moreover, the transatlantic alliance is still a crucial factor affecting the 
development of military capabilities of the EU. 
Elke Krahmann, Hylke Dukstra and Stephan Keukeleire’s studies concern the more 
specific institutional dimension of the CFSP. Concerning the multi-centric 
decision-making process emerging from the establishment of the CFSP and the 
possibility of developing a multi-level theory, Krahmann examines different 
multi-level approaches to studying European foreign policy (Krahmann, 2003). This 
research offers a quantitative measurement of political pressure in order to theorise 
the multilevel network approach when studying European foreign policy. By 
concentrating on the inter-institutional relations between the Commission and the 
EU Council Secretariat, Dukstra argues that although the overall relationship 
between the two institutions is co-operative, the differences between them 
inevitably undermine the consistency and effectiveness of the EU to cope with 
foreign affairs (Dukstra, 2009). Moreover, Keukeleire reviews different aspects of EU 
diplomacy and argues that the establishment of the ESDP is important to achieve an 
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effective and credible foreign policy structure (Keukeleire, 2003). All these studies 
support a more institutionalised framework if the EU attempts to strengthen security 
and defence dimensions in common policies.  
2.3.2 Interpreting the Security Role of the EU 
There are some studies that focus more specifically on the development of the ESDP, 
and raise concerns about how the EU develops a military role and how we should 
evaluate this role. Regarding the development of a military role for the EU, Anthony 
King reviews armed forces interactions between Britain, France and Germany and 
the EU, using a constructivist perspective to argue that a common European military 
culture is emerging (King, 2006). King argues that by participating in ESDP missions, 
member states can form common views of a threat and enhance collective will (King, 
2005). However, the Libya case signifies that only if member states have common 
political will towards the same issue would a CSDP mission be launched.  
Regarding whether the EU will develop an ethnic discourse to support the ambition 
of developing common security and defence, Alyson J. K. Bailes suggests that instead 
of adorning itself with too much normative motivation, the EU should have a more 
blunt determination and become a real collective defence community (Bailes, 2008). 
However, member states may not be ready to adopt a strong military role for the EU. 
For example, Tommi Koivula considers that the development of crisis management 
capability inevitably enhances a military ethos of the EU, but member states are not 
fully committed to such a role; therefore, progress in strengthening the military 
dimension of the ESDP has been limited (Koivula, 2009).  
Anne Deighton agrees that the development of a military role in the EU requires an 
appropriate culture and institutions, but she also considers that such developments 
largely depend on the political will of member states and the attitude of America 
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(Deighton, 2002). Simon Duke has an even more critical attitude towards the 
development of the ESDP. Reviewing the unsuccessful experiences of the EDC, 
Fouchet Plan and the WEU, Duke discusses the diversity of national industries, 
strategic orientations between member states and unavoidable pressure from 
America, with the EU being unlikely to achieve its ambition of developing 
autonomous security and defence capabilities (Duke, 2000).  
Although whether to strengthen the military dimension of common security and 
defence policy in the EU is still controversial, most studies admit the necessity for 
shaping a more definite security strategy for such policy.  
Regarding the possibility of the EU shaping a security strategy, there are popular 
discussions in the current literature. Sven Biship and Jan Joel Andersson amass 
perspectives to examine how the European Security Strategy (ESS, published by the 
Council in 2003) would assist the EU to tackle new security challenges in a new 
security environment (Bishop & Andersson, 2008). The ESS is considered to help 
codify the strategic orientation of the ESDP/CSDP (Bishop, 2008a), enable the EU to 
define new security threats and enhance a security role (Haine, 2008), support the 
EU to achieve effective multilateralism in the UN (Gowan, 2008), and underpin the 
neighbourhood policy of the EU (Danneruther, 2008). Also, the ESS would form a 
crucial basis for the EU to develop military capabilities (Howorth, 2008) and a 
common framework through which to negotiate strategic issues with other countries 
or organisations (Andersson, 2008).  
Although the ESS envisages comprehensive elements that the EU requires to develop 
an effective and efficient ESDP/CSDP, there are few shortfalls in the ESS. For example, 
the suggestion for the development of strategic partnerships with Japan, China, 
Canada and India does not make sense (Menotti & Francesca, 2008) and the ESS 
does not provide mechanisms to improve a more co-ordinated transatlantic 
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relationship (Kelleher, 2008). Moreover, Asle Toje indicates that the EU is putting by 
its ambition of being a great power and returning to multilateralism by reviewing the 
Report on Implementing the ESS (published by the Council in 2008) (Toje, 2010).  
Nevertheless, the necessity for and the possibility of developing a consolidated 
security strategic culture still exist. It is argued that because the EU is firming up its 
crisis management core via the CSDP, the convergence of military institutions of 
member states is emerging even though member states still have different national 
strategic cultures (Vennesson, Breuer, Franco & Schroeder, 2009). By offering a 
comprehensive introduction to the origin, institutional framework and achievements 
of the ESDP, Jolyon Howorth also considers that the EU could potentially shape a 
strategic culture via the ESDP because such a strategic culture enables supporting 
the EU to define and tackle challenges (Howorth, 2007).  
Besides the military dimension, there are few discussions regarding the civilian 
dimensions of the CSDP. Developing a civilian dimension in the ESDP and CSDP is a 
distinctive feature of the EU, but Karen E. Smith argues that the EU will not be called 
a civilian power only because it has civilian instruments to fulfil common security and 
defence policy; therefore, she considers that the focus will be on what the EU does 
instead of what the EU is (K. E. Smith, 2000, 2005). Actually, the EU is working on 
co-ordinating military and civilian dimensions in the CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty, 
although divergences between member states are still difficult to overcome (Aldis & 
Drent, 2008). Concerning how the EU undertakes crisis management via civil–military 
co-ordination after the Lisbon Treaty, Nick Hynek considers that the Lisbon Treaty 
has provided an effective decision-making procedure and steady leadership for 
implementing the CSDP; however, he nevertheless admits the political will of 
member states is still the most crucial factor in implementing this system (Hynek, 
2011). 
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According to the literature review in this section, we can conclude that the lack of 
political will and the diversity of national interests among member states are the two 
main factors that hinder the EU from forming a coherent common security and 
defence policy. Although most the literature affirms the emergence of a security 
strategy or a strategic culture in the EU, via the ESDP or the CSDP, there are 
competing perspectives on whether the EU should continue to enhance its military 
role.  
2.3.3 Considering the CSDP and the Transatlantic Relationship 
The transatlantic relationship occupies an important dimension for European 
countries when they are considering developing self-security capabilities. American 
military protection and NATO provided an indispensable assurance for Europe during 
the Cold War and still have an important role in maintaining security and stability in 
the world. As a result, developing self-security capabilities in Europe will unavoidably 
raise concern about whether this determination affects American willingness to 
defend Europe. As a result, it is also important to take NATO and America issues into 
consideration in studying EU security and defence integration. 
Literature regarding the EU and NATO is abundant. Robert E. Hunter, serving as a US 
ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998, provides a personal suggestion that the US 
government should have a more positive attitude towards the ESDP because a close 
US–EU relationship will contribute to founding NATO–ESDP co-operation and 
developing a strategic partnership (Hunter, 2002). Rockwell A. Schnabel also applies 
his empirical experience of being the US Ambassador to the EU from 2001 to 2005, 
suggesting that Americans pay more attention to the development of the CFSP and 
ESDP, even though he also calls for more burden-sharing from the EU to defend 
Europe (Schnabel & Rocca, 2005).  
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Similarly, Alexander Moens also considers a co-operative relationship between the 
EU and NATO is possible. Applying a governance perspective, Moens evaluates the 
impact of the ESDP upon EU–NATO relations and suggests that these two institutions 
have to tackle some procedures, including decision-making procedures, rules for 
planning and operations, and the allocation of shared assets, in order to achieve 
good governance for both NATO and the EU (Moens, 2001).  
Other studies share the perspective that the EU will develop more credible capability 
to enhance the transatlantic alliance (d'Argenson, 2009; Gompert & Larrabee, 1997; 
Hensel, 2000; S. Hoffmann, 2009; Kagan, 2003). Although Howorth argues that the 
debate on ‘out of area’ missions by NATO and the development of military forces for 
the EU may inevitably result in tensions between America and Europe (Howorth, 
2003), Bishop maintains that this will not be a zero-sum result since America will 
have a more capable partner with which to share its burden, which it has demanded 
for a long time (Bishop, 2008b).  
Regarding the EU’s problem of low deployability of ESDP missions, Bishop also 
suggests that the EU should have a defence transformation via ‘Permanent 
Structured Cooperation’, an achievement that could also become an EU pillar 
underpinning NATO (Bishop, ibid.). Actually, the lack of military capability and 
sufficient contributions to defence budgets has been complained about by the 
former US Secretary of Defence Roberts Gates. By arguing that only five out of 
twenty eight member states in NATO (America, Britain, France, Greece and Albania) 
exceed the agreed 2.0 per cent of GDP spending on defence, Gates has called for 
European countries to resolve this issue of lacking will and defence spending on 
developing military capabilities (Gates, 2011). Indeed, if the EU has an ambition to be 
capable of coping with security and defence affairs in the international scene, it will 
have to make corresponding contributions to defence budgets. 
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In summary, most studies agree on the significance of such an effort, and consider 
that the development of common security and defence policy should contribute to a 
more balanced transatlantic partnership between Europe and America. As a result, 
the CSDP should be considered a positive stimulus to the transatlantic alliance and 
support for NATO. 
 
2.4 Evaluating the Participation of Member States  
Since the EPC, CFSP, ESDP and CSDP are all developed on an intergovernmental basis, 
it is crucial to understand how EU member states participate in this process and how 
they conduct and shape such developments. As this thesis has selected Britain and 
Germany as case studies, the literature review in this section will focus especially on 
British and German roles on this topic. 
2.4.1 The Issue of Member States Developing the CFSP and CSDP 
Discussions of the role of member states in the ESDP or CSDP largely concentrate on 
the relations between Britain, France and Germany, especially on the 
Franco-German axis and British–French co-operation. This is not only because Britain, 
France and Germany are the three major powers in world economic and political 
affairs but also because they are the largest contributors to EU expenditure. It is 
recognised that if these three countries can co-operate with each other on the 
implementation of common security and defence policy, the EU can become more 
capable of tackling relevant affairs (Hynek, 2011; King, 2005). However, it is worth 
noting that Germany is usually criticised for its spending of a low percentage of its 
GDP on defence budgets. Since the mid-1990s, Germany has not spent over 2.0 per 
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cent of its annual GDP on defence, which is the NATO target; in 2010, Germany only 
spent 1.4 per cent of its annual GDP on defence, while Britain spent 2.7 per cent and 
France 2.0 per cent (Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries 1990–2010, in NATO 
Archive, 2011). A noticeable difference is that the latter two are above the NATO 
target. This demonstrates that although all three countries are important 
contributors to EU budgets, Germany does not have as strong a commitment as 
Britain and France to defence. This difference will be taken into consideration 
concerning German participation in security and defence integration in the EU.  
Concerning the indispensable role of the three countries in European integration, 
Frederic Merand investigates how military officers in Britain, France and Germany 
view the development of European defence capabilities, concluding that their 
opinions are important factors supporting the development of European armed 
forces (Merand, 2003). Although Josef Janning argues that Britain, France and 
Germany can be a core coalition to promote common defence in the EU (Janning, 
2005), there is not much evidence that the current Conservative–Lib Dem coalition 
Government in Britain is interested in such a coalition. Regarding this, Charlotte 
Wagnsson challenges the idea of ‘the EU being a normative power’, arguing that 
because the major European powers have strong individual ambitions, the EU has 
difficulty taking rapid and concerted actions during international crises (Wagnsson, 
2010). 
Some studies have focused on the Franco–German axis (Bloch-Laine, 1999; Cole, 
2001; Endow, 2003; Mazzucelli, 1997; Pedersen, 1998; Schild, 2010; Treacher, 2002) 
and Franco–British co-operation (Chafer & Cumming, 2010; M. Clarke, 2000; 
Howorth, 2000a; Larsen, 1997). They evaluate the influence of these two 
co-operative coalitions concerning progress on developing security and defence 
capabilities in the EU. By and large, attention to the Franco–German axis comes from 
the long-term partnership of the two countries in driving European integration; 
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meanwhile, concern about British–French co-operation derives from the 1998 St 
Malo declaration that formed a basis for creating the ESDP. 
Moreover, there is concern about the specific role of Nordic countries in contributing 
to the civilian dimension of common security and defence policy. Alyson Bailes, 
Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius provide a comprehensive investigation into the 
security role of Denmark, Finland and Sweden in Europe and how Nordic countries 
have contributed to developing capabilities for civilian crisis management and 
peace-building, and implementing such operations (Bailes, Herolf, & Sundelius, 2006). 
Peter Jakobsen also challenges the argument that Britain, France and Germany 
control the development of common security and defence policy in the EU, arguing 
that Nordic countries play a significant role in setting agendas, shaping concepts and 
making large contributions to the ESDP’s civilian missions (Jakobsen, 2009). Their 
research offers an alternative perspective on how small member states affect the 
development and implementation of common security and defence policy in the EU. 
Compared to the Franco–German axis, British–French co-operation and the Nordic 
role in the ESDP and CSDP, the British–German relationship is more or less ignored. 
This is because traditionally Britain and Germany have different approaches towards 
European integration and security issues, with the connections between them not 
being that strong. Although policy connections between these two countries 
regarding the issues of European security have been indicated before (Glee, 1999; 
Knowles & Thomson-Pottenohm, 2004; Norman, 2004; Schweiger, 2004, 2007, pp. 
81–166), since the ‘War on Terror’ against Iraq, their divergences have become more 
obvious than their convergences, especially on the issue of military intervention in 
Libya. 
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2.4.2 The British Role in European Integration 
Britain is usually described as an ‘awkward partner’ in European integration. 
Although Hugo Young has conducted a historical investigation ranging from Winston 
Churchill to Tony Blair to explain how Britain perceives Europe, predicting that 
Britain will inevitably adopt the reality of aligning with European countries (H. Young, 
1999), Britain still cannot get rid of the image of being ‘reluctant’, ‘awkward’ and 
‘semi-detached’ in the EU. Andrew Geddes also investigates Britain’s overall 
historical processes of integrating with the EU, pointing out that owing to the 
geopolitical position of the British Isles, the tradition of maintaining a balanced 
foreign policy, the emergence of the Cold War and the nationalisation programme 
for British industries in the early 1950s, Britain did not want supranational 
integration in Europe at the beginning (Geddes, 2004).  
There are more studies regarding the reasons behind British European policy. 
Stephen Wall argues that the different personalities of British prime ministers are a 
crucial factor influencing how Britain defines its EU policies (Wall, 2008). Andrew 
Gamble contends that open markets, liberal foreign trade and the special 
relationship with America are core values that determine British foreign policy, with 
these traditions also affecting British attitudes towards European integration 
(Gamble, 1998). By investigating domestic politics disputes over national sovereignty 
and European issues, Steve Ludlam (1998) and David Baker and David Seawright 
(1998) explain how the Conservative Party and the Labour Party have tackled the 
British role in European integration.  
Some studies illustrate the impact of EU mechanisms upon the domestic political 
system in Britain. Colin Pilkington investigates how EC and EU legislation has 
changed the British Constitution and decision-making process on subjects such as 
agriculture, farming, the environment and certain social issues (Pilkington, 2001). Ian 
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Bache and Andrew Jordan also review some works regarding the occurrence of 
Europeanisation in British domestic politics (Bache & Jordan, 2006), including 
examining how involvement in European integration has impacted upon the way the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) operates (Allen & Oliver, 2006a) and 
illustrating why Europeanisation does not change the British stance against the 
supranational integration of foreign affairs (Allen & Oliver, 2006b).  
On the basis of a concern that Britain should drive defence co-operation in the EU, 
Clara Marina O'Donnell considers that such co-operation will help Britain achieve 
‘cost-effectiveness of its defence procurement’ and make Europe become a more 
serious partner for an Atlantic alliance (O'Donnell, 2009). O'Donnell, although 
indicating that the present Conservative–Lib Dem Government is more interested in 
enhancing bilateral co-operation with France than with the whole Union because 
Britain and France have similar defence budgets and military ambitions (2010a, 
2010c), also warns that this intention may undermine the efforts of the EU on 
defence (2010b). 
These competitive perspectives provide various interpretations of British European 
policy and the British role in European integration. Although traditionally Britain is 
considered a reluctant or awkward partner in Europe, the results of current studies 
also demonstrate that it is in Britain’s interests to enhance defence and military 
co-operation with European countries. No matter whether Britain adopts bilateral 
co-operation with specific European countries or an integrationist perspective to be 
more engaged in the CSDP, Britain at least aspires to seek a common approach to 
security and defence co-operation with Europe. 
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2.4.3 The German Role in European Integration 
Compared to Britain, Germany is a much more engaged partner in European 
integration. Even after reunification, Germany still maintains its commitment to 
European integration. How to cope with Germany after WWII was a difficult issue, 
especially when confrontation between the US and USSR was escalating, when the 
task of reintegrating Germany into the West became more urgent. Clemens Wurm 
therefore reviews comprehensive illustrations of how Germany re-entered the West 
and took part in early European integration (Wurm, 1995c).  
Wurm indicates that the ‘German problem’ and ‘the role of France’ were the two 
main factors launching early European integration (Wurm, 1995a). Werner 
Abelshauser goes a step further, analysing how the ‘German problem’ drove early 
European integration, arguing that German participation in the EEC was a result of a 
political calculation rather than an economic consideration (Abelshauser, 1995). 
Furthermore, Hanns Jurgen Kusters considers participation in early European 
integration as a means of getting rid of external controls, getting sovereignty back 
and regaining international recognition (Kusters, 1995). These discussions illustrate 
the situation that Germany had to face after WWII and explain the options that 
Germany had in response to the situation. 
German reunification is another issue impacting upon the development of European 
integration. By reviewing Helmut Kohl’s foreign policy, Thomas Banchoff explains 
that because of the historical experience of WWII, German Chancellor Kohl viewed 
European integration as a question of war and peace, believing that Germany has a 
common fate with Europe. Banchoff also argues that, through expressing loyalty to 
European integration, Germany was enabled to make assurances to other countries 
that it would not become a threat to Europe (Banchoff, 1997). As a result, we can 
conclude that institution here is not only a dependent variable but also an 
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independent variable. On the one hand, it is utilised by Germany as a means to 
decrease objections against German reunification, while on the other, it embeds 
Germany in the framework of European integration.  
Douglas Webber also attempts to explain the reason why Germany has kept its 
commitment to European unity after reunification. He indicates that five constant 
features can be discerned in German foreign policy: a peaceful and democratic 
inclination; a multilateralist attitude; being friendly to the neighbourhood; insisting 
on a democratic republic-based government; and being integrated into numerous 
alliances, regional and international organisations (Webber, 2001). These features 
formed a basic foundation underpinning the engagement of a reunited Germany 
with European integration.  
Certain studies focus on the German policy towards military affairs and the 
development of the CFSP and CSDP. Adrian Hyde-Price considers that the Schröder 
Government utilised the opportunities arising from the 11 September 2001 attacks 
to ‘normalise’ the use of forces (Hyde-Price, 2003); however, by examining the 
attitudes of Britain, France, Germany and Poland on the use of force, he also 
indicates that Germany is still content to be a civilian power (2004). In order to build 
a balanced, multipolar order in the world, Hyde-Price suggests that Germany should 
exert appropriate influence consistent with its power capabilities (2007).  
By comparing the competitive perspectives of Denmark, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, Bernhard Stahl, Henning Boekle, Jorg Nadoll and Anna Jonannesdottir 
classify Germany as Europeanist, and with a more engaged attitude towards 
developing the CFSP (Stahl, Boekle, Nadoll & Jonannesdottir, 2004). That, as these 
authors indicate, the German public was sensitive about developing a military role is 
an issue which still today hinders German governments from accepting larger 
involvement in military operations. 
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Although Marco Overhaus argues that Germany is deviating from being a civilian 
power because of its offering support to create a European Rapid Reaction Force 
(ERRF) when holding the EU presidency and supporting the War on Terror against 
Afghanistan, and that Germany has expressed enthusiasm over the pursuit of 
national interests (Overhaus, 2004), Adrian Hyde-Price (2001) and Hanns W. Maull 
(2000a, 2000b) consider that Germany has not changed its stance on foreign policy 
fundamentally. Examining German participation in military combat operations by 
NATO in Kosovo, they argue that such participation should be viewed as a 
transformation into a normal civilian power instead of developing a robust military 
role. 
Concerning the German policy in the recent Libyan crisis, Hans Kundnani argues that 
Germany has transformed itself into a geo-economic power that is reluctant to use 
military force, but does pursue national interests using its significant economic 
influence (Kundnani, 2011). However, Thomas Valasek offers a different insight by 
arguing that German policy in the Libyan crisis is an aberration because it originates 
out of a domestic concern with regional elections in Germany in March 2011. Since 
America has announced it will place more emphasis on Asia and the Middle East 
than Europe, Valasek considers that Germany should and will be more engaged in 
military co-operation in Europe (Valasek, 2012).  
The current literature demonstrates that although Germany is engaged in European 
integration, it is not committed enough to develop a military CSDP. As has been 
mentioned, German defence spending has not reached the NATO target of spending 
at least 2 per cent of annual GDP on defence since the mid-1990s, which signifies 
that Germany does not have much interest in building up military capabilities. 
However, since Germany is trying to transform its armed forces to become more 
professional and modern, it is possible to close the gap between capability and 
political will. Since July 2011, Germany ended the conscription and compulsory 
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military services and has transformed its armed forces to professional soldiers, and 
the Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg of the Merkel Government 
considered that this reform is necessary to cope with new threats and offer 
well-trained and -educated troops for international peacekeeping missions 
(Dempsey, 2010). Although it is too early to assert that Germany is committed to a 
stronger military ambition or becoming a leading power in military affairs, this 
structural reform of the military system at least is closing the gap so as to fulfil 
Germany’s military pledge on international peacekeeping missions. Being one of the 
leading countries in European integration, German attitude towards security and 
defence integration in the EU will inevitably affect whether the EU is able to develop 
rapid and concerted mechanisms and respond to international crises. 
2.4.4 Britain and Germany in Common Security and Defence Policy in the 
EU: Convergence or Divergence? 
According to the survey conducted by Edward Turner and Simon Green, research 
concerning the relationship between Britain and Germany largely concentrates on 
social, fiscal and environmental policies (Turner & Green, 2007); only few studies on 
the British–German relationship in the CFSP and ESDP. 
Generally speaking, the literature concerning the British–German relationship in 
common security and defence policy can be divided into two perspectives; one 
considers possible convergence between them, while the other focuses on their 
divergence. The argument for possible convergence between Britain and Germany 
was almost made before the effect of the ‘War on Terror’ against Iraq upon the EU 
and the transatlantic relationship (Bulmer, Jeffery, & Paterson, 2000; Glees, 1999). 
Even though their arguments do not explain the current British–German relationship, 
they offer the insight that under favourable conditions these two countries could 
enjoy close co-operation.  
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Although Christian Schweiger considered that a British–German working partnership 
might possibly become the alternative leadership system in the EU (2007, pp. 137–
150), since Tony Blair chose to stand with America on the War on Terror against Iraq, 
Britain has distanced itself from the EU again. This development corresponds to 
Schweiger’s concern that the inclination of Britain towards America after the Iraq 
crisis may have undermined the foundation of possible British–German co-operation 
(2004). 
On the other hand, as Britain chose to stand with America on the war in Iraq, the 
divergence between Britain and Germany, or the EU, has become more marked. 
Kerry Longhurst and Alister Miskimmon argue that the different responses of Britain 
and Germany to 11 September 2001, Afghanistan and Iraq not only demonstrate 
divergence on these issues but also reflect the different strategic cultures behind 
them (Longhurst & Miskimmon, 2007). Moreover, although the special relationship 
between America and Britain is perceived to be more important from the British 
perspective than from the American side (Dumbrell, 2006, 2009), concern about this 
special relationship inevitably affects British foreign policy towards the EU, as well as 
the traditional friendship between France and Germany, making the British–German 
relationship more complicated (Longhurst & Miskimmon, ibid.).  
Two recent issues may increase the divergences between Britain and Germany. 
Concerning the Libyan crisis, Germany clearly still has a different strategic culture 
from Britain and France, with Germany finding it difficult to join the British–French 
military ‘avant-garde’ (Grant, 2011c). Besides, concerning the Eurozone crisis, the 
rejection by the Cameron Government of a new fiscal compact may have resulted in 
a more isolated status for Britain in the EU (Grant, 2011a). These two issues illustrate 
that in both military and economic areas, Britain and Germany are more divergent 
than convergent. 
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In summary, since Britain chose to stand with America on the War on Terror and 
implemented ‘liberal interventionism’, declared by Blair in Chicago in 1999, which 
aimed to protect human values via military intervention (see Ch. 4 for more 
discussions), the divergence between Britain and Germany has gradually become 
more apparent, not only because Britain and Germany have different strategic 
cultures and priorities to resolve security issues but also because Britain has 
distanced itself from Europe again. This isolation has become more serious in the 
Cameron Government. Therefore, at present, there is no evidence showing that 
Britain and Germany can work together to develop the CSDP or enhance military 
co-operation. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The literature review in this thesis investigates how the current studies resolve three 
issues: (1) defining institution and institutionalisation, (2) understanding the 
development of EU security and defence integration, and (3) evaluating the role of 
member states in this process.  
Derived from the notions of institution and institutionalisation, the literature review 
has compared diverse definitions from different schools of new institutionalism, 
especially historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism. By accepting a compromise position between rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalists define 
institutions as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions, with 
this definition providing an appropriate context for this thesis to tackle relevant 
issues.  
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Moreover, historical institutionalists introduced the idea of path dependence and 
unanticipated consequences, which will contribute to exploring how long-term 
historical processes impact upon the behaviours of individuals. However, the 
perspective of intergovernmentalists cannot be ignored. This thesis argues that 
intergovernmental and institutional factors are not totally contradictory. Especially 
in the field of the CSDP, because it not only maintains the intergovernmental 
decision-making process but has also gradually formed an institutionalised 
framework, it is important to take both the perspectives of institutionalism and 
intergovernmentalism into consideration. 
As regards understanding the development of the ESDP and CSDP, although there 
are suspicions in terms of a consistent common security and defence policy in the EU, 
coherence is gradually enhanced through the institutionalisation process. The 
imbalances between expectations and capabilities have been improved since the 
establishment of the ESDP in 1999. Most studies also agree on the significance of 
such efforts and consider that the current development of the CSDP should 
contribute to a more balanced transatlantic partnership between Europe and 
America. However, the lack of political will and diversity of national interests among 
member states still hinder the EU from shaping a real coherent CSDP. 
The literature review on British and German roles shows that these two countries 
have quite different attitudes towards European integration and also EU security and 
defence integration. Regarding the general direction towards European integration, 
Germany is much more committed than Britain; however, concerning the 
development of a military role for the EU, Germany is hesitant about playing an 
eminent role. These differences definitely affect these countries’ political will in the 
development of EU security and defence integration. Therefore, it is important to 
examine whether these differences are fundamental and difficult to overcome, or 
whether it is possible to find a compromise between them.  
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The literature review offers a comprehensive illustration, comparison and evaluation 
of the achievements of current studies and underpins the theoretical and empirical 
background of this thesis. The next chapter will start to review the historical process 
of building an institutionalised framework for EU security and defence integration, 
and then present how the institutionalisation process in this policy area has 
emerged. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
A Historical Path of Institutional 
Development for Security and Defence 
Integration in Europe 
3.1 Introduction 
As Mark Aspinwall and Gerald Schnider have argued, institutions can shape political 
actions and consequences instead of merely mirroring social activities and rational 
competitions among different actors (Aspinwall & Schnider, 2001, p. 2). Also, 
institutions are considered to support actors to achieve collective purposes and 
better ends (Peters, 2005, p. 5). Accordingly, institutional arrangements are 
supposed to contribute to offering a reliable environment for actors to consolidate 
relations and also provide applicable instruments and measures for them to stabilise 
co-operation. Regarding the initiative to drive European integration in the 1950s’, it 
aimed to establish an institutional framework in order to achieve a collective 
objective, which was peace.  
Since then, institutions have provided a stable environment for European integration 
to make progress. More specifically, the EU has been described as an area of 
high-institutionalisation (Choi & Caporaso, 2002, pp. 492-493; Gourevitch, 2002, p. 
309), and treaties also provide frameworks to define how institutions work and how 
member states interact within these frameworks (Rosamond, 2010, p. 109).  
Because institutions and the institutionalisation process affect the development of 
European integration and embed member states within these frameworks, it is 
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important to understand how this historical process emerged and how and why 
specific frameworks were chosen for different policy areas. Especially regarding the 
research topic of this thesis, it is important to explore why an institutional and also 
an intergovernmental framework has been chosen for security and defence 
integration in the EU.  
European integration originated from the aspiration to rebuild peace in Europe. 
There were two main arguments proposed for this purpose. One was based on the 
idea of federalism and aimed to establish a federal Europe (Middleton, 1969); 
therefore, surrendering all sovereignty to a supranational institution should be 
acceptable. Accordingly, the process of European integration could be a top-down 
process and directed by a supranational organisation (Harrison, 1974, pp. 44–45; 
Pistone, 1998, pp. 85–92, cited in Rosamond, 2000, pp. 23–31).  
The other argument was based on the idea of functionalism and accepted a partial 
limitation to the exercise of sovereignty vis-à-vis a supranational authority by arguing 
that the process of European integration should go through functional and technical 
co-operation in order to reach consensus for further integration (Mitrany, 1966, 
1975, cited in Rosamond, 2000, pp. 31–42). Therefore, European integration should 
be a bottom-up process; also, people might shift loyalty from nation states to 
functional organisations (Taylor, 1990, pp. 125–138). These discussions inspired 
certain proposals for reconstructing post-war peace in Europe and had been applied 
to the ECSC and economic integration. 
Security and defence integration is more difficult to achieve because it is more likely 
to involve national sovereignty and ‘high politics’ issues that are sensitive for nation 
states. Therefore, before the launch of the EPC, integration in the EC was mainly 
concentrated on economic affairs. Even in the EPC, it did not involve substantial 
security or defence issues, although it did provide a crucial basis for the 
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development of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the 
EU has attempted to develop an institutionalised framework for common foreign 
and security policy; moreover, from the establishment of the ESDP in 1999, a more 
specific focus has been placed on developing common security and defence in the 
EU. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that a series of treaty reforms from the mid-1990s to 
the Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the development of a more institutionalised CSDP, it 
has not changed the intergovernmental nature of this policy area. EU member states 
are usually reluctant to render competence for supranational actors to intervene in 
the CSDP. However, this framework is an important foundation for co-operation 
between member states. At least in the field of common foreign policy, it is 
considered that EU member states have adopted a more positive and proactive 
approach (M. E. Smith, 2004a, 2004b). Although the CSDP is a relatively new policy 
area in the EU, it is related to a long-term historical process taking place since the 
failure of the EDC, and this historical process nevertheless contributes to shaping the 
institutionalisation process of EU security and defence policy. 
This chapter will review the historical process of developing security and defence 
integration by the EU member states, from the very first initiative of the EDC to the 
latest developments in the Lisbon Treaty, and then find out the implications of 
institutional and intergovernmental factors in this process. The EDC is not ignored, 
because it was a major attempt to institutionalise security and defence at the 
supranational level, although it was not approved by the French Parliament. The 
investigation of the history of building an institutionalised framework for security 
and defence integration is expected to clarify how institutional and 
intergovernmental factors affect each other during this process. 
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3.2 The Unaccomplished Prospect of Building a Common 
Defence Policy in Europe: The European Defence Community in 
the 1950s 
Discussions about which approach would be more appropriate for undertaking 
European integration and rebuilding peace in Europe were popular in the early 
post-war years. As has been mentioned, whether Europe needed a federal project to 
change the status quo fundamentally or should adopt a moderate approach was a 
controversial issue. These discussions were important because they affected the 
institutional choice of launching European integration. Then, a supranational project 
was adopted to establish the ECSC and develop economic integration. 
On the other hand, the failure of the EDC inspired further thinking about whether 
the supranational approach was the only way to achieve European integration. The 
EDC was supposed to integrate the armed forces of ECSC member states, in order to 
become a consolidated pillar in NATO to defend Europe. It aimed to have a similar 
framework with the ECSC, and therefore military forces were concentrated under 
common institutions of the EDC; in other words, member states were only allowed 
to maintain very limited independence on security and defence affairs. However, 
because the French Parliament did not approve the EDC Treaty, this supranational 
project was abolished in the end. Although Europe might present a different picture 
if the EDC could be accomplished, the failure of the EDC nevertheless signified there 
should be an alternative approach rather than a supranational framework for 
progressing European integration. 
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3.2.1 Before European Integration: The Arguments after WWII about the 
Future of Europe  
The very first proposal for building a federal European nation was proposed by 
Richard Nikolaus Graf Coudenhove Kalergi in his book Pan-Europa in 1923. Kalergi 
encouraged transnational Pan-European movements and this led to the 
establishment of a non-governmental organisation, ‘the Pan-European Union’, in the 
1920s. The proposal to build a united Europe was then promoted by the French 
Prime Minister Aristide Briand, a European federalist Altiero Spinelli and the British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Accordingly, Briand had asked for the building of a 
European nation at the League of Nations; Spinelli’s argument led to the 
development of the Union of European Federalists in 1946 (Spinelli and Rossi, 1941, 
repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998); Churchill’s speech at Zurich University in 1946, which 
called for a ‘United States of Europe’, contributed to establishing the Council of 
Europe in 1949 (Churchill, 1946, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998). However, both the 
Pan-European Union and the Union of European Federalists are non-governmental 
organisations, while the Council of Europe is a mainly a political forum for member 
states and has not developed an institutionalised framework. Besides, the idea of 
building a united country in Europe is too idealistic and radical to be accepted by 
European countries. Nevertheless, their proposals had encouraged people to try to 
find more solutions for the future of Europe in the early post-war years.  
Instead of advocacy for the building of ‘one’ country in Europe, there was another 
argument that considered the fulfilment of a united Europe might be achieved by 
gradual integration among European countries. Inspired by the French politician Jean 
Monnet, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman called for the establishment 
of a high authority for the common management of the coal and steel industries in 
France and Germany. This notable proposal was known as the ‘Schuman Declaration’ 
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and eventually contributed to the building of the ECSC in 1951 (Schuman, 1950, repr. 
in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998).  
Besides France and West Germany, the original ECSC also included Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. The founding member states of the ECSC were 
referred to as ‘the Six’, which were compared to the ‘Seven’ in the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA). Although the ECSC only involved the integration of the coal and 
steel industries by the members, it was a fundamental step towards further 
European integration projects afterwards. Meanwhile, this was the first time that 
European countries had accepted a supranational management to control their 
domestic affairs, and it then became a cornerstone for a peaceful, stable and 
prosperous environment in Europe. However, the failure of the EDC signified that 
the supranational approach could not be a general approach to apply to all policy 
areas in European integration, and this was why security and defence integration 
would have a different destiny from that of the ECSC. 
3.2.2 The Incentives to Build a European Defence Community 
The EDC was proposed under a specific situation, when West and East started to 
confront each other and German rearmament was still an unresolved issue. There 
were three factors promoting the development of the EDC. The escalating 
confrontation between West and East during the Cold War in the early 1950s, 
especially the outbreak of the Korean War, changed the policy of the US, which 
decided to rearm Germany (Fursdon, 1980, pp. 67–72; Soutou, 1994, p. 109). 
Accordingly, America and Britain firstly addressed this issue and allowed Germany to 
rearm (Costigliola, 1992, p. 48). 
Besides, regarding the demand from the US for more defence contributions from 
Europe, Western European countries had to search for a solution (Schmidt, 1995, pp. 
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137–138). Concerning this situation, France had to re-evaluate policy on Germany 
rearmament and accepted Germany as part of the West, even though France was 
reluctant to make a concession to German status (Creswell & Trachtenberg, 2003, pp. 
5–7).  
Moreover, Adenauer’s Westpolitik policy also contributed to Germany taking part in 
the setting of the EDC. According to a report published by the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) in 1951, this indicated that the reason West Germany did not favour 
rearmament in the early post-war years was that it was considered that rearming 
Germany might irritate the Soviet Union or hinder a divided Germany from 
becoming unified (CIA, 1951). However, escalating confrontation between the West 
and the East inspired Adenauer to undertake his Westpolitik foreign policy, and 
encouraged West Germany to be integrated in the economic and military systems of 
the West (Abelshauser, 1995). 
Because West Germany was established in the same year as the creation of NATO, it 
did not become a member of NATO immediately. An alternative to integrating West 
Germany into Western defence system was nevertheless necessary. A proposal 
regarding the establishment of the EDC and the development of a European army 
was made by the French Prime Minister René Pleven in 1950, finally leading to the 
signing of the Treaty Instituting the European Defence Community (the EDC Treaty) 
by the Six in 1952. 
By placing security and defence forces of member states under a supranational 
institution, the EDC aimed at full integration of defence affairs. In the preamble of 
the EDC Treaty, it was stated:  
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‘Considering the fullest possible integration … of the human and material 
elements of their Defence Forces assembled within a supra-national European 
organisation to be the best means for the attainment of this aim with the 
necessary speed and efficiency’. (Preamble to the EDC Treaty, repr. in Hill & K. 
Smith, 2000, p. 16). 
Being the first attempt at developing a supranational institution for security and 
defence integration in Europe, the EDC signified a revolution, in that nation states 
make concession for the first time to a supranational framework for tackling security 
and defence affairs. Although the EDC had never been fulfilled because the EDC 
Treaty had been disapproved by the French Parliament in 1954, the Six had learned a 
lesson that supranational security and defence integration was not feasible if nation 
states lacked commitment. This unsuccessful experience with the EDC exactly 
illustrated that compared to economic integration, security and defence integration 
obviously required more political will from national governments. 
3.2.3 The Elements of the Institutional Framework of the EDC 
The institutional framework of the EDC was similar to the framework of the ECSC, 
which placed the management of coal and steel industries under a supranational 
High Authority. Consequently, under the management of common institutions, the 
EDC aimed to manage common armed forces and budgets (Article 1, The EDC Treaty). 
There were three elements identified in the institutional framework of the EDC. 
Firstly, the EDC was conducted by common institutions, including a Council of 
Ministers, a Common Assembly, a Commissariat and a Court of Justice (Article 8, The 
EDC Treaty), and had a juridical personality to represent member states on the 
international scene and intervene in the national legal bodies of member states 
(Article 7, The EDC Treaty). In other words, the EDC was superior to national 
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governments. Therefore, member states were constrained from exerting 
independent competence on security and defence issues. Because common 
institutions of the EDC were authorised to manage security and defence affairs for 
member states, if the EDC Treaty had entered into force, common defence would 
feasibly have been achieved within a short period. However, even in terms of 
economic integration, it had to start from the common management of the coal and 
steel industries. It was impossible to achieve security and defence integration in one 
step. 
Secondly, EDC member states would have been deprived of recruiting or maintaining 
national armed forces (Article 9, The EDC Treaty). It was a revolutionary move for 
sovereign nation states. If the EDC Treaty had entered into force, member states 
would have been asked to place their national armed forces under the arrangement 
of the EDC. Also, the EDC’s European Defence Forces would have had to wear the 
same uniform (Article 15, The EDC Treaty). Therefore, they would have become a 
real European army instead of a member states’ army.  
Thirdly, the EDC Treaty created a link with NATO. The Supreme Commander of NATO 
would be authorised to ensure that European Defence Forces were capable of 
carrying out mandates; meanwhile, NATO might issue technical directives to the EDC 
according to the military competence of NATO (Article 18, The EDC Treaty). Since 
West Germany had not joined NATO until 1955, the link between the EDC and NATO 
would contribute to integrating West Germany into the whole Western defence 
system. Besides, this link would prevent a rearmed Germany from becoming a 
military threat to the West (Schmidt, 1995, p. 146).  
Accordingly, the development of European Defence Forces would not undermine 
NATO but strengthen it. In a tripartite declaration signed with France in 1952, 
America and Britain also supported the development of the EDC because the EDC 
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was considered as contributing to the joint defence of NATO (Trachtenberg, 1999, p. 
121). The British Government made another declaration in 1954 to reiterate the 
policy that it would enhance co-operation with the EDC in terms of common security 
and defence issues (Hovey, 1955, pp. 329–330). 
The three elements above describe the status, operation and connection of the EDC 
within the European security environment. Under this institutional framework, 
Western Europe would have been consolidated and counter the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union. Because the EDC was not merely a traditional military coalition and 
would act using common forces under a central commander authority, it was more 
like a single military power that integrated all the military resources and materials of 
the Six. 
3.2.4 The Implications of the Failure of the EDC 
Although the EDC originated with the French Prime Minister Pleven’s proposal, the 
Treaty did not win a majority in the French Parliament in 1954, with 250 voting in 
favour and 319 against (Fauvet, 1957, p. 162). Actually, when Pleven’s idea was 
proposed it was not favoured by the French public, and even Pleven knew the Treaty 
would be very unlikely to win support in the Parliament (Fursdon, 1980, pp. 87–88). 
Indeed, this proposal was produced in response to pressure from the Americans 
calling for the rapid rearmament of West Germany (Creswell & Trachtenberg, 2003, 
pp. 7, 22); therefore, it was not what France aspired to by itself. 
According to Matrin Dedman’s analysis, three reasons explain why the French 
Parliament rejected the EDC Treaty. Firstly, the leader of the Soviet Union from 1953 
to 1955, Georgy Malenkov, was considered more moderate than Stalin. The threat 
from the Soviet Union was alleviated, with the development of the EDC becoming 
not particularly urgent for France. Secondly, Dedman argued that public opinion in 
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France viewed the EDC as providing access for Germany to be rearmed and French 
people still could not reach consensus about the issue of German rearmament at 
that time. Thirdly, France was still stuck in the Indo–China war, so the Government 
did not pay much attention to propagating the EDC and pushing for ratification of 
the Treaty (Dedman, 1996, pp. 83–87). Raymond Aron also considered that the 
Indo–China war in 1954 was an important argument against the EDC since many 
French senior military staff were away for the war (Aron, 1957, p. 16). 
After the French Parliament rejected the EDC Treaty, the EDC became an 
unaccomplished project for common defence. The failure of the EDC signified that 
national governments would be very unlikely to make concessions on security and 
defence affairs under a supranational framework. It is compatible with the 
arguments of intergovernmentalism that nation states would only agree to such 
concessions when the situation was very necessary. Meanwhile, the economic 
integration model could not be simply copied for security and defence affairs. In 
other words, a ‘spill-over’ effect would not happen from economic integration to 
security and defence integration because these involve distinct policy areas and have 
different implications for nation states. As was argued by Steven Everts, economic 
integration started from very specific and functional affairs in Europe; however, 
security and defence policy is not a functional thing, and therefore the ‘spill-over’ 
would not happen in this policy area (Everts, 2009).  
The failure of the EDC also illustrated the importance of political will regarding 
institutional developments. It has been argued that the development of institutions 
shall come after member states have achieved consolidated opinions 
(Heathcoat-Amory, 2009); in other words, institutions cannot be developed without 
any consensus or common opinions. Although, according to sociological arguments, 
institutions may help construct the identities of preferences and interests (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, pp. 947–950), if member states are not committed to working in an 
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institutional framework, there will be no chance of such construction occurring. 
Sometimes even though member states have made a commitment to an institutional 
framework, they are unable to ensure complete fulfilment of their commitments; 
needless to say in a case like the EDC, France was sceptical about this issue, and 
therefore the EDC had no possibility of being accepted.  
Since the Schuman plan did not work to develop security and defence integration, an 
alternative approach was required. Meanwhile, the failure of the EDC also became a 
crucial reference for further efforts in this policy area. Since the development of the 
EPC accepted an intergovernmental approach, and this approach has been applied to 
develop the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP, an intergovernmental path in EU security and 
defence integration has been gradually confirmed. 
 
3.3 An Alternative Project for Political Integration: European 
Political Co-operation in the 1970s 
The most important lesson learned from the EDC is that a supranational institutional 
framework is rarely adopted by nation states when conducting key political issues, 
especially for security and defence affairs. Since West Germany was incorporated 
into the Western defence system by joining NATO in 1955, the Six thus concentrated 
their attention on economic integration, including building a common market in 
Europe, which saw significant progress in the 1950s and 1960s. The ambition for 
security and defence integration in Europe was left aside. 
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Attention to enhance political co-operation for further political integration in Europe 
was raised in the late 1960s and mainly due to EC member states being unable to 
form a coherent position in response to the Six-Day War between Israel and Arabic 
countries in 1967. Three lessons that the EC countries learnt from the experience of 
the response to the Six-Day War were identified by Michael E. Smith: (1) lack of a 
single voice for EC countries, (2) lack of a mechanism to form common positions, and 
(3) lack of a consensus about what form such a mechanism should take (M. E. Smith, 
2004a, p. 63). These frustrations led EC member states to recognise the necessity for 
making progress on political integration. 
3.3.1 The Origins of an Intergovernmental Framework for the EPC 
The US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked a famous question: ‘Who do I call if I 
want to speak to Europe?’ This remark signified that Europe presented a fragmented 
picture of individual national governments, rather than a coherent image. In order to 
improve this situation, at the 1969 Hague Summit meeting EC member states 
reaffirmed their determination to carry out political objectives (Conclusions of the 
Hague Summit, adopted in 1969). For that purpose, two official reports were 
adopted, the 1970 Luxembourg Report and the 1973 Copenhagen Report. 
Proposing as it did initiatives for the EPC, the Luxembourg Report identified three 
objectives of the EPC: (1) building better mutual understanding on international 
issues through regular exchanges of information and consultations; (2) enhancing 
the solidarity of member states by co-ordinating their positions; and (3) undertaking 
common actions (Luxembourg Report, adopted in 1970). According to the 
Luxembourg Report, the operation of such political co-operation was based on 
regular meetings by the Foreign Ministers of EC countries and irregular summit 
meetings by the heads of governments. A Political Committee was also built to assist 
the Foreign Minister meetings.  
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As soon as the Luxembourg Report was adopted, the first Ministerial meeting of the 
EPC was held in November 1970 in Munich. It was the first time that Foreign 
Ministers of the Six had met together on such an occasion; they discussed the 
situation in the Middle East and also CSCE issues during the meeting (First Meeting 
of the Foreign Ministers Conference on Political Union, 1970). Although this meeting 
did not reach substantial conclusions on common positions or actions, it signified 
that the EPC could become an effective platform for improving the convergence of 
policies among member states (Nuttall, 1992, pp. 55–58). The Luxembourg Report 
did not ask EC counties to implement the conclusions of Foreign Minister meetings, 
thus providing a more flexible environment for member states to join the 
negotiations.  
The Copenhagen Report provided supplementary instructions and suggestions about 
the EPC’s operations. Accordingly, the report increased EC Foreign Minister meetings 
and Political Committee meetings; also, it said some technical bodies should be built, 
including a group of correspondents, working parties, medium- and long-term 
studies and a communication system; besides, the Presidency of the Council might 
propose initiatives for the EPC (Copenhagen Report, adopted in 1973).  
The Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports offered an initial framework for member 
states to have intergovernmental co-operation. It was considered that the EPC had 
an intergovernmental framework because of the effect of Gaullism. As David Allen 
and William Wallace have argued, the impact from the failure of the 1962 Fouchet 
plan and the Community crisis in 1965–1966 (also known as the empty chair crisis 
caused by de Gaulle) had not faded away in the early days of initiating the EPC (Allen 
& W. Wallace, 1982, pp. 29–30). This unfavourable atmosphere for close 
co-operation was unable to offer the EPC a formal or institutionalised framework. 
However, this ‘loose, non-binding and modest formula’ with a process of ‘developing 
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trust’ was supposed to form common opinions and consensus among member states 
(Wessels, 1982, p. 17). 
3.3.2 The Elements of the Institutional Framework of the EPC 
Regarding the institutional framework of the EPC, there are also three internal 
elements. Firstly, because the EPC was based on the Luxembourg and the 
Copenhagen reports, it did not belong to the supranational structure of the EC. 
Therefore, the EPC was described as ‘decentralised, loosely structured’, and its scope 
as being ‘extremely limited’ (Ifestos, 1987, p. 208). Even though it had an ambitious 
objective of developing common positions and actions, it did not have a strong 
institutional framework to support it at the beginning. However, by the end of the 
1980s, the EPC had become an extensive, evolving network working on diplomatic 
issues (W. Wallace, 2005, pp. 434–435). The practice of the EPC was thus considered 
to be able to reshape and reinforce the habits of national diplomats by providing 
joint training courses, personnel exchanges and the sharing of embassy facilities in 
other countries (W. Wallace, ibid.). 
Secondly, the creation of the European Council enhanced the intergovernmental 
basis of the EPC even more. In the 1974 Paris Summit, the Heads of Governments of 
the EC decided to meet three times a year, accompanied by Foreign Ministers, and 
established a ‘President-in-Office’ to be the spokesman for member states on the 
international scene (Conclusions of the Paris Summit, adopted in 1974). Therefore, 
since 1975, the Heads of Governments of the EC have met regularly in the European 
Council to discuss both EEC and EPC issues. Because the European Council became 
de facto the highest body of the EEC and EPC by defining ‘the basic strategic line 
guiding Community activity’ (Bonvicini, 1982, p. 35), it was held to reinforce the 
intergovernmental framework of the EC (Ifestos, 1987, p. 186). 
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Thirdly, the entry of Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 1973 to the EC also enlarged the 
participation of the EPC. Since then, the ‘Big Three’ in Europe have been included in 
the grand project of European integration and had given EPC discussions more 
comprehensive representation by Western Europe. Although Britain never favoured 
creating a new institutional framework for European integration nor supported a 
supranational system for political affairs, its participation was important for the EC 
and EPC because of its major economic and political influence throughout the world.  
Even though it lacked substantial contributions to define formal common positions 
or actions, the EPC at least offered a forum for EC countries to consult in political 
affairs. Disapproval of the Tindemans Report at the 1976 Hague European Council 
demonstrated that member states were not prepared to offer a more 
institutionalised or centralised framework for the EPC. 
3.3.3 The Implications of the Tindemans Report on European Political 
Integration 
Owing to the lack of a formal and legal institutional framework for the EPC, there 
was demand in the EC for the strengthening of the institutional framework of the 
EPC at the 1974 Paris Summit meeting. Accordingly, the Belgian Prime Minister Leo 
Tindemans was charged with drawing up a proposal by the end of 1975 to improve 
the existing framework of the EC and the EPC, and he also aimed to achieve further 
European integration. Tindemans proposed an overall plan in 1975 that covered all 
aspects of European integration, including the external relations of Europe, 
economic and social policies, and the establishment of the European Union (The 
Tindemans Report, proposed in 1975).  
In terms of reforming the EPC, the Tindemans Report suggested that there should be 
a single decision-making centre in the Council so that the Council would be able to 
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undertake all aspects of issues. Consequently, the Council would decide security and 
defence issues and member states would have to implement Council decisions. Also, 
Tindemans advocated a European foreign policy because this would consolidate the 
transatlantic alliance. However, the Hague European Council in 1976 did not make a 
clear commitment to adopt this (Conclusions of the Hague European Council, 
adopted in 1976). 
The Tindemans Report attempted to give the EPC legal status and merge it with the 
EC, which would undermine an existing intergovernmental basis; however, member 
states were not ready for ‘a rapid move forward’, nor did the outside environment 
urge certain member states to make changes; therefore, no definite commitment 
was made to implement the Report (Hill & K. Smith, 2000, p. 100). Besides, severe 
economic recession in the early 1970s also affected the political will of EC countries 
to consider a new institutional framework for grand integration.  
The unsuccessful experiences of the EDC and the Tindemans Report illustrated how 
member states had been hesitant about adopting a supranational project for 
political integration. Also, the unaccomplished effort of the Tindemans Report 
demonstrated that only when basic integration had been completed could there be a 
European foreign policy (Andreatta, 2005, p. 23). This consequence was consistent 
with the reason why the EDC did not succeed. Only when member states have 
enough political will would a major institutional reform be possible. Although Gianni 
Bonvicini (1982) and William Wallace (1982) recognised that there were increasing 
interactions between member states and EC institutions in terms of foreign affairs, 
and suggested the EPC reform, it cannot be ignored that no significant change had 
been made for improving the framework of the EPC until the establishment of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Actually, before the Single European Act (SEA) incorporated the 
EPC into the treaty framework of the EC (Title I, Title III, SEA), the EPC did not even 
have a formal or legal basis in the EC. 
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3.3.4 Evaluate the Institutional Framework of the EPC  
As Kissinger’s question suggests, Europe was still unable to build a coherent and 
consolidated image via the EPC machinery. Christopher Hill reviewed the 
performance of the EPC regarding international crises from the 1973 October War to 
the 1991 Yugoslavian crisis, concluding that on most occasions EC countries had 
been unable to formulate active and coherent actions via the EPC machinery (Hill, 
1992, pp. 139–145). Hill argued that although the EPC prevented EC countries from 
complete inaction, it lacked appropriate resources for EC countries to take firm, 
decisive and dramatic actions. The EPC had to depend mainly on the commitment of 
member states, but it was not a stable factor (Edwards, 2005, p. 52). Since consensus 
might not be automatically produced from informal consultations, if EC member 
states aimed to form common positions and actions and develop a political 
community eventually, a more institutionalised framework with effective 
mechanisms for co-ordination and implementation would be necessary, rather than 
the EPC. It is because an institutional framework may not lead to common positions 
or actions definitely, but it may encourage member states to build consensus. 
By and large, if the EPC was expected to be a mechanism which could make common 
foreign policy, it was not qualified, because it usually failed to promote any 
substantial convergence of attitudes by EC member states (W. Wallace, 2005, p. 435). 
However, if the EPC was considered a forum which would consolidate common 
opinions and increase convergences among member states, it did its work.  
Because the EPC had an intergovernmental framework, which was different from the 
Community, it had to develop its own functions; also, although it did not have legal 
or formal status, it had developed its own networks (Nuttall, 1992, pp. 1–29). 
Member states therefore had to ‘learn by doing’ in this process, and tried to build 
another model for political integration. Since institutions can provide an 
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‘information-rich’ environment (Moravcsik, 1993; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 
2009), the EPC at least offered an environment in which member states could have 
consultations and information-exchange. This being considered the first step for 
member states to work towards a political union (Edwards, 2005, p. 41), the EPC had 
an important role in increasing ‘inter-state cooperation’ and searching for 
‘common-denominator solutions’ for European countries (Ifestos, 1987, p. 208). This 
positive result would lay the foundation for further political integration.  
Besides, as Michael E. Smith stated, the EPC did contribute to information-sharing 
among member states (M. E. Smith, 2004a, pp. 42–43). Increasing 
information-sharing was essential for accumulating mutual understanding and 
forming consensus that could lead to the further institutional development of 
political integration. Consequently, although the EPC lacked an efficient 
decision-making process and effective mechanisms for intergovernmental 
co-ordination, this flexible structure encouraged member states to ‘accumulate an 
increasing body of common positions’, and ultimately would create conditions for 
‘qualitative changes into new integrative dimension’ (Wessels, cited in Ifestos, 1987, 
p. 210). Therefore, following the intergovernmental model of the EPC, the 
Maastricht Treaty established the CFSP, which maintained the regular Council 
meetings as being the major decision-making body but with a more institutionalised 
framework to connect member states and the EU. 
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3.4 Towards an Institutionalised Framework: The CFSP and 
ESDP 
The determination to form common positions and actions in Europe on external 
political affairs was repeatedly confirmed in the 1970 Luxembourg Report, the 1973 
Copenhagen Report and the 1986 Single European Act. The EPC was launched for 
this purpose; however, it did not finally achieve the objective of forming common 
positions and actions. Therefore, the idea of building a European Union was 
readdressed by Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, in a 
speech in Bruges in 1989. Delors called for ‘a radical change’ and ‘a new political 
initiative’ because the existing institutional framework of the EC had not been 
enough to respond to new situations in the world (Delors, 1989, repr. in Nelsen & 
Stubb, 1998, pp. 55–68). Indeed, the reunification of Germany and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union changed the security and economic environment in the world, and 
urged the EC countries to make a major change to the existing institutional 
framework for European integration.  
For the purpose of reforming the existing institutional framework of the EC and also 
preparing for a political union in Europe, there were several proposals made by 
individual EU member states before the Maastricht Treaty. Although a unified 
supranational framework for the whole union was proposed by Belgium, it was not 
adopted in the end. The Maastricht Treaty created a pillar structure, which 
established the CFSP, with an intergovernmental framework and unanimous voting 
rule to make decisions. The Maastricht Treaty did not offer EU supranational 
institutional actors the capacity to intervene in the CFSP, but the original idea of the 
Treaty was to create an even closer Union (Preamble to the Maastricht Treaty, 
1992). 
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3.4.1 Establishing an Institutionalised Framework for the CFSP 
Before the Maastricht Treaty was signed, several proposals were put forward by 
individual EC national governments. Belgium firstly proposed advocating the 
expansion of the capacity of the Commission, applying qualified majority voting to all 
areas of the Council and strengthening the role of the European Parliament to 
intervene in Council decisions (Vanhoonacker, 1992, pp. 40–42). France and 
Germany supported Belgium’s proposal and sent a letter jointly to the Irish 
Presidency of the EC to call for intergovernmental conferences. In this joint letter, 
France and West Germany desired to ‘strengthen the democratic legitimation of the 
Union, render its institutions more efficiency, ensure unity and coherence of the 
union’s economic, monetary and political action, and define and implement a 
common foreign and security policy (repr. in Vanhoonacker, ibid., p. 276). Italy and 
the Netherlands also made their proposals, with a draft treaty being decided during 
the 1991 Luxembourg Presidency.  
In the 1990 Rome European Council, EC member states agreed to begin two 
intergovernmental conferences aiming to build a Political Union and an Economic 
and Monetary Union. In terms of a Political Union, the Presidency Conclusion of this 
meeting stated that EC member states had reached consensus on developing a 
common foreign and security policy and agreed to increase ‘the coherence, speed 
and effectiveness of the Community’s international action’ (Presidency Conclusions 
of the Rome European Council, adopted in 1990). In the 1991 Luxembourg European 
Council, a draft treaty proposed by Luxembourg to establish a European Union with 
a three-pillar framework was adopted by EC member states. This draft treaty 
introduced a basic framework for the Union; regarding the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, EC countries agreed that the CFSP would cover all questions relating 
to security and ensured that a European defence identity would contribute to 
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strengthening NATO (Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council, 
adopted in 1991). 
The Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 
November 1993. The Treaty not only established the European Union as replacing 
the previous framework of the EC and EPC, but also expanded into more policy areas 
with a reformed institutional structure. Instead of having a unified decision-making 
framework, the Treaty had a compromise structure, with three-pillar arrangements 
for the EU to satisfy different requirements in distinct policy areas. This three-pillar 
structure was considered to be a bridge connecting two competing models of 
institutional governance: a supranational system and intergovernmental 
co-operation (Andersson, 2008, p.124).  
As regards the matter of the CFSP in the Treaty, it was applied to intergovernmental 
co-operation. Although the European Council and the Council were charged with 
defining the CFSP, they had to act unanimously. Therefore, EU member states still 
maintained independence on agenda-setting and decision-making in the CFSP, but 
had a formal and institutional framework for implementing the policy. 
Although the Maastricht Treaty did not actually provide much space for EU 
supranational institutional actors, such as the Commission or the European 
Parliament, to intervene in the CFSP, and member states still maintained the right to 
veto policy initiatives (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p. 244), the significance of the Treaty 
was that it provided a definite decision-making process for forming common 
positions and joint actions, two instruments that were supposed to be an 
indispensable means whereby the EU could shape a unified image on the 
international scene.  
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3.4.2 The Elements of the CFSP Institutional Framework before the 
Establishment of the ESDP 
The Maastricht Treaty provided an initial framework for the EU to conduct the CFSP. 
Although it was objected that it could not effectively close the capabilities–
expectations gap, especially because EU countries had ambitious expectations of 
conducting foreign and security affairs but with limited mechanisms of the CFSP in 
the Maastricht Treaty (Hill, 1998; Peterson, 1998), the Maastricht Treaty at least 
provided a basic foundation for later treaty reforms. Therefore, it could be viewed as 
a turning point that EU foreign and security integration began an institutionalised 
stage. Although, under the Maastricht Treaty, member states generally mainly 
concentrated on forming a European foreign policy and rarely involved security and 
defence dimensions, the Treaty nevertheless offered a basic framework for further 
reform, which meant member states could expand their activities by reforming this 
intergovernmental framework instead of creating a new one. Therefore, it is 
important to identify the elements contained within the Maastricht Treaty regarding 
the conducting of foreign and security affairs.  
Firstly, the Council of Ministers (the Council) was granted decision-making authority 
on the basis of guidelines from the European Council; member states had to 
implement decisions made by the Council (Article J.2, J.3, The Maastricht Treaty). 
Both the European Council and the Council in the Treaty were intergovernmental 
mechanisms because of unanimous voting being applied, but member states were 
liable to implement Council decisions. This ensured that Council decisions would be 
implemented and therefore enhanced policy consistency between member states 
and the EU. As a result, compared to the EPC, the CFSP had a relatively formalised 
and institutionalised framework to create more possibilities for ‘common’ activities 
on relevant issues.  
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Although the Amsterdam Treaty introduced ‘constructive abstentions’ and qualified 
majority voting (QMV) to the Council in order to improve efficiency in the 
decision-making process of the CFSP, this procedure would not be applied to matters 
that had military or defence implications (Article J.13, The Amsterdam Treaty). In 
other words, this procedure did not change the intergovernmental basis, but did 
offer flexibility in deciding non-military and non-defence affairs. 
Secondly, common positions (Article J.2, The Maastricht Treaty) and joint actions 
(Article J.3, The Maastricht Treaty) were introduced to implement the CFSP. They are 
still crucial in order for the EU to impose diplomatic means and contribute to forming 
a unified image on the international scene. The objective of forming common 
positions and joint actions actually originated from the EPC, but the EPC did not have 
applicable mechanisms or definite procedures to fulfil it. The provisions for common 
positions and joint actions in the Maastricht Treaty offered the EU a legal basis to 
impose sanctions; meanwhile, to impose such sanctions would increase the 
connections between the CFSP and Community affairs (Hill, 1998, p. 28). The 
increasing connections would encourage the EU to improve internal consistency, and 
then achieve a more coherent institutional framework. 
The Maastricht Treaty ensured an intergovernmental framework for member states 
to conduct foreign and security affairs, and this framework was considered a 
structure in favour of member states (Milward & Sorensen, 1993, p. 19). When 
member states applied common positions and joint actions to impose economic 
sanctions, there would be a need to co-ordinate and co-operate with the 
Commission, and this would increase connections with the Community pillar. 
However, the Maastricht Treaty did not create a post to connect the Council and the 
Community; actually, in the Council, member states were fragmented units and 
lacked a unified representative. Concerning this problem, the Amsterdam Treaty 
introduced a High Representative to the CFSP and a Secretary General to the Council 
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in order to formulate, prepare and implement Council decisions (Article J.16, The 
Amsterdam Treaty) and also to assist the Presidency (Article J.8, The Amsterdam 
Treaty). These two new posts would not only contribute to co-ordination between 
EU member states for more effective implementation but also increase the 
coherence of the CFSP by providing ‘one phone number to call’ in Europe (Andersson, 
2008, p. 125).  
Another problem with the CFSP framework under the Maastricht Treaty was that it 
did not provide exact definitions for CFSP objectives and CFSP missions. This was 
supposed to be left to the European Council to define (Article J.8, The Maastricht 
Treaty). However, because the EU had not produced a document for defining 
security strategy until 2003, this block left the CFSP without a definite objective 
regarding undertaking certain kinds of missions. In order to fill this gap, the 
Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the WEU into the EU (Article J.7, The Amsterdam 
Treaty), and also the Petersberg tasks (Protocol on Article 17 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty).  
The Petersberg tasks, which were defined by the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, 
referred to conflict prevention and crisis management missions which included 
‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management and peace-making’ (The Petersberg Declaration, adopted in 1992). 
This incorporation was meaningful because it enabled the EU to become more 
focused on certain situations that would involve it. Meanwhile, the Peterbergs tasks, 
which contained a special emphasis on crisis management missions and 
humanitarian tasks, also become a blueprint when the EU was considering 
developing military and civilian capability under the ESDP. 
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3.4.3 Evolution: An Institutionalised Framework for Common Security and 
Defence Policy 
The outbreak of the civil war in the Balkans in the early 1990s resulted in a serious 
regional crisis for almost ten years. Because the theatre of war was so close to 
Central Europe, there was pressure for EU countries to take action. The Luxembourg 
Foreign Minister Jacques Poos had argued that this should be the time for Europe to 
resolve this issue because it was European’s problem, not anyone else’s (cited in C. J. 
Smith, 1996, p. 1); meanwhile, the President of the European Commission, Jacques 
Delors, also argued that the Yugoslav crisis was a European issue and should be 
resolved by Europeans (cited in Roberts, 1996, p. 183). However, the result 
nevertheless highlighted the fact that the EU lacked political will and also military 
capability to resolve a serious security situation (Soetendorp, 1999, p. 140). When 
the crisis in Kosovo became uncontrolled in the late 1990s and NATO finally 
intervened with an air campaign, EU countries finally made a determination to 
remedy the shortfall in political will and military capability.  
In order to enable the EU to take part in security and defence missions, and 
accomplish the goal of common security and defence, also inspired by British–French 
defence co-operation (St Malo Declaration, adopted in 1998), the 1999 Cologne 
European Council appointed Javier Solanna, the former Secretary-General of NATO, 
as the High Representative for the CFSP and developed the ESDP (Presidency 
Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, adopted in 1999).  
As a sub-policy area, the ESDP was under the structure of the CFSP and had a special 
focus on security and defence affairs. In the 1999 Helsinki European Council, EU 
member states determined to build up military capability for the implementation of 
the Petersberg tasks and adopted the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, which set military 
targets for implementing ESDP missions (Presidency Conclusion of the Helsinki 
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European Council, adopted in 1999). Thereafter, more headline goals were adopted 
in order to improve capability to undertake security and defence affairs: the Civilian 
Headline Goal 2008 (adopted in 2004), the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (adopted in 
2007) and the Headline Goal 2010 (adopted in 2004).  
Meanwhile, two documents for defining European security strategy were adopted: 
(1) European Security Strategy (ESS, published in 2003), and (2) the Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy (published in 2008). The former 
was also considered the first EU document to identify challenges and threats in 
Europe, and to define the strategic objectives of the EU (Gowan, 2008, pp. 42–61; 
Haine, 2008, pp. 21–41; Howorth, 2008, pp. 81–102); therefore the ESDP would have 
more specific and definite objectives concerning how to achieve common security 
and defence in the EU.  
The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy 2008 was an 
assessment report that re-evaluated the security environment and addressed new 
threats in Europe, including cyber security, energy security and climate change. The 
security threats defined by the report involved non-traditional security threats which 
signified that, besides a military dimension, the EU also placed emphasis on a civilian 
dimension in order to accentuate the civilian role of the EU in security and defence 
issues.  
The decision-making process and institutional framework of the ESDP did not differ 
from the CFSP’s. Actually, after the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU did not make major 
adjustments to the institutional framework of the CFSP or ESDP until the Lisbon 
Treaty. However, after the establishment of the ESDP, the EU focused more 
attention on the substantial reform of military and civilian capability. Concerning the 
military dimension, according to the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, the EU will be able 
to deploy a European Rapid Response Force (ERRF), amounting to between 50,000 to 
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60,000 troops within sixty days, and such a deployment will last at least one year 
(Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, adopted in 1999). Besides, according to the Headline 
Goal 2010, the EU has developed the concept of ‘battle groups’ since 2005 for 
offering more responsive forces in a short timescale to crisis management 
operations. Each battle group consists of 1,500 soldiers and can be ready to deploy 
on a four-month operation within ten days. The EU maintains two battle groups on 
standby (Headline Goal 2010, adopted in 2004). 
Concerning the civilian dimension, according to the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 the 
EU has identified six priority sectors for civilian crisis management missions: police, 
rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring missions, and support for 
EU special representatives. Therefore, the components of civilian capabilities include 
police forces, prosecutors, judges, prison officers, civil administrative staff, customs 
officials, human rights experts, civil protection and disaster relief agents, assessment 
and co-ordination teams, and intervention teams. The human resources of these 
components basically depend on the commitment of member states (Civilian 
Headline Goal 2008, adopted in 2004). 
The framework of the ESDP provided deployable capability for the EU to implement 
ESDP missions. However, because the capability was based on voluntary 
co-operation from member states, it largely depended on whether member states 
were able to fulfill their commitment to the ESDP; meanwhile, whether member 
state were willing to maintain their commitment depended on what issues and 
situations they were facing. Political will was an unstable factor affecting the 
fulfilment of the ESDP. Therefore, without enough political will, even if the EU 
already has deployable military capability, it will still be unable to play a serious role 
in security and defence affairs (Deighton, 2002). 
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3.4.4 The Implications of the Institutionalised Framework of the CFSP and 
ESDP before the Lisbon Treaty 
Compared to the EPC, the CFSP is considered to be able to enhance security and 
defence co-operation via its institutionalised framework (Sjursen, 1998, pp. 99–101). 
This framework is also considered a presentation of ‘intensive 
transgovernmentalism’, which is different from the Community Method because it 
involves a direct circle of national governments (H. Wallace, 2005, pp. 87–89). 
Although, before the establishment of the ESDP, the EU merely relied on imposing 
diplomatic or economic sanctions to implement common positions and joint actions, 
this framework offered a stable environment for member states to co-operate. 
Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty only built a weak institutional framework, 
especially compared to the framework of the Community pillar (F. Cameron, 1998, 
pp. 59–76; Peterson, 1998, pp. 7–11; M. E. Smith, 1996, p. 2).  
The establishment of the ESDP nevertheless strengthened the capability of the EU in 
terms of security and defence dimensions. Therefore, since the first EU mission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003, the EU has launched 24 CSDP missions: 16 
are civilian missions, 7 are military, and the last combines civilian and military 
responsibilities (see: EU Operations, Overview, 2012). 
The institutionalised framework from the CFSP to the ESDP before the Lisbon Treaty 
also showed that an intergovernmental path had been strengthened through the 
continuing practices of member states. This is what historical institutionalists argue 
that institutional developments would follow the physical notion of ‘inertia’ instead 
of changing or abolishing it (Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990). The path of 
institutional developments of the CFSP and ESDP followed the intergovernmental 
framework of the EPC, and became a stronger institutional framework. This process 
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certainly enhanced the intergovernmentalism and institutionalism characteristics of 
this framework at the same time.  
Besides, through continuing practices, the shortcomings of this framework would 
gradually emerge and then member states could know how to reform it, something 
they had not expected when they established this framework. This learning process 
also strengthened the existing institutional basis and would improve it (Peters, 2005, 
pp. 33–34). For example, when the Maastricht Treaty built the CFSP it only had a 
vague aim, and no one knew what common foreign and security policy meant or 
what common defence would be. When common positions and joint actions became 
increasingly important mechanisms for the CFSP, member states realised the 
necessity to give the CFSP a more concrete context. Therefore, the WEU and the 
Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the EU. Moreover, when a necessity for 
connecting the Council and the Community was emerging, member states also 
realised that they needed a person who could represent their opinions and build a 
coherent image for the EU, and then this idea led to the introduction of the High 
Representative. The development of military and civilian capability also follows this 
learning-by-doing process, and this process is still ongoing.  
By and large, before the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP and ESDP already had an 
institutionalised framework combining vertical and horizontal dimensions, which 
contributed to the EU in pursuing the policy goals of the CFSP and ESDP (Andersson, 
2008, p.124). A vertical system, indicating the hierarchical relations in CFSP and ESDP 
institutions, ensures efficiency and consistency in the decision-making and 
policy-implementation process. The horizontal connection networks, referring to 
non-hierarchical and informal connections between member states and the EU 
through day-by-day routines or informal meetings, help to exchange information and 
consolidate opinions (Andersson, ibid.). These frameworks offered an 
institutionalised environment for member states and EU institutions to have 
97 
 
intensive interactions, and these intensive interactions are considered to be able to 
shape common ideas and values (Everts, 2009). Although, in the field of defence 
affairs, it would be difficult to form common ideas through informal interactions or 
day-by-day routines, the framework of the CFSP and ESDP nevertheless offered a 
place where member states, EU institutions and technical experts could fully 
associate with each other (Silveira, 2009). 
 
3.5 A More Coherent Institutionalised Framework: The Common 
Security and Defence Policy in the Lisbon Treaty 
The most important incentive to drive EU member states to reform the treaty 
frameworks in the 2000s originated from the enlargement project, which made the 
EU have a larger participation of 27 member states, and the existing framework was 
unable to implement efficient and fair decision-making in response to this change. 
The result of enlargement in the EU was considered to increase the diversity of the 
EU and might undermine the consensus which had formed before the enlargement 
(Heathcoat-Amory, 2009). Therefore, in order to tackle this situation, a reform was 
needed to ensure the enlarged European Union could still function well (Church & 
Phinnemore, 2010). The Lisbon Treaty was proposed in response to an enlarged 
Union. In the field of common security and defence affairs, the Lisbon Treaty has not 
only renamed the ESDP to the CSDP but also has adjusted the institutional 
framework to achieve a more efficient and effective common security and defence 
policy on the international scene.   
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3.5.1 Improving the Institutionalised Framework of the CSDP 
The Treaty Establishing a Constitution (European Constitution) originated after more 
than ten years of deliberation on institutional reforms after the Maastricht Treaty, 
and to ensure that the EU would still function after enlargement incorporating new 
member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The European Constitution was 
signed in 2004 in Rome and aimed at consolidating previous EU treaties into one 
single document to provide a more coherent and consistent institutional framework 
to cover all EU policy fields (European Constitution, signed in 2004). However, the 
European Constitution was rejected by two referendums in France and the 
Netherlands in 2005. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty was under the German Council 
Presidency in 2007 to replace the European Constitution with some amendments. 
The Lisbon Treaty has now completed all the processes of ratification and it entered 
into force on 1 December 2009.  
The Lisbon Treaty did not maintain the three-pillar framework established by the 
Maastricht Treaty. It placed all three pillars under the single framework of the 
European Union, while still applying different decision-making rules to different 
policy areas (Church & Phinnemore, ibid.). The most important reform of the Lisbon 
Treaty involving the CSDP is to strengthen the role of the President of the European 
Council and the High Representative. The President of the European Council (the 
President) becomes a permanent position elected by the European Council, via 
qualified majority voting, and has a two-and-half-year term that is renewable once 
(Article 15, The Lisbon Treaty). The new President is expected to raise the consistent 
profile of the EU in international affairs, and Herman Van Rompuy, a former Belgium 
Prime Minister, is appointed as the first President of the European Council from 1 
December 2009. 
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The capacity of the Foreign Affairs Council and High Representative has been 
increased in the Lisbon Treaty. It has been considered a ‘big change’ to the Council 
(Kionka, 2009). The High Representative now has the capacity to make proposals in 
the Council and chair the Foreign Affairs Council, and is also the Vice-President of the 
Commission at the same time (Article 18, The Lisbon Treaty). Besides, the creation of 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) is supposed to assist the High 
Representative to monitor international situations, prepare Council meetings, 
initiate proposals, and implement Council decisions (Article 27.3, The Lisbon Treaty). 
Because the creation of the EEAS increases the independence and capability of the 
High Representative, it is considered a phenomenon of Brusselsisation (Rosamond, 
2010, p. 251). Catherine Ashton, a former UK European Trade Commissioner, was 
appointed as the new High Representative on 1 December 2009. 
Also, the status of the European Defence Agency (EDA) is strengthened in the Lisbon 
Treaty. Accordingly, the EDA is charged with the authority to identify the objectives 
of military capability of member states, and evaluate whether member states need 
to improve them (Article 45, The Lisbon Treaty). Before the Lisbon Treaty, the 
capability targets were negotiated and decided by the Council. The Lisbon Treaty 
offers the EDA authority to improve capability targets of EU member states, and 
therefore will assist the improvement of CSDP capability.  
Although the Lisbon Treaty has offered the EU a ‘legal personality’ that enables the 
EU to have treaty-making power and rights during missions (Schoutheete & Andoura, 
2007), the EU has not been authorised to present this legal personality in all 
situations, especially regarding security and defence affairs (Piris, 2010, pp. 86–88). 
Taking the Libyan crisis as an example, although the High Representative Catherine 
Ashton had attempted to provide a coherent EU image on this issue, she could not 
bypass member states in taking major decisions unless authorised by the Council. 
Therefore, if member states still lack the political will to implement the CSDP, the 
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Lisbon Treaty will not really make the EU more effective when responding to 
international crises (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p. 47). 
3.5.2 Defining Objectives of the CSDP since the Lisbon Treaty 
Besides adjusting the framework of the CSDP, the Lisbon Treaty also codified the 
content of CSDP missions into the treaty framework. Accordingly, the EU will be able 
to undertake five CSDP missions: (1) joint disarmament operations; (2) humanitarian 
and rescue tasks; (3) military advice and assistance tasks; (4) conflict prevention and 
peace-keeping tasks; and (5) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, such as 
peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (Article 43.1, The Lisbon Treaty). This 
content is broader than the Petersberg tasks because it increases joint disarmament 
operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict 
stabilisation. It signifies that the EU has become more ambitious in undertaking 
military operations of CSDP missions.  
The Lisbon Treaty does not set general standards about when and how to launch a 
CSDP mission. This is because each mission has different situations and aims (Séailles, 
2009); meanwhile, member states would not be committed to supporting any CSDP 
missions because they also have to evaluate each mission case by case (Keetch, 
2009). Nevertheless, although the Lisbon Treaty does not build general procedures 
about how to assure contributions from member states, this broader definition 
offers a legitimate basis for member states to apply in case they have political will to 
intervene in relevant situations. Besides, the Lisbon Treaty makes it clear that 
member states also have to make civilian capabilities available together with military 
capabilities (Article 43.2, The Lisbon Treaty). This provision strengthens the civilian 
dimension of the CSDP, and also enhances the civilian role that the EU has pursued 
since the early 2000s. 
101 
 
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a project for permanent structured 
co-operation in the EU (Article 42.6, Article 46, The Lisbon Treaty). This project 
allows some of the member states of the EU to establish permanent structured 
co-operation just between themselves in order to fulfil important criteria in defence 
affairs by making more binding commitments on military capabilities. Although it 
provides a more flexible approach to achieving higher security and defence 
integration and some member states of the EU have expressed interest, this project 
has not yet been fulfilled. 
To summarise, the Lisbon Treaty has not changed the intergovernmental 
decision-making process of the CSDP but has increased the role of EU institutions. 
Member states are still the dominant factors to influence the CSDP and can still 
lobby the EU to input national interests. The institutionalisation process in EU 
security and defence integration has built a framework that maintains the 
intergovernmental basis, but also increases the institutionalised feature. As was 
mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty is the result of learning-by-doing, which means 
member states realise the shortcomings of institutions through continuing practice 
and participation. In other words, the more member states take part, the more they 
will know how to improve this framework. This is what institutionalists called the 
‘reciprocal relationship’ or the ‘reciprocal link’ between institutional developments 
and the habit of member states in co-operating to achieve joint objectives (March & 
Olsen, 1984; M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 17). Once they are used to this link, co-ordination, 
consistency and coherence can happen for member states and the EU. As Séailles, a 
senior staff for security policy in the EU, has stated, ‘practicing the CSDP will help to 
build a better institutional framework and help member states to learn from the past’ 
(2009). Therefore, if member states continue the practice of the CSDP, they are 
supposed to become more embedded in this framework and contribute to a path for 
further institutional developments and the institutionalisation process of the CSDP. 
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3.5.3 Implications of the Lisbon Treaty to the CSDP 
The Lisbon Treaty provides a more definite institutional framework for implementing 
the CSDP. Especially for the High Representative, the Treaty offers a whole executive 
team to plan and implement policies for this post. The EU institutions now have a 
definite role in participating in the CSDP, and the bureaucratic system in the CSDP 
also becomes more organised and institutionalised. Take as an example the EEAS, 
which has been considered as representing a major step whereby the EU can 
become an international actor (Vanhoonacker & Reslow, 2010). The framework of 
the EEAS has the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS); 
also, under the PSC and EUMS, the EEAS also has a Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), 
EUMC, EUMS, CIVCOM, a Civil & Military Planning Department (CMPD), a Political 
and Military Group (PMG), Civilian Planning and Conducting Capabilities (CPCC) and a 
EU Operations Centre. 
Accordingly, the EEAS has already become a massive and complicated bureaucratic 
system. However, will the phenomenon of ‘Brusselsisation’ increase the 
psychological distance between member states and the EU? Britain, especially, 
because it already felt distanced from the EU (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009), would 
definitely not welcome a supranational or Brusselsised CSDP. Similar opinions were 
shared by the German MdBs interviewed in this thesis in arguing that Brussels 
should not intervene in CSDP decision-making because the EU is not a ‘real’ state 
(Arnold, 2009; Bartels, 2010; Henne, 2009). There is a generally sceptical feeling 
among Europeans towards the EU (Séailles, 2009). Regarding this, the EU and 
member states are considered to have responsibility for the isolated feeling between 
people and EU issues (Kionka, 2009), and therefore both of them have to resolve this 
dilemma, namely, how to maintain an efficient and effective framework for the CSDP 
and ensure the most participation from member states at the same time. 
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In addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduces the new President of the European Council 
and the High Representative for the foreign affairs and security policy. These new 
positions are supposed to enhance the leadership of EU institutions in the CSDP, and 
they would have more equal status to work with member states.  
As Ashton herself stated in an interview with the Fletcher Forum, she aimed to 
develop a team relationship with foreign ministers of member states (Ashton, 2011a, 
p. 9). Although aspiring towards an ambitious goal, Ashton is criticised for being 
incapable of playing a leading role. For example, when she came to the European 
Parliament for the first time, she was criticised for her vague rhetoric and lack of 
‘lucid presentation of priority’; one MEP even said: ‘the Parliament did not want her 
to be an ambassador for 27 foreign ministers’ (Traynor, 2010). Joylon Howorth 
considers that Van Rompuy or Ashton, lacking ambition and experience, are still 
unable to provide a strong leadership for the EU to improve its role on the 
international stage (Howorth, 2011). 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty does not resolve the problem of 
how to make sure member states maintain reliable contributions to CSDP missions. 
Although member states are committed to implementing CSDP missions, sometimes 
the EU encounters the problem of understaffing, even in the field of civilian missions. 
It is argued by the people interviewed that because most civilian staff are not 
working for national governments or the EU, it is impossible to force them to take 
part in  CSDP missions (Anonymous, 2009; Toll, 2009). In terms of the military 
dimension, the Eurozone crisis led member states to cut defend budgets. EU 
countries had cut military spending ‘by an amount equivalent to the entire annual 
defence budget of Germany’ since 2008 (Valasek, 2011c). This would inevitably 
affect their political will to maintain full commitment to the CSDP. Although it was 
also argued that the result might encourage member states to poll and share military 
resources (Valasek, 2011a, 2011d), this austerity will inevitably have a short-term 
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impact on the political will of member states in contributing to launching CSDP 
missions. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The establishment of an institution is considered to create ‘information-rich’ grounds 
for actors, and the transparency of the decision-making process will also be 
increased thereby; therefore, trust among actors will be gained more easily when 
they work in an institution together and positive-sum bargains are more likely to 
happen (Rosamond, 2000, p. 204). However, because an institution is created by 
rationalists and their rational decisions (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 940, 944–946; 
Pollack, 2004, pp. 138, 141; 2005, pp. 19–22), national governments will only agree 
to transfer their sovereignty to supranational authority after prudent consideration.  
Especially regarding security and defence affairs, national governments may agree to 
act together, but they are unlikely to accept a supranational authority for conducting 
their defence and security. As was argued by Heathcoat-Amory, ‘the development of 
the European security policy will be based on intergovernmental co-operation; a 
supranational framework is not preferable for our Conservative Party’ 
(Heathcoat-Amory, 2009). Actually, no British MPs or German MdBs interviewed for 
this thesis preferred a supranational framework for conducting security and defence 
affairs. Even though it has been more than fifty years since the failure of the EDC, 
there is no significant sign that EU member states would accept a supranational 
framework for security and defence policy.  
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Certainly, this intergovernmental framework signifies the decisive role played by EU 
member states in the CSDP decision-making. Although the reforms made in the 
Lisbon Treaty are supposed to improve co-ordination and coherence between 
member states and the EU and also help implement the CSDP, this framework still 
largely depends on member states’ co-operation. Political will is still the most crucial 
factor in deciding whether the CSDP can achieve common security and defence in 
Europe.  
Nevertheless, a framework which maintains the intergovernmental basis but ensures 
efficient institutions is acceptable both to member states and EU institutions, 
because it at least offers an environment in which they can work for relevant issues 
(Anonymous, 2009; Bartels, 2010; Séailles, 2009). The process of institutionalisation 
of EU security and defence integration, from the EPC, CFSP and ESDP to the CSDP, 
has illustrated this consequence. A more concrete context for objectives, mission 
targets and work-sharing arrangements is gradually defined in this framework. This 
process also demonstrates how, via constant participation and practice in the 
institutionalisation process, member states are able to get more involved in this 
system and may become more used to utilising the instruments within this 
framework to achieve common objectives. 
Concerning the influence of political will upon the implementation of a common 
security and defence policy, it is important to investigate the criteria of member 
states in this institutionalisation process. As Britain and Germany are two of 
important member states in the EU and have fundamentally different attitudes 
towards military and defence issues, it is useful to compare their policies vis-à-vis 
security and defence integration issues in this framework and examine whether they 
are able to co-operate to promote further integration. Accordingly, the next two 
chapters will discuss British and German examples. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Britain and EU Security and Defence 
Integration 
4.1 Introduction 
The role of Britain in the process of European integration is controversial. Sometimes 
it is described as ‘one of reluctance’, ‘awkwardness’ and ‘semi-detachment’ (Geddes, 
2004, p. 1), and one prioritising the ‘special relationship’ with America (Gamble, 
1998; George, 1998). Although there was a concern about whether this special 
relationship would cease owing to the end of the Cold War, John Dumbrell indicates 
the War on Terror offers a new impetus to make these two countries become closer 
(Dumbrell, 2004); however, Dumbrell also argues that this special relationship is 
more emphasised by the British than by the Americans (Dumbrell, 2006, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the concern about the special relationship with America inevitably 
affects British foreign policy and the policy on European affairs. 
Besides the concern about the special relationship with America, the UK has 
traditionally showed distance towards the affairs of the European continent. The 
idea of building a ‘United States of Europe’ was promoted by the British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill (Churchill, 1946, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998); however, 
Churchill did not include Britain in this novel European federation. Actually, what 
Churchill called for was a united country in the European continent, and then any 
war between France and Germany would become impossible. Indeed, for Churchill, 
Britain had its own dreams and tasks, and therefore Britain was ‘with Europe’ 
instead of ‘being part of Europe’ (Pilkington, 2001, pp. 2–3).  
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Being a global Empire over hundreds of years, Britain is used to planning its foreign 
policy from the perspective of global politics. Although the history of Empire has 
faded, the legacy stays. Therefore, British foreign policy is affected by three 
concentric circles, the Atlantic alliance, Europe, and the British Commonwealth 
(Pilkington, ibid.). The UK Conservative MP David Heathcoat-Amory has also 
indicated that Britain has universal interests. The special relationship with America is 
the most important, followed by the British Commonwealth and then is Europe. 
Heathcoat-Amory considered the EU as being more a link to connect the UK and the 
world (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009). This typically British opinion originated from a 
history of empire, and still influences the UK’s foreign policy today. 
Viewing itself as having a particular presence in global politics, Britain did not 
restrain itself from being a regional power in Europe after WWII and still attempted 
to maintain flexibility in foreign policy and exert influence in the world. This attitude 
hindered Britain from taking part in the establishment of ECSC. As a result, Britain 
missed the chance to shape the initial stage of institutionalised European integration, 
but did not realise it at the beginning. Although Britain changed its mind and applied 
for accession to the EC since the early 1960s, as the Conservative Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan argued, in the 1960s the major concern of British foreign policy 
was still on trade relations with the Commonwealth countries (Pilkington, ibid., p. 
12). Macmillan’s opinion was corresponding to the tradition: ‘be with Europe but not 
of Europe.’ Nevertheless, when Prime Minister Edward Heath signed the Treaty of 
Accession to join the EC from 1973, Britain also became one participator of European 
integration.  
Britain’s accession to the EC signified that it took a more pragmatic attitude towards 
economic integration in Europe, but it also created a difference between Britain and 
the Six about integration. Margaret Thatcher’s speech at the College of Europe in 
Bruges may serve as an example. Thatcher had argued that Britain favoured 
108 
 
intergovernmental co-operation instead of concentrating power at a European 
centre, and therefore the EC should be a ‘family of nations’ rather than a European 
super-state; she was also opposed to adopting new treaty frameworks for European 
integration (Thatcher, 1988; repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998). This attitude of rejecting 
the adoption of new treaty frameworks still exists in British EU policy today. The 
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron rejecting changes to reform the Lisbon 
Treaty, which was proposed for resolving the Eurozone crisis at the end of 2011, is 
an example. Cameron considered that this would undermine the City of London 
which was an important part of the British economy (C. Walker, 2011). This signified 
that UK governments are very sensitive about national interests and this firm stance 
usually makes Britain reluctant to make concessions in the process of European 
economic integration.  
On the other hand, being a major military power in the world, Britain has its military 
ambitions. Therefore, as opposed to having a prudent attitude towards 
supranational integration on the European community, Britain is more interested in 
developing security and defence co-operation in Europe. However, even though 
Britain has made efforts to establish an intergovernmental framework for the CFSP 
and develop the ESDP to accomplish common defence, it cannot be concluded 
simply that Britain is fully engaged in the framework of the EU. Although people may 
argue Tony Blair’s pro-European policy presented a policy shift towards the EU, his 
proactive attitude towards European integration only happened in his first term. 
Since he chose to stand with America on the ‘War on Terror’, Britain distanced itself 
again from the European Continent. Besides, Britain seems to prefer to enhance 
bilateral defence co-operation with individual partner countries rather than promote 
deepening of the CSDP (O’Donnell, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). The evidence can be found 
in Britain signing the treaties for enhancing bilateral defence co-operation with 
France in 2010; also, Britain co-operated with France to lead the multi-state coalition 
in the military mission in Libya. Therefore the determination of Britain to improve 
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the institutional framework of security and defence integration of the EU is not 
assured. 
This chapter will explore the role of Britain in security and defence integration in the 
EU and examine how national interests affect British choices in this process. 
Accordingly, it will explain the factors resulting in the hesitant and cautious attitude 
of Britain towards European integration and the institutionalised framework of the 
EU. Also, this chapter will analyse why Britain has a preference for military 
co-operation and how this preference affects Britain taking part in EU security and 
defence integration. More specific discussions about the role of Britain in the Kosovo 
crisis and the Libyan crisis will be presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
4.2 Background of Britain’s Policy on the Initial Development of 
European Integration  
Britain was neither a founding member of the ECSC nor part of the EC until 1973 
when the Community completed its first enlargement. Since the Six signed the 
Treaty of Paris in 1951 to establish the ECSC, from then until Britain signed the 
Treaty of Rome to become a member of the EC in 1973 had been over twenty years. 
In other words, Britain was absent from the initial progress of European integration 
for some two decades.  
One reason Britain did not take part in initiating the ECSC was because Britain 
defined itself as having a special role in world politics. The development of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), initiated by Britain, may be seen as a British 
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approach differing from the prospect of the EC on economic integration in Europe. 
Another reason to delay the participation of Britain in European integration was the 
veto imposed twice by the French President, Charles de Gaulle, on British 
applications. Britain had made applications to the EC in 1961 and 1967, but both 
were rejected by de Gaulle, in 1963 and 1967. Actually, when de Gaulle was in office 
as the French President from 1959 to 1968, Britain had no chance of being adopted 
as a member of the EC. 
The absence of participation for decades has inevitably resulted in Britain feeling 
distanced from European integration and became not that committed to it. This 
distanced feeling still exists nowadays in British politics. For example, in the 
campaign for the 2010 General Election, David Cameron, when he was still the 
leader of the opposition, had promised a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty before it 
came into force if the Conservative Party won the election (D. Cameron, 2009). It 
was not the first time that Britain had attempted to overturn the existing 
institutional framework of European integration. There was a referendum in 1975 on 
whether to leave the EC, which was launched by the Labour Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson. Although the result showed the majority of the British public supported 
staying in the EC (Gay, 2011), it nevertheless signified that European integration was 
a controversial issue for Britain.  
4.2.1 Describe Britain’s Foreign Policy Traditions on Europe 
Having the largest colonial empire in the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, Britain used to define its foreign policy from a global perspective. As a 
result, for Britain, Europe was not the first priority in its foreign policy. At that time, 
Britain’s attention was largely concentrated on consolidating its empire; even though 
the influence of the Empire had declined after two World Wars, interests in the 
Commonwealth nations still occupied much attention in Britain’s foreign policy.  
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Generally speaking, there are three main factors that have traditionally influenced 
Britain’s foreign policy in undertaking European affairs. Firstly, in the past Britain did 
not assume itself to be part of Europe. Britain is geographically distant from the 
European continent, and this distance results in a psychological distance of the 
British people from Europe. Take Winston Churchill’s speech in 1946, which called 
for a United States of Europe, for example. This idea aimed at helping France and 
Germany to reach reconciliation, but this proposal did not include Britain itself. 
Churchill argued that ‘we British have our own Commonwealth of Nations’, and 
Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, America and the Soviet Russia would 
support this ‘new Europe’ (Churchill, ibid.). This speech implied two things. Firstly, 
Britain viewed itself as one of the Great Powers. Secondly, Britain saw the special 
connection with the Commonwealth as a priority. Therefore, Britain’s national 
interest in foreign policy in the early 1950s was made on the basis of ‘a continuing 
belief in Britain’s world role’ (P. Morris, 1996, p. 125). Occupied with a ‘traditional 
globalist orientation’ in the early post-war years (George, 1991, p. 34), Britain, with 
its policy of locating itself as a global power rather than a regional European power, 
lacked interest in the regional project of supranational European integration. This 
policy did not change until the end of the 1950s. 
Secondly, Britain was suspicious about the European continent because of the long 
history of war in Europe. Therefore, Britain used to believe that maintaining 
flexibility in foreign policy was a fundamental approach to protect the freedom of 
Britain, and also Europe. In 1988 in Bruges, Thatcher described the history of Europe 
as ‘a series of interminable wars and quarrels’, and said, ‘we British have a special 
way contributed to Europe’; she also believed Britain had a responsibility to ‘prevent 
Europe from falling under the dominance of a single power’ (Thatcher, ibid.). She put 
Britain in a special position: it was not part of the European continent, but still 
maintained some connections. Thatcher’s perspective explained to some extent why 
Britain was used to take a cautious and distanced attitude towards European affairs. 
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Moreover, the proposal of establishing a supranational institution to manage 
industries of coal and steel in Europe was not favoured by either the Labour Party or 
the Conservative Party in Britain. For the Conservative Party, Britain’s future 
depended on three international circles of influence, the Commonwealth, America 
and Europe, and then Britain would not ‘pledge the latter at the expense of the 
other two’ (P. Morris, ibid.). The Labour Party won the General Election in 1945 
because of being expected to resolve the problem of high unemployment and 
economic depression; therefore the Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, 
undertook a series of social welfare policies, such as creating the National Health 
Service, and programmes for nationalising industries such as coal, gas and the 
railway system. Given this situation, the Labour Government would not favour to 
transfer authority to another supranational institution in Europe.   
4.2.2 Britain’s Approach to Reconstruct Europe 
In spite of being absent from the initial programme for European economic 
integration, Britain was not indifferent to European affairs. As Thatcher stated, 
Britain had its way of contributing to Europe. Supporting the establishment of EFTA 
and NATO were the two ways in which Britain could contribute to promoting 
economic development and stabilising security environment in Europe.  
Because the Conservative Party had a preference for free trade rather than for 
joining a close economic union, the ideas of the ECSC and the Common Market were 
not so attractive to it. This was not only due to lack of interest in a project of 
economic integration with strong political implications; also, Britain was reluctant to 
join a common agricultural policy. However, after winning the General Election in 
1951 the Conservative Government also recognised the necessity of forming an 
economic mechanism to promote free trade. The frustration resulting from the Suez 
crisis gave Britain more impulse to review a worldwide interest strategy because in 
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the 1950s the British Empire was declining while America and the Soviet Union were 
rising (Hyam, 2007, pp. 221–240; S. C. Smith, 2007; Sorby, 2002). This situation 
pushed the Conservative Government to ‘work more closely with Europe’ (Eden, 
1956, cited in Newman, 1997, p. 10). The application to the EEC in 1961 was 
therefore considered a recognition of this necessity (Parr, 2006). 
Britain also worried that, if it kept on standing outside of Europe, the EEC would 
become too dominant in Europe. By saying that ‘what I chiefly fear … is the Common 
Market coming into being and the Free Trade Area never following’ (Macmillan, 
1971, cited in J. W. Young, 2000, p. 53), Macmillan addressed the concern that it 
would be incompatible with Britain’s national interests if Europe could not build a 
free trade area. Therefore, in order to avoid being marginalised from Europe and 
also to promote the development of the FTA, Macmillan signed the treaty to form a 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with six other European countries in 1959.  
EFTA was the fulfilment of Britain’s idea for free trade. Compared to the Common 
Market, which aimed to establish a close economic union via supranational 
institutions, EFTA did not have strong political or integrationist implications but had 
the objective of building a low-tariff common market (Pilkington, 2001, p. 12). 
Besides, EFTA did not include common agriculture policy because that would 
undermine the existing trade relationship with the Commonwealth. By and large, 
EFTA and the EEC were two different approaches between the EEC Six and the EFTA 
Seven to further economic integration. More specifically, these two approaches 
represented different perspectives between Britain and France towards the 
economic and political future of Europe (Wurm, 1995b). Therefore, the history of 
European integration before the 1990s was more like a history of Anglo-French 
differences over the issues, including supranational integration or intergovernmental 
co-operation, EFTA or the EEC, British accession to the EC, the EC’s budget problem, 
and the common agricultural policy. 
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EFTA was claimed by Macmillan to ‘form a basis for negotiating a comprehensive 
European settlement’ (Wurm, ibid., p.62). In other words, the Macmillan 
Government did not give up the attempt at establishing a pan-European free trade 
area. However, EFTA neither became a basis for incorporating the EEC nor was able 
to compete with the EEC. The EEC experienced fast economic growth, which made 
Britain become a supplicant to the EEC and pushed it to review its traditional 
thinking of ‘imperial supremacy’ (Newman, 1997, pp. 12–14). Britain’s growing share 
of exports to the EEC (from 19.0 per cent in 1962 to 24.7 per cent in 1973) signified 
that the EEC/EC was becoming a more important market (Rollings, 2007, p. 26), and 
so joining the EC became more and more unavoidable. 
Besides, there were divergences inside the EFTA Seven as well. EFTA did not reach a 
consensus on agriculture and fishery co-operation at any time in the 1960s. The only 
significant success achieved by EFTA in the 1960s was building free trade in industrial 
products in 1966. The decision by Britain to charge 30 per cent import tax also 
irritated other EFTA member states, especially Scandinavian countries (Archer, 1976). 
Since the progress of EFTA of accomplishing a free trade area was slow, Britain had 
to consider whether to compromise with the EEC. 
Moreover, America also pressed Britain to take part in the EEC. The US warned that 
‘the special relationship would decline if Britain did not join the EEC’ (Middlemas, 
1990, cited in J. W. Young, 2000, p. 66). Britain also worried that ‘the Americans will 
think more and more of the Six as the group which they have to consult in Europe’ 
(Greenwood, 1992, cited in Newman, 1997, p. 15). Under American pressure and 
also for economic incentives, Britain made its first application to the EEC in 1961. 
Britain’s application to the EEC was a fundamental policy shift because it implied the 
UK would adopt a supranational form for the achievement of economic integration, 
which was once considered to be incompatible with the national interests of Britain 
(Newman, ibid.). Therefore, the policy change of Britain in applying to the EEC may 
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be interpreted as a redefinition and evolution of national interests from the 
perspective of worldwide interests to more pragmatic, realistic and regional thinking.  
In terms of the development of European security system, in the early years after 
WWII, the Labour Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin had between 1945 and 1947 
proposed an idea of building a political, economic and military bloc in Europe. This 
proposal was also based on a consideration of national interests because it would 
strengthen Britain’s role as a global power; meanwhile, the proposal was also made 
in response to the absence of a firm promise from Americans to defend Europe 
(Dedman, 1996, pp. 35–37). As the relationship between the West and the East 
deteriorated and the US made a promise to defend Europe, this proposal was left 
aside. Especially when the Soviet Union was able to make nuclear weapons from 
1949, development of independent military forces by European countries became 
more unrealistic. 
When the initiative of the EDC was proposed, Britain was still outside the group of 
the Six. Although it signed a Treaty of Association with the EDC, it did not mean to 
contribute to a European army. Britain already made a commitment to NATO, and 
could be protected by NATO and America. It would be not necessary to join the EDC. 
Therefore, signing this Association treaty was more like a connection between 
Britain and the Six. Actually, the three Foreign Ministers from the mid-1940s to 
mid-1950s, Ernest Bevin, Herbert Morrison and Anthony Eden, had expressed similar 
concern that Britain would not contribute to developing a European army because 
this effort might result in American withdrawal from protecting Europe (Dedman, 
ibid., pp. 76–79). Nevertheless, the signature could be considered for the purpose 
that Britain would not become marginalised in this framework if the EDC were finally 
achieved. 
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4.2.3 Britain’s Shift to European Community 
Because it realised a more realistic policy was needed, rather than a strategy of 
global interest, in response to the declining influence of British Empire, the 
Macmillan Government changed policy and made the first application to the EEC in 
1961. In the meeting between the EEC Six and Britain in October 1961 in Paris, the 
British representative, Edward Heath (also British Prime Minister from 1970 to 1974), 
admitted that the economic and political achievements of the EEC was one of the 
attractive factors for Britain in applying for accession (Heath, 1961). However, 
because Britain attempted to ensure the access of the Commonwealth to the British 
market and called for special consideration for British agricultural policy during 
negotiations with the EEC Six, it was criticised for lack of commitment to the EEC, 
especially because de Gaulle considered the UK a ‘Trojan horse’ in Europe (Chopra, 
1974, p. 278) which would open the gates to US influence and Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism. 
In a press conference on 14 January 1963, de Gaulle considered that if the EEC Six 
compromised with the UK and accepted special requests made by Britain, this would 
undermine the consensus foundation which had been made by the Six; also, de 
Gaulle was concerned such compromise would increase divergences in the 
Community, which would then become ‘a colossal Atlantic community under 
American dependence and direction, and which quickly absorbed the community of 
Europe’ (de Gaulle, 1963). Since accession to membership had to be agreed by the 
Six unanimously, de Gaulle’s opposition halted Britain’s first application.  
Another application was submitted by the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 
1967, but was rejected again by de Gaulle for similar reasons. In another press 
conference on 27 November 1967, de Gaulle argued that since the economic system 
and interests between Britain and the Six were still incompatible, he would offer 
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only Britain associate member status with the EC rather than full membership; 
meanwhile, at this time de Gaulle was still concerned about the impact of the UK–US 
special relationship on the Community (de Gaulle, 1967). It was not surprising that 
this statement had provoked the Labour Government. In a press conference on 29 
November 1967, Wilson spurned every reason asserted by de Gaulle for rejecting 
Britain’s application and complained, ‘those who rely on a static concept in a rapidly 
moving world are themselves backwards’ (Wilson, 1967). Regardless of gaining 
support from other EC countries, Britain could not win accession to the EC without 
the consent of France.  
After Georges Pompidou replaced Charles de Gaulle as President from May 1969, the 
position of France regarding UK application became more flexible; Britain finally 
found its own chance to enter the EC. In June 1970, Britain and three other applicant 
countries were able to start the first ministerial meeting with the Six in Luxembourg; 
after one and a half years, Britain, Denmark and Ireland signed the Treaty of Rome in 
1971 and the first enlargement in the history of European integration was completed. 
It was worth noting that although Norway finished the negotiations with the Six and 
signed the Treaty of Accession, the result of the public referendum did not favour 
the Treaty; therefore, the first enlargement of the EC only included Britain, Denmark 
and Ireland. 
In fact, when Britain chose a wait-and-see strategy in the 1950s regarding the initial 
development of the ECSC and the Common Market, it did not expect this project 
would meet with great success in the 1960s, nor did it foresee its application would 
be blocked for more than ten years by France. For Britain, this was an unintended 
consequence. Therefore, it was considered that ‘the refusal to enter talks on the 
Schuman Plan’ was ‘the most critical of the lost opportunities for Great Britain to 
lead Europe’ (Nutting, 1960, cited in J. W. Young, 2000, p. 48). This absence also 
made Britain unable to share in common working practices or mutual commitment 
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to the Community. Because it underestimated the achievement of economic 
integration by the Six and the consequences of being absent from this project might 
be, Britain had to adopt most provisions made by the Six, which it might not have 
favoured.  
Take the budget issue, for example. The budgetary framework agreed by the Six at 
the Hague summit in 1969 set a framework to decide national contributions to the 
EC budget. Under this budgetary framework, Britain would become the second 
biggest contributor, just behind West Germany, to the EC budget, and would not be 
paid much back in agricultural subsidies (Godley, 1980). In the 1971 White Paper, 
Prime Minister Heath admitted that there were some disadvantages to membership 
that Britain had to tolerate, the high amount of contributions to the EC budget, £300 
million a year, being one of them (Geddes, 2004, p. 70). In order to build a more 
balanced budget framework, Britain had to take almost ten years to resolve this 
issue, from 1975 to 1984. In the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council meeting, a 
final settlement of the contribution plan named ‘The UK’s Correction’ was agreed to 
cut Britain’s contributions after 1985, and this was essentially the British rebate that 
Thatcher negotiated for the UK (Mattelaer, 2010).  
Moreover, the concept of path dependence can also be applied to explain why de 
Gaulle rejected Britain’s application. One of the reasons de Gaulle rejected Britain’s 
application was that its accession to the Common Market might undermine existing 
agreements and institutional framework made by the Six. Indeed, the founding 
members, which had invested time and resources to build an institutional 
framework, would be inclined to maintain the sustainable development of this 
framework. Since the accession of Britain to the EC would inevitably ‘break what 
existed’ (de Gaulle, 1967), de Gaulle had to take a more cautious attitude towards 
this issue. This attitude helps explain that actors have a tendency to maintain the 
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sustainability and consistency of an institution and this tendency may lead to the 
result of ‘path dependence’ and affect the future of this institution. 
Nevertheless, the case of Britain’s accession to the EC also demonstrated how 
national interests affected this process. De Gaulle not only rejected Britain because 
this could undermine the cohesion of the Six, but also worried that its accession 
could weaken the leading role of France in the Community. On the other hand, 
Britain changed policy and applied to the Common Market because it recognised this 
was a favourable option for economic development, and Britain should not be 
excluded from the Common Market for too long. This event has illustrated that since 
national governments play a dominant role in the process of institutional 
developments, including initiating an institution, changing it, reforming it or 
abandoning it, whether the development of an institutional framework is compatible 
with national interests inevitably affects the participation of governments.  
4.2.4 Britain in the European Political Co-operation 
Regarding the project of EPC, Britain did not express much aspiration for it or any 
project of political integration in Europe at the beginning. As Macmillan stated, for 
him the EEC was mainly ‘an intergovernmental co-operative economic entity’ (cited 
in Gowland & Turner, 2000, p. 98). Macmillan’s words implied two things. Firstly, the 
EEC was not expected by Britain to work for political purposes; secondly, the EEC 
was expected to work on the principle of intergovernmental co-operation instead of 
a supranational approach.  
Similarly, in the visit to the Council of Europe on 23 January 1967, when answering 
the question from the Italian Vice-President of the Consultative Assembly, Montini, 
about whether Britain was in favour of political integration, the Labour Prime 
Minister Wilson said this option was acceptable for Britain. However, referring to the 
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question about ‘the political future of Europe’ from the Belgium representative 
Struye, Wilson only promised Britain would talk with the Six once they discussed 
British entry into the EC (Merand, 2003). Wilson’s statement implied that he was not 
in accord with the Six, which had a strong aspiration for political integration in 
Europe.  
Certainly, the main factor to attract Britain into the EEC/EC was the economic 
incentive, and therefore much of Britain’s attention was concentrated on this topic. 
However, the dissatisfaction about the unbalanced budgetary framework and 
disappointment with the possible economic benefits accruing from membership of 
the EC also led to a referendum in 1975, which was the first referendum in Britain’s 
history and was calling for reopening of negotiations about the Treaty of Accession. 
The result showed 67 per cent of British people in favour of EC membership, but on 
only a 65 per cent turnout of the registered electorate (Gay, 2011). The issue of an 
unbalanced budgetary framework and Britain’s contributions to the EC also triggered 
public dissatisfaction, and this issue, from the mid-1970s to 1984, made the 
relationship between Britain and other EC members tense (Godley, 1980). 
Nevertheless, this budgetary issue had two implications. Firstly, institutions were not 
unchangeable, but might take longer to change than to establish. Secondly, national 
interests were proven again to be a major consideration for national governments in 
making a commitment to an institutional framework.  
In order to alleviate negative sentiment from other EC members towards Britain 
because of the budget issue, Thatcher had tried to show good intentions regarding 
the development of the EPC. In a speech to the European Parliament on 16 
December 1981, Thatcher admitted that co-ordination of foreign policies through 
the EPC was essential for the EC to be ‘a force of stability’ in the world; the EPC was 
thus considered as representing a ‘single and coherent’ European approach for 
undertaking international affairs (Lak, 1992, p. 41). However, Thatcher did not make 
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a clear promise regarding whether Britain aspired to a real common foreign policy in 
Europe. 
Besides, Thatcher appreciated the special relationship with America much more than 
prime ministers before her had done. Since the menace of the Soviet Union still 
existed and NATO was the only military mechanism capable of confronting the Soviet 
Union, Britain had to ensure the presence of America and NATO on the European 
continent. This concern constrained Britain to make a serious commitment to 
developing common security or defence in Europe. Moreover, Thatcher had a good 
personal connection with the American President Ronald Reagan. Both were 
conservative realists, and this connection even enhanced the special relationship 
with America and consolidated Britain’s support for NATO; therefore, Thatcher did 
not have an ambition to reform the EPC to develop a more centralised framework 
(Lak, ibid., p. 47). Although emphasising a ‘maximum of consistency’, Britain’s draft 
for reforming the EPC, proposed in the 1985 Milan European Council meeting, was a 
relatively moderate proposal which preferred to maintain the status quo and 
rejected extending the capacity of the Commission in the EPC (Lak, ibid.).  
Compared to Britain’s draft, the drafts proposed by Italy, the Netherlands, France 
and Germany were more ambitious. These drafts aimed to increase consistency 
between the EPC and the EC, for example by setting a General Secretariat staffed by 
European officials to ensure continuity and consistency of the EPC and the EC 
(Franco-German version), allowing all EC Ministerial Councils tackling EPC matters 
(the Netherlands version), and establishing a General Affairs Council to pursue ‘one 
and the same external policy’ (Italian version) (Lak, ibid., pp. 47–48). However, 
because of lacking consensus, the Single European Act (SEA), which signed in 1986, 
only codified the procedures of the EPC into the EC, although the establishment of a 
Secretariat General charged with supporting the Presidency improved connections 
between the EPC and the Commission. 
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In a speech delivered in 1988 in Bruges, Thatcher expressed her preference for 
intergovernmental co-operation by arguing ‘co-operation between sovereign states 
should be the best approach for a European Community’; she also emphasised the 
reluctance to adopt new treaties since ‘the North Atlantic Treaty, the revised 
Brussels Treaty and the Treaty of Rome were capable of tackling the future 
developments of the Community’ (Thatcher, ibid.). This statement signified that 
Britain maintained a very cautious attitude towards making a new commitment to 
European integration. Although Thatcher did not favour establishing a new 
framework for European integration, the reunification of two German states and the 
end of the Cold War pushed European countries to rethink the future of Europe. 
Therefore, the succeeding Conservative Prime Minister, John Major (1990–1997), 
had to adopt a more moderate and pragmatic policy for the establishment of a 
European Union.  
Major was originally opposed to building a federal Europe. Nevertheless he made a 
promise to put Britain ‘at the heart of Europe’ on signing a new treaty (Wester, 1992, 
pp. 197–198). Referring to the conclusion made in the 1991 Luxembourg European 
Council meeting which adopted a new draft treaty for the European Union, Major 
said he welcomed the new draft treaty and the three-pillared approach because this 
meant ‘some things are done on the basis of Community treaties and others on the 
basis of intergovernmental action outside the Treaty of Rome’; he also considered 
that a common foreign and security policy would enhance the Atlantic Alliance 
(Miskimmon, 2001).  
Major’s statement signified that it was not in Britain’s national interests to expand 
the supranational framework to other policy areas of the EU. Therefore, Britain 
would not adopt a supranational framework in the field of security and defence 
affairs or expand the competence of the Commission to this field. Also, Major 
assumed the development of the common foreign and security policy would 
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enhance relations between the EU and NATO or America. This stance implied Britain 
would not accept any attempt which would undermine Britain’s promise to NATO or 
transatlantic relations. Basically, Major’s stance was consistent with other British 
prime ministers’.  
The commitments to NATO and intergovernmentalism are two of the most 
important principles Britain has when it is considering developing security and 
defence integration in Europe. These commitments are consistent with Britain’s 
traditional foreign policy, which has a special focus on the UK–US special relationship 
and also maintains a rather independent position in Europe. Although these two 
commitments are not something new for Britain, they are becoming more lucid and 
definite in the process of Britain taking part in European integration. The more 
Britain takes part in this process, the more it knows what is compatible with its 
national interests. Therefore, for Britain, the institutionalisation process of European 
integration is also a learning process, and in this process Britain can learn and shape 
its path in protecting or pursuing national interests. This was why these two 
commitments were reiterated and strengthened by British governments in the 
developments of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP.  
 
4.3 Britain and an Institutionalised Common Security and 
Defence Framework 
The change in the global security environment from the late 1980s urged the 
member states of the EC to play a more active political role in the world. The 
post-Cold War environment constituted a relatively peaceful security environment in 
the global context for Europe to pursue a European view of security, especially 
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because France always aspired to an alternative security approach to NATO (Menon, 
1995, p. 22). Meanwhile, German reunification also strengthened the commitment 
of European countries to staying in the project of European integration in order to 
ensure that the reunited Germany was embedded in Europe and would not become 
another threat. Besides, because the EPC was unable to provide effective mechanism 
for member states to have a common position or act promptly in response to the 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Edwards, 1992), a more efficient 
and effective common approach was needed to improve the capabilities of European 
countries in response to international crises or urgent situations. These factors 
created favourable conditions for the Maastricht Treaty to be adopted, and also 
pushed British governments to accept this reform. 
4.3.1 Major’s Engagement in the Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP 
The Maastricht Treaty was signed by the Conservative Government led by John 
Major on behalf of Britain. For Major, it was not realistic to block the negotiations for 
a new treaty and new framework for European integration. He did not want to 
repeat the failure of being absent from the initial process of the ECSC and the EEC, 
which more or less undermined the leading role of Britain in undertaking Community 
affairs. Also, Major was described as someone who lacked ‘ideological commitment’ 
(J. W. Young, 2000, p. 151) and therefore would find it possible to adopt a more 
flexible approach in undertaking EU affairs.  
When explaining the stance of the Government on the Maastricht Treaty to 
Parliament, Major argued that ‘it is in Britain’s interests to continue to be at the 
heart of the European Community and able to shape its future’; he also stated that 
to avoid ‘the development of a federal Europe’ and develop ‘a European security 
policy compatible with NATO and co-operation in foreign policy’ were in the 
long-term interests of Britain (Major, 1991). This statement signified that the Major 
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Government would adopt a co-operative attitude towards the Maastricht Treaty and 
the establishment of the EU.  
The principles of the Major Government regarding the development of the CFSP did 
not change. A supranational framework was unacceptable, and such development 
should not undermine or weaken the role of NATO in Europe. This principle was also 
argued by Foreign Minister Malcolm Sinclair, who stated, ‘introducing mechanisms 
such as majority voting would weaken Europe’s voice and lead to acrimony and 
disunity’ (Sinclair, 1991). Sinclair also argued that NATO would be the priority of 
Britain for common defence in Europe in saying that the government would ‘make 
sure any European defence dimension does not weaken but reinforces NATO in 
which we already have a tried and tested common defence policy’ (Sinclair, ibid.).  
Similar principles are still kept nowadays and stated by two UK MPs in the interviews 
for this thesis. Heathcoat-Amory, who was also Foreign Minister in the Major 
Government in 1993, insisted that NATO should be the primary military organisation 
for European security and that the development of European security policy should 
be based on intergovernmental co-operation (Heathcoat-Amory, 2009). Paul Keetch, 
who was a Liberal Democrat MP, also stated that NATO should not be replaced by 
the CSDP or EU forces (Keetch, 2009). Indeed, they had shared a consensus about 
the basis of intergovernmental co-operation for common security and defence policy 
in the EU and the primary role of NATO; even when the pro-European Prime Minister 
Blair initiated the ESDP, he did not intend to introduce a supranational framework 
for common security and defence affairs, because he called for the EU to be a 
‘superpower’, but not a ‘superstate’ (Blair, 2000). 
Because of the consideration of national interests, Britain inserted these principles 
into the Maastricht Treaty. Lynda Chalker, the Minister for Overseas Development, 
stated that there were two objectives of Britain regarding the CFSP. Firstly, Britain 
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would keep the CFSP outside the Treaty of Rome and maintain the 
intergovernmental framework. Secondly, Britain would ensure that decisions in the 
CFSP were made unanimously (Chalker, 1993). Besides, Chalker argued that it was 
the British Government’s aim to insert Article J.4.4 into the Maastricht Treaty in 
order to ensure Britain’s commitment to NATO would not be undermined by the 
implementation of the CFSP (Chalker, ibid.). Article J.4.4 asked that the Treaty should 
‘respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty’ 
(Article J.4.4, The Maastricht Treaty).  
Because the Treaty maintained an intergovernmental basis for the CFSP, and did not 
intend to develop an independent European security capability, these became 
crucial foundations for gaining support from Parliament. On 20 May 1993, the House 
of Commons approved the Maastricht Treaty with 292 votes in favour and 112 
against (Hansard, vol. 225, cc381–471); two months later the House of Lords also 
approved the Treaty with 141 votes in favour and 29 against (Hansard, vol. 548, 
cc602–701). 
Although the Major Government argued that it had done much to ensure the 
Maastricht Treaty was compatible with Britain’s national interests, the Government 
still encountered much opposition from the Conservative Party and the public. On 
the one hand, Thatcher and the Conservative MP Teddy Taylor had called for a 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty; although the Treaty was approved by 
Parliament in the end, a tiny victory in the confidence vote on 23 July 1993 implied 
Major’s leadership was challenged (D. Baker, Gamble, & Ludlam, 1994). 
On the other hand, according to a survey made by the European Commission in 1996 
to identify public opinion in 15 member states, compared to the average of 65.8 per 
cent in fifteen member states, only 51.2 per cent of the British people questioned 
favoured developing a common foreign policy with non-EU countries. Also, 
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compared to the average 59.6 per cent of fifteen member states, only 47.6 per cent 
of the British people questioned favoured a common military and defence policy 
(Kernic, Callaghan, & Manigart, 2002, pp. 34–38). Besides, according to another 
survey made by the Commission in 1996, only 37 per cent of the British people 
questioned considered the membership of the EU a good thing for Britain 
(Eurobarometer Surveys, 1996). The results of these surveys showed that the 
general public of Britain did not have much enthusiasm for the CFSP or the idea of 
common defence and security.  
The reasons why the British people lacked enthusiasm for the CFSP stemmed from 
two concerns. Firstly, too much involvement in developing independent European 
security and defence capabilities might undermine the existing transatlantic security 
relationship, since this connection had been seen as a cornerstone of American 
security guarantee since the end of the WWII (Sjursen, 1998, p. 107); besides, 
further institutionalisation of the CFSP might result in more national sovereignty 
being transferred to Brussels and EU institutions (H. Smith, 1998, p. 154). Therefore, 
the Maastricht Treaty maintained an intergovernmental basis and also ensured that 
participation in the CFSP would not affect the commitment of Britain to NATO. These 
were the results of Britain’s ‘input’. By participating in forming a treaty, Britain could 
play a leading role and shape the institutional framework in order to ensure this 
framework (output) would be compatible with Britain’s national interest.  
4.3.2 Blair’s First Term and the Amsterdam Treaty 
When the Labour Party won the 1997 General Election, its leader, Tony Blair, 
became Prime Minister to replace John Major. The Blair Government was described 
as a ‘New Labour’ Government because Blair promised to undertake a revolutionary 
approach in both internal and external affairs (Applebaum, 1997; A. Gray, 1998; A. 
Gray & Jenkins, 1998; Thompson, 1998). Regarding the EU and the development of 
128 
 
the CFSP, Blair also took a more engaged and active attitude than the Conservative 
Party or his Labour predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The first task for the Blair Government was the Amsterdam Treaty. In the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), a few issues about the CFSP were discussed, 
including expanding majority rule to the CFSP and improving connections between 
member states and the Union. However, Britain did not favour adopting majority 
voting or a supranational structure to define the CFSP because this was not 
compatible with the intergovernmental principle.  
A White Paper published by the Major Government clearly stated the stance of 
Britain in the 1996 IGC regarding reforming the institutional framework of the CFSP 
(UK White Paper, 1996). Stephen George indicated that there were three principles 
the Major Government adhered to in negotiating the 1996 IGC: (1) maintaining the 
intergovernmental framework, (2) a basis of consensus and unanimity, and (3) a 
representative for the Council. These principles were also shared by the Labour Party 
(George, 1996), and were consistent with Britain’s long-term stance on the EU and 
European integration, which was not changed.  
Take the QMV issue for example. As the Labour MP Tessa Blackstone argued, 
although the Labour Party would agree to apply the QMV to the areas of social, 
regional, industrial and environment policy in order to prepare the enlargement 
project, it would not adopt QMV to be applied to the CFSP or JHA affairs (Blackstone, 
1996). Although the QMV was still applied to some parts of the CFSP in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, especially procedural matters, nevertheless there was no 
‘wide-scale extension’ and it should not be applied to decisions with defence or 
military implications (Article J.13, The Amsterdam Treaty). Nevertheless, such an 
extension still invoked opposition in Parliament.  
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In response to the Opposition, the Foreign Minister of the Blair Government Doug 
Henderson had explained that the Government had made efforts to ensure such an 
extension would have an emergency brake, which was ‘the veto mechanism’, to 
allow any member state that ‘opposes a specific flexibility proposal’ to ‘veto it by 
bringing it back to the Council’ (Henderson, 1998). This stance was supported by the 
Liberal Democrat MP Menzies Campbell, who was Foreign Affairs spokesman for the 
Liberal Democrats from 1997 to 2006. He affirmed that since ‘foreign and security as 
a whole remains intergovernmental’ and member states maintained the capacity to 
reject CFSP decisions, this would be acceptable to Britain (Campbell, 1997). The Blair 
Government and supporters tried to persuade others that the Amsterdam Treaty 
was not incompatible with British national interests. 
Moreover, this was a consensus in Britain that to agree the extension of QMV to 
some policy areas of the EU, including the CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty, was 
necessary in response to the coming enlargement project. The Labour MP Mike 
Gapes argued that ‘it is impossible to have any enlargement of the European Union 
without extending QMV to make the Union work effectively’ (Gapes, 1997), which 
illustrated that for Britain to adopt QMV to be applied to the CFSP was a necessary 
compromise. Indeed, a more efficient decision-making procedure was necessary in 
response to an enlarged EU and the Blair Government also supported enlarging the 
Union to East and South Europe.  
4.3.3 Blair’s Efforts towards a Common Security and Defence Policy 
There was another crucial decision made in Blair’s first term about EU security and 
defence integration, which was the launch of a common security and defence policy 
in Europe to develop EU military and defence capabilities. This was the most 
important decision made by Blair to improve the institutionalised framework and 
achieve the objective of common defence and security in Europe. 
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On 4 December 1998, Blair signed the St Malo Declaration with the French President 
Jacques Chirac and promised to enhance military co-operation between Britain and 
France. Although the St Malo Declaration was signed for British–French bilateral 
military co-operation, it became a foundation for the EU to develop the ESDP. The 
notable speech made by Blair in Chicago declared Blair’s ambition to develop a 
European defence capability. Blair argued that the ultimate objective of such 
development was to improve the contribution of Europe to NATO (Blair, 1999b). This 
objective was actually consistent with Britain’s commitment to NATO and the 
transatlantic alliance. Accordingly, the principle ‘without prejudice to actions by 
NATO’ was confirmed by the conclusions of the 1999 Cologne Council, which 
adopted the decision to develop the ESDP (Presidency Conclusions of Cologne 
European Council, adopted in 1999). 
Regarding the concern that the St Malo Declaration, and developing armed 
capabilities in the EU, might undermine Britain’s commitment to NATO, Blair 
explained to Parliament why the Government had decided to sign the declaration 
with France. He argued: ‘strengthening European defence capability will, I believe, 
strengthen NATO’ (Blair, 1998b). This statement illustrated that Blair did not intend 
to develop an alternative military mechanism in Europe to replace NATO. Because 
there was always a voice within the EU to call for improving the security and defence 
capabilities of the EU, Blair suggested that the smartest thing for Britain to do was 
‘not to pretend that that debate is not happening’, but that Britain should ‘get in 
there and shape it so that we act in a way that is consistent with NATO and do not 
allow the agenda to be set by those who want to undermine NATO’ (Blair, ibid.).  
Blair’s support for the establishment of the ESDP and the EU Rapid Reaction Force 
(ERRF) was also part of a new doctrine of liberal interventionism which he outlined in 
Chicago. He argued that Europe and the international community as a whole had a 
moral obligation to intervene when human rights were under threat (Blair, 1999a). 
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This argument implied military means could be a measure to accomplish 
humanitarian values. Therefore, Britain’s military intervention in Kosovo was 
considered a practice of liberal interventionism (Daddow, 2009), and Britain’s 
contributions to the ERRF, including 12,500 troops, 18 ships and 72 combat planes, 
would also be viewed as implementing this doctrine (Miskimmon, 2005, p. 103). 
Tony Blair is described as ‘the most instinctively pro-European Prime Minister since 
Edward Heath’ (Stephens, 2003, p. 253, cited in Dryburgh, 2010, p. 257), and is also 
considered a key figure in launching the ESDP (Howorth, 2000b, p.383). Indeed, 
because of Blair’s support in his first term, an institutionalised framework for the 
ESDP was able to gain the support from the British public and to be established. This 
framework would enable the EU to fulfil the objective of common defence and 
security. Besides, taking a co-operative attitude towards EU affairs enabled Britain to 
become a link between Europe and America so as to consolidate the special 
relationship with America and enhance the leading role of Britain in the EU at the 
same time.  
This pro-European position should not be seen as an entire shift of Britain’s policy to 
the EU, however, because Blair did not abandon the intergovernmental principle and 
also rejected undermining the commitment to NATO. The difference between the 
Blair Government and its predecessors was that the Blair Government adopted a 
co-operative policy rather than a resistant attitude in leading and shaping the 
process of developing the EU, which was essentially still compatible with Britain’s 
national interests. Besides, it is worth noting that Blair signed the joint declaration 
for bilateral military co-operation with France before he committed to the 
development of the ESDP; this signified that bilateral and non-institutional 
framework is the priority for Britain.  
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Because the Cameron Government also sought for bilateral defence co-operation 
with France rather than doing this through the framework of the EU (Gomis, 2011; 
O'Donnell, 2011a, 2011b), it has demonstrated that Britain does not view the EU or 
CSDP as the sole framework for building co-operation. Although it has military 
capability and the ambition of playing a more decisive role in the international scene, 
Britain prefers to maintain flexibility and independence so as to choose the more 
favourable model in pursuit of its national interests.  
Since Britain is very sensitive about its national interests and the special relationship 
with America is its priority here, it is not surprising that Blair chose to stand with 
America on the ‘War on Terror’. There were serious disputes among member states 
of the EU about whether to take part in the War on Terror; this divergence inevitably 
had an impact on the coherence of the transatlantic alliance and also affected the 
political will of Britain to continue developing the ESDP. 
 
4.4 Britain and the Implementation of a Common Security and 
Defence Policy  
The institutional developments of EU security and defence integration began to 
make substantial progress from the early 2000s. However, Britain did not continue 
an engaged policy towards these developments after the Blair Government became 
inclined to America on the war against Iraq. Since then, Britain has not continued 
building a close relationship with EU partners. 
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4.4.1 Britain’s Choice on the War on Terror 
When the events of 11 September happened, European countries expressed much 
sympathy and strong condolences to America so as to support American 
determination to combat terrorism. Wolfgang Ischinger, German Ambassador to the 
US, had noted that ‘the EU is the United States’ strongest support in the war on 
terrorism’ (Ischinger, cited in Golino, 2002, p. 63). In his speech declaring the War on 
Terror on 20 September 2001, the American President George W. Bush also 
appreciated the support from Europe and the rest of world; Bush especially 
cherished Blair’s support by arguing that America ‘has no truer friend than Great 
Britain’ (Bush, 2001). In the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 
October 2001, European countries did provide credible military support to America, 
especially Britain, France, Germany and Italy (Golino, 2002, pp. 64–66). However, 
when America extended the War on Terror to Iraq and the Saddam Hussein regime 
in March 2003, France and Germany took a critical attitude to the American decision.  
Because Britain continued support for America, and the EU member states in Eastern 
Europe also supported a hard line against Saddam Hussein, the divergence between 
member states on this issue became more serious. Therefore, it was argued that ‘if 
the war in Iraq has proven anything, it’s that the EU’s members do not have a 
common foreign policy’ (Dowd, 2004, p. 66). Blair also admitted that there were 
‘deep divisions over the coalition action’ and ‘not that all of European opinion is one 
way’ (Blair, 2003b). These divisions, however, did not push Blair to just leave or 
completely ignore the development of the ESDP.  
Blair recognised that by staying in this system Britain could protect its national 
interests from being undermined. Accordingly, Blair argued, ‘if Britain opted out of 
the policy that would not get rid of it. It would just go forward without British 
participation’ (Blair, 2003c). Actually, Blair did not want to repeat the failure 
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represented by absence from the initial development of economic integration, 
because it had led to a diminution of Britain’s influence in Europe. Also, Blair had a 
dream to make Britain become a bridge connecting Europe and America. This dream 
was proposed in the speech in Chicago in 1999 by Blair and reiterated again in 
Birmingham in 2001 (Blair, 2001). However, since America and some European 
countries (France and Germany especially) were so divergent on this issue, it became 
unlikely that Blair could be a bridge between them.  
These divisions inevitably impacted on Britain’s enthusiasm to host initiatives to 
develop the ESDP. Besides, although Blair’s choice of standing firmly with America on 
the issue of the Iraq war had consolidated the UK–US special relationship, it also 
distanced Britain from France and Germany. Blair’s choice implied that the special 
relationship with America was still the top priority of Britain’s policy, especially on 
security and military affairs. Because the foreign policy of Britain was very close to 
America’s, if Europe and America had a serious dispute it would make Britain 
become difficult to mediate between the US and Europe.  
4.4.2 Britain’s Commitment to Implementing the CSDP 
Although the War on Terror had gained a great deal of British attention in military 
affairs and had made Britain not that enthusiastic to take a progressive initiative on 
the ESDP, Britain was unlikely to reject an existing framework, otherwise it might run 
the risk of losing a say in the system. Since an institutionalised framework of the 
ESDP had been established from 1999 and a series of headline goals for defining 
capabilities-targets had gradually been adopted, Britain still continued its 
commitment to implementing the ESDP. Therefore, despite divisions over the Iraq 
war, there was still some progress made by Britain through the co-operation with 
France in the EU.  
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For example, in the four military ESDP missions in Africa, Britain and France were the 
most important contributors assisting in peacekeeping and training African 
peacekeepers (Chafer & Cumming, 2010, pp. 1134–1142). The EDA was also 
established in 2003 by a British–French joint proposal in order to ‘complement and 
reinforce NATO capability improvement work; and therefore, the EDA should 
generate better targeted and more cost-effective capabilities for ESDP’ (Blair, 2003a). 
Besides, Britain had co-operated with France to make a joint proposal for building EU 
battle groups. Up to now, Britain had committed to organising two battle groups, in 
2008 and 2010 (Lindstrom, 2007, p. 88), and it will prepare another battle group with 
Sweden in the second half of 2013. 
Regarding the Lisbon Treaty, the intergovernmental principle and the role of NATO in 
the new framework of the CSDP were still the most eminent concerns for Britain. In 
terms of the influence that the Lisbon Treaty might have upon NATO, the Brown 
Government assured Parliament that ‘NATO will remain the cornerstone of the 
United Kingdom defence policy and the only organisation for collective defence in 
Europe’ (Scott, 2008, p. 89). The Lib Dem MP Paul Keetch also stated in an interview 
for this thesis that Britain would support the EU to develop military capability as long 
as this would not undermine NATO (Keetch, 2009). Actually, the Brown Government 
did not change the principles regarding Britain referring CSDP issues, but Brown took 
a more ‘calm’ attitude. Therefore, Brown was considered as having a low 
international profile and as drawing back from the leading role played by Blair in the 
EU (Shepherd, 2010, pp. 53–55). 
The current Cameron Government has a more critical attitude towards EU issues. For 
example, regarding the proposal by France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain for 
establishing an EU military headquarters, the Foreign Minister William Hague stated 
that the Government would not agree to this because more creation would only 
distract member states from concentrating on utilising existing frameworks (Hague, 
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2011b). Besides, France, Germany and Poland had made a joint proposal about 
increasing the scope of common funding for EU battle groups (Rettman, 2010), but 
this proposal was unfavoured by Britain as well. Gerald Howarth, the Minister for 
International Security Strategy in the Cameron Government, claimed that the 
Government was opposed to such common funding (Howarth, 2011). This is because 
increasing common funding of the CSDP will increase the authority of EU institutions 
in Brussels in military affairs, and this development would undermine the 
intergovernmental foundation.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Being an influential military power in the EU, Britain has a credible capability of 
playing an eminent role in security and defence affairs if it has strong political will as 
well. Traditionally, Britain had not identified Europe as its top priority in its foreign 
policy, since it aimed at maintaining a leading role in the British Commonwealth and 
the special relationship with America. Because economic integration in Europe made 
much progress, Britain had to adopt a pragmatic and engaged policy towards 
European integration. In other words, although Britain did not favour a 
supranational framework, this was the compromise Britain had to make for 
membership of the EC. 
Regarding the development of security and defence integration in the EU, an 
intergovernmental framework which will not undermine the primary role of NATO is 
Britain’s principle. Therefore, any proposal for changing the intergovernmental basis 
or introducing an alternative to replace NATO will be unacceptable for Britain. Even 
the Blair Government, which had been considered the most pro-European 
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administration in Britain’s history, did not change this principle. In order to avoid the 
development of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP from being incompatible with this 
principle, these British Prime Ministers, John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, 
had all offered assurances that this principle had been included in relevant articles of 
the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. 
The pro-European policy undertaken by Blair in his first term should not be 
interpreted as a shift in Britain’s EU policy because Blair did not change the stance 
regarding the intergovernmental framework and NATO. Besides, generally speaking 
Britain has the ability and political will to undertake military co-operation with 
European countries if such co-operation will enhance the military influence of Britain 
and underpin the transatlantic alliance. That was why Blair signed the St Malo 
Declaration with Chirac, and also why Cameron agreed with Sarkozy to enhance the 
sharing of defence capabilities. These efforts imply military co-operation is 
compatible with Britain’s national interests, but Britain prefers a simple 
intergovernmental approach.  
Although the Lisbon Treaty maintains an intergovernmental basis for the CSDP, this 
framework more or less constrained member states to adopt a decision efficiently 
and make progress. Indeed, it is difficult to overcome the divergences between 27 
member states and reach consensus on an issue. Especially regarding an urgent 
situation like the Libyan crisis, Britain will prefer a more flexible approach to ensure 
the Government is able to take actions in the shortest time.  
Nevertheless, Britain still has to fulfil its commitment to the existing institutionalised 
framework of the CSDP. As Blair stated, even without the participation of Britain this 
system may still go forward, and then Britain will run the risk of being marginalised. 
Only by keeping on taking part in this system can Britain shape favourable conditions 
and protect its national interests. Britain’s case also illustrated that an 
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institutionalised framework would more or less have a ‘lock-in’ effect upon actors; 
member states may be not fully committed to implementing their promises, but 
such a framework would cost more to leave it. Therefore, Britain might reduce its 
participation in the CSDP if via this framework it is not able to achieve its national 
interests, but it would not totally abandon this system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
Germany and EU Security and Defence 
Integration 
5.1 Introduction 
Germany has presented a role model for European integration. This image derives 
from its long-term participation in and commitment to a united Europe. Its history of 
excessive nationalism under the National Socialists and the resulting occupation by 
the Allied Powers after 1945 restrained Germany’s national sovereignty and the 
ability of its political leaders to pursue self-interest. Especially in the early post-war 
years, four victorious powers had made a common and fundamental point to 
Germany: ‘Germany should never again be an independently-acting great power’ 
(Krieger, 1994). Afterwards, Germany was technically divided when the three 
Western Allies allowed the creation of the West German Federal Republic (West 
Germany) in 1949 and the communist German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 
was founded in the territory occupied by the Soviet Union in the same year. 
Although America, Britain and France agreed to end military occupation in West 
Germany and signed the Deutschlandvertrag treaty in 1952, which entered into force 
from 1955, it did not change the consequence of the division of Germany; this was 
because this treaty did not give West Germany full sovereignty, especially regarding 
the issues of German reunification and negotiation of a peace treaty for a united 
Germany (Kusters, 1995, pp. 58–59). 
For Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of West Germany, the early post-war years 
were ‘a struggle to regain sovereignty and achieve equality in the international 
system’ (Erb, 2003, p. 23). In order to alleviate the impact of this situation, Adenauer 
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undertook the Westpolitik policy in order to be fully engaged with the West. This 
policy relied on the logic that Germany’s interests were fully compatible with the 
Western powers’; therefore, if they trusted Germany enough, they would wish to 
dismantle the discriminatory status of Germany and accept Germany as a genuine 
partner (Paterson, 1996, p. 53). The Westpolitik policy led the Adenauer Government 
to adopt a multilateral policy, which was considered the ‘other side of the coin’ of 
the Westpolitik policy. Therefore, from 1949 to 1955, the Adenauer Government 
focused on maintaining close relations with America and France (D. B. Smith, 1990b, 
p. 159) and integrated West Germany into all major West alliances and multilateral 
organisations, including the European Community and NATO (Webber, 2001, p. 3).  
Although the Westpolitik policy was opposed by Kurt Schumacher and the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) because it was considered to hinder German reunification 
(Hanrieder, 1967, cited in Erb, ibid., p. 25), since Adenauer stayed Chancellor 
between 1949 and 1961, this signified that the Westpolitik policy was supported by 
the German people (Schweiger, 2007, p. 46). Even when Willy Brandt, the SPD 
Chancellor of West Germany from 1969 to 1974, pursued a new policy towards the 
East, West Germany still anchored itself firmly with the West (D. B. Smith, 1990c, p. 
223). 
The commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism did not change after 
Germany completed reunification. That is because, through its long-term 
participation in European integration, this commitment has been embedded in 
German national interests. It is also believed that integration into Western 
institutions has transformed German attitudes towards politics and government; 
therefore, national interests would be pursued by using soft power within 
co-operative institutional frameworks (Erb, ibid., p. 104). Accordingly, Helmut Kohl, 
the Chancellor who led the divided Germany to complete reunification in 1990, had 
stated in a speech to the Bundestag that Germany would continue its commitment 
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to economic integration, and also work for political integration in Europe (Kohl, 
1989). Since then, Germany has kept its commitment to taking part in forming 
institutionalised framework for the CFSP, ESDP and the CSDP, and active 
participation in this process also enables Germany to consolidate its leading role in 
the EU.  
This chapter will review the historical process of how Germany has been involved in 
security and defence integration in Europe and examine how Germany shapes this 
process. Firstly, this chapter will unfold how Germany became integrated into the 
West’s security system in the early post-war years. Secondly, it will discuss the 
German role in the EPC. Thirdly, this chapter will analyse how a reunited Germany 
led the EU to fulfil its efforts to build common security and defence. Meanwhile, this 
chapter will explore how Germany has been transformed as a civilian power and 
how it has exported this character to the development of the CFSP, ESDP and CSDP 
as well.  
 
5.2 Background of Germany’s Policy on the Initial Development 
of European Integration 
When West Germany was established, on 23 May 1949, it still suffered from 
semi-sovereignty status because it was still occupied by the Allied forces of America, 
Britain and France. In order to overcome this situation, the first Chancellor of West 
Germany, Adenauer, introduced the Westpolitik policy in order to regain the trust of 
the West. The Westpolitik policy also led Germany to advocate institutionalism and 
multilateralism, and then participate in the project of European integration. As 
presented by Konrad Adenauer, participation in European integration was not only 
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for economic interests, but was also based on a desire for political stability 
(Abelshauser, 1995, p. 29). A co-operative image would help Germany to be trusted 
by the West and develop full sovereignty. Especially in the early post-war years, to 
reach reconciliation with the Western countries and France most of all was an urgent 
task for Germany (Miskimmon, 2001, pp. 84–85). 
On the basis of the Westpolitik policy, the foreign policy of West Germany was 
described as having three characteristics: multilateral orientation, civilian character, 
and Euro-centrism (Webber, 2001, pp. 3–5). Via these features, West Germany 
established the image of being a peaceful and reliable partner for the West. In order 
to fulfil the Westpolitik policy, on the one hand West Germany echoed the Schuman 
Declaration in 1951, which advocated building a common market for the coal and 
steel industries (Schuman, 1950, repr. in Nelsen & Stubb, 1998, pp. 13–14), and then 
contributed to establishing the ECSC in 1951; this was followed by the Treaty of 
Rome, signed in 1957, to build a EEC. On the other hand, to obtain security 
assurances from the West, West Germany integrated with NATO after 1955.  
5.2.1 German Commitment to Initiate European Integration 
Taking account of the escalating tension between the West and the East, there was 
not much space for European countries to adopt a ‘middle way’ policy. Although the 
SPD proposed a neutral foreign policy (Hacke, 1997, p. 47, cited in Schweiger, 2007, 
p. 46), this proposal was not favoured by the German people, who were looking for 
stability, and the Western countries (Erb, 2003, p. 25). However, the contending 
views represented by Adenauer and Schumacher should be seen as different political 
judgements about which option would help Germany to get rid of external 
constraints rather than as different ideologies or national aspirations (Krieger, 1994, 
p. 157). Because Adenauer realised the fact that West Germany’s future relied on 
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the relations with the West (Kay, 1998, p. 55), he released the most sincerity to take 
part in international institutions. 
The contribution to the ECSC was a commitment made by West Germany to 
demonstrate that it was willing to be engaged in Europe. Meanwhile, by asking for 
equal terms of entry into the ECSC, West Germany alleviated restrictions on its 
sovereignty in the ECSC. The ECSC created the Franco–German alliance, and this 
co-operation was considered the basis of European peace and prosperity since 1950 
(Dedman, 1996, p. 63), which would make any war between France and Germany 
become not only unthinkable but also ‘materially’ impossible (Diebold, 1959, p. 1, 
cited in Erb, ibid., p. 26). 
Following the ECSC, there was another proposal made by France which aimed to 
integrate the military resources of West European countries and build the EDC. The 
Deutschlandvertrag (the Allied–German Contractual Agreement) was signed in 1952 
to give West Germany ‘full power over its domestic and foreign affairs‘, if the EDC 
came into force (Erb, ibid., p. 76). Therefore, the proposal to build the EDC was 
welcome by West Germany since it was an opportunity to regain sovereignty. 
Besides, Adenauer considered that by playing a leading role in European integration 
West Germany would ‘have a good chance to impress the stamp of a Christian 
ideology on the making of Europe‘ (Adenauer, 1952, cited in Kusters, 1995, p. 62), in 
contrast to socialism. 
The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 and ratified by the Bundestag of West 
Germany on 19 May 1953, with 225 votes in favour against 165 opposed (Patton, 
1999, p. 52). Meanwhile, the result in the General Election for the Bundestag on 6 
September 1953 also signified the majority of German people supported the 
leadership of the Adenauer Government and the policy of Westpolitik. In this 
General Election, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group gained 244 seats, and compared 
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to the previous election result, it gained 105 extra seats while the SPD merely gained 
20 (Roegele, 1954). However, because the EDC Treaty was rejected by the French 
Parliament in 1954, the West had to look for an alternative to engage West Germany 
in the Western security and defence framework, and the consequence was to 
incorporate West Germany into NATO. Nevertheless, although the EDC was not 
accomplished, West Germany had proved its commitment to the West again in the 
process of building the EDC. 
5.2.2 West Germany Rearmed and Integrated into NATO 
Being the most successful security alliance ever, NATO had provided security 
assurance for Western Europe to resist the threat from the Soviet Union over the 
Cold War period. The original goal of NATO was for a dual strategy of containment, 
which was not only to contain the Soviet Union, but also to prevent Germany from 
becoming militaristic again. As the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay said 
bluntly that NATO was established to ‘keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and 
the Germans down’ (Ismay, cited in Manea, 2010). Hence, when the North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed in April 1949, West Germany was not part of NATO since West 
Germany was only founded that year.  
Things changed when West Germany was formed one month after the North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed, and then how to help a disarmed free German country to survive 
and protect it from the threat of the Soviet Union became important to the West. 
Accordingly, it was argued that neither the Soviet Union nor America could afford 
the luxury of maintaining their demilitarised German territories (Fischer, 2001, p. 
148, cited in Maruzsa, 2011, p. 291). The EDC was supposed to resolve the issue of 
German rearmament, but then this was rejected by France. The defeat of the EDC 
was therefore considered as a door opened for West Germany to NATO, and Britain 
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and France realised they had to accept this possibility because this was the necessary 
price of American support for defending Europe (Erb, ibid., p. 29).  
After the EDC Treaty was disapproved by the French Parliament on 30 August 1954, 
the Nine-Power meeting in London held on 28 September 1954 invited West 
Germany to join NATO, and the Western allies would end their occupation of 
German territories (Final Act of Nine-Power Meeting, 1954). Since then, West 
Germany had equality in security affairs. At the conclusion of this meeting, West 
Germany also made a commitment that it would not produce atomic, biological or 
chemical weapons and offensive weapons, including missiles, mines, warships and 
bombers, unless requested by NATO, and this compromise was basically made to 
ease anxiety from NATO member states about a rearmed West Germany. West 
Germany was incorporated into NATO since 1955 and most restrictions imposed 
from the end of WWII were dismantled. Although the military occupation did not 
end completely, because West Germany agreed that Allied troops would remain 
stationed on its territory as part of a NATO security guarantee in case of an attack by 
the Soviet Union, it nevertheless became a de facto sovereignty country.  
Besides, West Germany, together with Italy and the signatory states of the Treaty of 
Brussels, was incorporated into the Western European Union (WEU) by the modified 
Treaty of Brussels signing on 23 October 1954. This treaty was originally signed in 
1948. The conclusion made on 21 October 1954 in the Nine-Powers meeting held in 
Paris by America, the Benelux Countries, Britain, Canada, France, West Germany and 
Italy confirmed that the Western allies would end the occupation of West Germany, 
and also reached agreement to invite West Germany and Italy to join the WEU 
(Conclusions of Nine-Power Meeting in Paris, 1954). However, although the WEU 
was established for the building of a collective defence system through 
intergovernmental collaboration and therefore would enable West Germany to 
contribute to defending Europe, in the end it did not become a serious military 
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mechanism. West Germany attempted to develop the WEU for co-ordinating foreign 
and defence policies, but this idea was objected to by America, Britain and France. 
American did not favour according the WEU strong political implications, while 
Britain and France viewed the WEU only as a controlling agency for arms production 
(Schmidt, 1995, p. 159).  
We can conclude that through the Westpolitik policy, West Germany embedded 
itself into the Western economic and military systems, and this enabled it to gain 
economic progress from the project of European economic integration and obtain 
security assurances from NATO and America. This signified the success of the 
Westpolitik policy. Meanwhile, by taking part in multilateral institutions in the West, 
West Germany also contributed to the post-war Western Europe process, which was 
characterised as one of ‘deep integration’, and then a multilateral framework for 
resolving the ‘German problem’ was established; eventually Germany even 
‘conflated’ its interests with European interests (Hyde-Price, 2000, pp. 80, 124). 
Indeed, this process had started to shape West Germany and made it become more 
‘civilian’, because the Westpolitik policy was utilising a multilateral and institutional 
approach to pursue West German self-interests. Adenauer adopted this approach in 
order to participate in and shape European integration, but in the end Germany was 
also shaped by the consequence of European integration. Besides, long-term 
participation in European integration not only gave Germany an equal opportunity to 
work with Western countries (Kusters, 1995, p. 76), but also it became able to export 
its domestic state structure and federal ideas to institutional frameworks eventually 
(L. Hoffmann & Shaw, 2004; Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, pp. 40–47), which 
strengthened the leading role of Germany in these institution-building processes.   
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5.2.3 Before the European Political Co-operation: West Germany’s Eastern 
Policy 
The commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism encouraged West Germany 
to take part in institution-building processes in Europe. In the security and defence 
context, although West Germany had become a NATO member in 1955, it was still 
willing to develop other security mechanisms in Europe. It was believed that 
participation in more multilateral institutions would be a ‘safe’ way to increase its 
influence in Europe. Therefore, a project for Franco–German military co-operation 
was agreed on 22 January 1963 in Paris by Adenauer and the French President 
Charles de Gaulle. This project covered the fields of cultural, political, economic and 
foreign and defence affairs, and provided institutionalised procedures for regular 
official meetings at different levels between the two governments (Joint 
Franco-German Declaration, 1963). However, because France and West Germany 
had a dispute over Britain’s accession to the Community and also over NATO’s 
primary raison d’être of defending Europe (Chopra, 1974, pp. 150–152), this bilateral 
co-operation project merely concentrated on information and personnel exchanges 
(J. L. Clarke, 1988, p. 77). 
The aspiration of enhancing political co-operation in the Community was growing as 
economic integration had made significant progress. Besides, the ‘empty chair’ crisis 
in the Community also triggered the concern that developing political integration in 
Europe was inevitable. In 1965, de Gaulle pursued the ‘policy of the empty chair’ for 
half a year in order to maintain the veto of national governments in the Council of 
Ministers. The ‘empty chair’ crisis was criticised by the SPD (Moeller, 1996, p. 37) 
and also illustrated the fact that ‘the creation of economic control authorities 
without the corresponding formation of a political union would, in the long run, 
discredit the integration plan’ worried about by Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer 
(Loth, 1995, pp. 215–216). Moreover, the inability to form a coherent position in 
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response to the Six-Day War between Israel and Arab countries in 1967 also urged 
EC countries to work for closer political co-operation. Furthermore, the change in 
German foreign policy since the Brandt Government also offered an incentive for EC 
countries to develop a political framework to ensure German commitment to 
European integration.  
As the détente between America and the Soviet Union continued since the 
mid-1960s, the relationship between the West and the East eased, and this offered a 
chance for West Germany to rethink the Westpolitik policy and the Hallstein doctrine. 
The Hallstein doctrine was a principle of Adenauer’s foreign policy which referred to 
a non-recognition policy regarding East Germany and avoided diplomatic relations 
with Eastern Europe (W. G. Gray, 2007, pp. 80–86). Although Adenauer aimed to 
isolate East Germany, this doctrine inevitably affected the space and flexibility of 
West Germany’s foreign policy.  
In order to create a favourable environment for German reunification, the SPD had 
maintained a preference for a closer relationship with the East. When the CDU/CSU 
and the SPD reached consensus about ‘Germany’s Western identity’ in the 1960s 
(Erb, ibid., pp. 34–41; D.B. Smith, 1990d, p. 199), the SPD also committed to the 
Westpolitik policy, but promised to develop relationships with the East. When Willy 
Brandt was elected Chancellor of the SPD/FDP coalition government from 1969 to 
1974, he advocated the Ostpolitik policy, based on the idea that building closer 
relations between two German states was not necessarily anti-Western (Erb, ibid., p. 
43). Accordingly, the Brandt Government recognised the status quo of a divided 
Germany, although it did not accept the German Democratic Republic as a state 
under international law (Hacker, 1995, cited in Schweiger, 2007, p. 49); the 
Government also signed treaties with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague from 1970 to 
1973 in order to release long-term tensions between West Germany and the East.  
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Compared to the Westpolitik policy, which was held to be an inflexible pro-Western 
position, the Ostpolitik policy accomplished Brandt’s idea of coping with the issue of 
‘one nation in two states’ (Brandt, 1969) by normalising the relationship with East 
Germany and increasing interactions and mutual understanding. The Ostpolitik 
policy enabled West Germany to gain more autonomy to undertake foreign policy 
(Schweigler, 1975, pp. 135-137; D. B. Smith, 1990a, p. 162). However, it invoked 
some criticisms from the CDU because it was argued that this policy might 
undermine relations with the Western allies and therefore attempted to object to 
the ratification of the Treaty of Moscow in the Bundestag (Erb, ibid., pp. 44–46). 
Besides, the Ostpolitik policy was considered to encourage West Germany to pursue 
national self-interest instead of European commitments (Kinsky, 1971).  
Actually, the Ostpolitik policy would strengthen West Germany’s commitment to the 
West, because it did not want to be accused of ‘reverting to Germany’s old position’ 
(Erb, ibid., p. 48), and would contribute to a real détente between the West and the 
East and then build a more stable environment in Europe (Fink & Schaefer, 2009, pp. 
1–6). In order to cope with the concern arising from domestic politics and the 
Western allies about the Ostpolitik policy, Brandt had given assurances that the 
Ostpolitik policy would not undermine the government’s commitment to the West. 
In his speech in the Bundestag in 1969, Brandt emphasised the indispensable role of 
NATO for defending Europe (Brandt, ibid.); also, at the SPD conference in May 1970, 
Brandt reiterated support for and participation in the EC, and even promised to 
co-operate on foreign and security policies (Moeller, 1996, p. 39). 
5.2.4 West Germany in the European Political Co-operation 
In order to express determination for continuing the European integration progress, 
at the 1969 Hague summit Brandt declared that he would support the first 
enlargement of the EC, the launch of the EPC, and institutional reforms for the EC 
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(Moeller, ibid., pp. 38–39). Besides, in the address to the European Parliament, 
Brandt expressed his aspiration to achieve the unification of Europe, and he also 
argued that the EPC should be a tentative step towards wider consultations between 
EC member states (Brandt, 1973, repr. in European Political Cooperation (EPC), 1988, 
pp. 312–315). Walter Scheel, the Foreign Minister in the Brandt Government, called 
for the EC to undertake a pragmatic and progressive approach for taking joint actions 
in order to maintain an influential status in the world (Scheel, 1973, repr. in ibid., pp. 
310–312). These promises fixed West Germany within the multilateral and 
institutional frameworks of the EC, and then West Germany was still firmly anchored 
within European integration.  
By claiming a ‘less ideological and more pragmatic’ policy than the Brandt 
Government, although the succeeding SPD Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, promised to 
continue the Ostpolitik policy, he would do that ‘without illusions’ (Schweigler, 1975, 
pp. 139–140). This signified that Schmidt took a more cautious attitude towards the 
Ostpolitik policy, because the international economic system was facing change in 
the early 1970s since the oil crisis had led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System; meanwhile, the EC was occupied with coping with its first enlargement and 
launching its first institutional reforms since the mid-1970s, including direct elections 
to the European Parliament from 1979, establishing the European Monetary System 
(EMS), and adjusting the budgetary framework. Either Schmidt’s Germany or other 
European countries were too distracted to work out a more detailed plan for 
political integration.  
Besides, the aspiration of the West German public towards reunification was not 
that strong in the early 1970s. A public poll conducted in 1973 showed that only 23 
per cent of West Germans considered German reunification more important than 
the unification of Europe, while 65 per cent considered the unification of Europe 
more important than German reunification (Moeller, ibid., p. 36). Therefore, to 
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pursue German reunification was not a priority for the Schmidt Government; a 
stable and pragmatic approach for the future was for Germany more realistic.  
The commitment to institutionalism continued becoming an essential element for 
the Schmidt Government. This commitment was reflected in the support to the 
Tindemans Report by West Germany. The Schmidt Government accepted the overall 
objective of the Tindemans Report in 1976, but called for a more democratic 
framework for the European Union (Moeller, ibid., p. 39). Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
the Foreign Minister for the Schmidt and the Kohl Government, also stated a 
common foreign policy in Europe with broader fields and higher degree of common 
action should be achieved by expanding the EPC in the statement on direct election 
for the European Parliament (Genscher, 1976, repr. in European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), ibid., pp. 315–318). 
The commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism was also insisted by the Kohl 
and CDU/CSU Government, which won the General Election in 1982. The 
commitment to European integration, stemming from Adenauer’s Westpolitik policy, 
was strengthened by Kohl, who argued that he would follow the legacy left by 
Adenauer (Kohl, 1975, p. 5, cited in Paterson, 1996, p. 55). Under the German 
Presidency in 1983, Genscher also promised West Germany would maintain the 
commitment to the EC and EPC and promoted the joint proposal by West Germany 
and Italy for the ‘European Act’ and European unification; moreover, he declared 
that the Government aimed at strengthening the EPC in the field of security affairs 
for further political unification (Genscher, 1983, repr. in European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), ibid., pp. 321–324). Genscher’s statement was echoed by Kohl in 
his speech at the signing of the Solemn Declaration in 1983 (Genscher, repr. in ibid., 
pp. 324–326), and reiterated by Genscher himself on other occasions, including at 
the European Parliament in 1983, the Institute of European Policy in 1985, and the 
University of Salamanca in 1986 (repr. in ibid., pp. 326–327, 344–349, 359–368). 
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These public speeches signified that West Germany was completely embedded in 
the framework of European integration, or at least the Government attempted to 
show it had been embedded in this framework. Moreover, the Kohl Government 
pursued further political integration, and the result would expand West Germany’s 
influence from an economic to a political dimension.  
In addition to the commitment to European integration, Kohl also emphasised the 
core basis of the Franco-German relationship in the process of driving European 
integration, and the friendship between Kohl and the French President François 
Mitterrand also contributed to this relationship (Paterson, 1996, pp. 55–56). A joint 
proposal for a Draft Treaty on European Union was proposed by France and West 
Germany which advocated increasing the capacity of supranational actors and 
introducing a majority to the Council (The Draft Treaty, proposed in 1984). Although 
this proposal was not adopted by the 1985 European Council in Milan (Presidency 
Conclusions of Milan European Council, adopted in 1985), it encouraged other 
member states of the EC to propose other projects for building the European Union.   
 
5.3 Germany and an Institutionalised Common Security and 
Defence Framework 
German reunification and the end of the Cold War not only changed the 
international environment but also offered a new incentive for European integration. 
In this respect, although NATO played the most decisive role in the Cold War in 
protecting Western Europe, as the Warsaw Pact was disbanded in 1991 the presence 
of NATO in Europe was inevitably discussed, including the possibility of replacing 
NATO with a new pan-European security organisation (e.g. the OCSE) (J. Clarke, 
153 
 
1993-1994; Heisbourg, 1992; Kenny, 1991; Schake, 1998; Wallander, 2000), and the 
call for reforming the EC also emerged since the 1980s. In other words, both NATO 
and the EC faced a stage of transformation after the end of the Cold War. 
In order to fulfil its commitment to European integration, Germany contributed to 
the development of European integration and an institutionalised common security 
and defence framework in the EU, and played a leading role in this process. The 
interactions between German participation and the development of European 
integration therefore accomplished a ‘reciprocal’ link. As institutionalists have 
argued, a reciprocal relationship between actions and external environment would 
not only make the environment become stable, but also ensure that the actors 
would maintain their contributions to this environment (March & Olsen, 1984; M. E. 
Smith, 2004a, p. 17). 
5.3.1 Kohl’s Continuing Commitment to European Integration 
When the Unification Treaty entered into force on 3 October 1990, two German 
states became united. However, the reunited status and the end of the Cold War 
raised the ‘Germany questions’ again (Webber, 2001, pp. 5–6). Since the reunited 
Germany was questioned by its EC partners about whether it would continue its 
commitment to European integration (Rummel, 1996), in order to ease those 
worries Kohl had reiterated that the determination of Germany regarding European 
integration and NATO would be irreversible (Morgan, 1993, pp. 93–112, cited in Cole, 
1998, pp.125–126). Besides, the conclusions made in the 1989 Strasbourg European 
Council also confirmed that EC countries decided to accelerate the process of 
building a European Union (Presidency Conclusions of the Strasbourg European 
Council, adopted in 1989). Therefore, maintaining a commitment to multilateralism, 
institutionalism, European integration and NATO continued to be an essential 
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foundation for the Kohl Government so as to gain the agreement of the Western 
Allies for the German states to reunite.  
The commitment of the reunited Germany to European integration was confirmed 
by Kohl’s words: European unity is a ‘question of war and peace’ and German unity 
and European unity are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Kohl, cited in Banchoff, 1997, p. 
61). Although the Cold War has ended and the confrontation between the West and 
the East does not exist, the characteristics of being a multilateral actor, a civilian 
power, and maintaining an institutionalist inclination coming from the policy of 
Westpolitik, had not been changed in Germany’s foreign policy, and underpinned the 
Kohl Government to promote a more ambitious project for European integration 
(Denison, 2001, p. 159). 
Accordingly, since 1990 Kohl and the Federal Minister Genscher had declared 
repeatedly that Germany was ready for an entire political union in the EC and called 
for other member states to follow it (Beuter, 1994, p. 87). Kohl’s position on creating 
a political and economic European Union was also supported by the French 
President Mitterrand (Erb, ibid., p. 126). Actually, Mitterrand also wanted the 
reunited Germany to be deeply embedded in the framework of European integration 
(Bozo, 2009, pp. 83–110). The Franco-German motor led to the establishment of the 
European Union and also became an important basis for further institutional reforms 
of the EU.  
A joint letter from Kohl and Mitterrand was sent to the Irish Presidency of the 
Council on 19 April 1990 to call for intergovernmental conferences for building a 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and a European Political Union (EPU) (Beuter, 
1994, pp. 87–88; Hagland, 1995, p. 555; Wijnbergen, 1992, p. 58); also, an initiative 
for the Eurocorps was proposed at the Franco-German Summit in La Rochelle on 21–
22 May 1992 (Hagland, 1995, p. 559). Although the proposal for the Eurocorps was 
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not accepted under the framework of the Maastricht Treaty, the Eurocorps was still 
established in Strasbourg in 1992 by France and Germany; Belgium, Spain and 
Luxembourg joined respectively. The idea of the Eurocorps was to improve citizens’ 
security on the basis of European citizenship (Anderson, 1994), and therefore it was 
a transnational and supranational initiative which connected internal police 
institutions with the whole social-economic environment in Europe (N. Walker, 
1994). 
The significance of Germany developing the Eurocorps was that it was the first time 
that Germany had suggested establishing a supranational European police agency 
which aimed at building common capability to combat drug barons and organised 
international crime (Paterson, 1996, p. 57). This proposal was supposed to break 
traditional territorial boundaries between member states, and therefore it would be 
a revolution on internal security affairs. However, this proposal was not really 
fulfilled by member states. The Eurocorps did not develop a supranational 
framework in the end. It now has become a headquarters to prepare and deploy 
humanitarian operations for NATO and the EU. 
The Maastricht Treaty mentioned the objective of forming a common defence policy 
(Article J.4, The Maastricht Treaty). However, if the EU countries attempted to 
develop full independent security and defence forces, this risked causing tensions 
between America and Europe (Janes, 2008, p. 4; Miskimmon, 2001, pp. 91, 95). For 
example, according to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, America would not 
welcome the EU ‘duplicating existing NATO efforts, decoupling European defence 
from NATO and discriminating against states who are members of NATO but not of 
the EU’ (cited in Orakhelashvili, 2011, p. 145). Therefore, although Kohl favoured a 
more integrated structure for the CFSP, he decided to share a similar opinion with 
Britain that the EU would not replace NATO (Hagland, 1995, p. 564).  
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Moreover, although Kohl was willing to maintain the commitment to institutionalism 
and building an institutionalised framework for the EU, including the CFSP, he did 
not have much aspiration to develop a military role for Germany. The commitment 
to institutionalism, multilateralism and even supranationalism has transformed 
Germany into a civilian power. A civilian power, as defined by Hanns W. Maull, refers 
to a state that accepts co-operation with others in pursuit of external aims; it would 
therefore focus on non-military and economic means to ensure national objectives 
with military power were left as a last resort; also, it is willing to develop 
supranational frameworks to cope with international issues (Maull, 1990, pp. 92–93). 
Accordingly, a civilian power has three features. Firstly, it is a power with political, 
economic and military capability. Secondly, it would utilise non-military means to 
accomplish its objectives first, regardless of having military capability. Thirdly, it is 
not only a co-operationist, but also would not reject supranationalism. According to 
these criteria, Germany is usually considered a civilian power, and the principle of 
being a civilian power inevitably affects the political will of Germany to take part in 
military missions.  
Although the Franco–German motor was relaunched for the development of the 
Eurocorps, which was supposed an ambitious project for consolidating internal 
security in Europe, the Kohl Government did not make further commitment to build 
European security and defence capability. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in 
1994 the German Constitutional Court issued a ruling to allow the German 
government to deploy troops outside the area of NATO under the mandate of the 
UN, but the German government has to be explicitly approved by the German 
Parliament before each deployment (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfGE 90, 145, 
1994). This decision removed the restriction on the German government taking part 
in overseas operations and was a crucial basis for Germany to shape an active 
security role in the international scene. However, it did not fundamentally change 
the principle of Germany being a civilian power. 
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5.3.2 Germany’s Proposals for the Amsterdam Treaty 
In the process of negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty, Germany was eager to reform a 
more efficient decision-making process in order to implement the CFSP effectively. 
For example, the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel had called for qualified majority 
voting on all aspects of the EU’s affairs (German Basic Points to the IGC, 1996). A 
more comprehensive statement of Germany’s suggestions to reform the CFSP was 
presented in its White Paper (German White Paper to the IGC, ibid.).  
According to the White Paper, Germany repeated the necessity for expanding 
majority voting to define the CFSP in order to create an efficient decision-making 
process and effective implementation; besides, Germany also expressed the stance 
of integrating the WEU into the EU in order to strengthen the defence basis of the 
CFSP. Moreover, both France and Germany called for a permanent supranational 
body to ensure the implementation of the CFSP. It is worth noting that the CDU/CSU 
document, which was included in this White Paper, called for intensifying Franco–
German co-operation to reform the framework of the field of the CFSP and internal 
policy, which intended to drive further integration for the CFSP and internal affairs 
via a Franco–German motor. Even today, the co-operation between France and 
Germany is still considered a crucial force for driving the development of European 
integration (Henne, 2009). However, regardless of the efforts of developing the CFSP, 
the Kohl Government did not intend to undermine the role of NATO because it 
stated repeatedly that NATO was an indispensable presence for European security. 
The necessity of developing the capability of the CFSP in order to share responsibility 
for the transatlantic alliance was also mentioned in the White Paper.  
Most proposals from the Kohl Government regarding the reform of the CFSP in the 
1996 IGC were adopted in the Amsterdam Treaty. For example, the qualified 
majority had been expanded in the CFSP decision-making process and brought into 
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the constructive abstention (Article J.13, The Amsterdam Treaty); the WEU was 
incorporated into the EU as an integral part (Article J.4, The Amsterdam Treaty); and 
a High Representative for the CFSP (Article J.16, The Amsterdam Treaty) and a policy 
planning and early warning unit (Declaration to the Final Act on the Establishment of 
a policy planning and early warning unit, The Amsterdam Treaty) were introduced.  
The high achievement of German proposals for CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty 
implied that Germany had played a leading role in the process of negotiations for 
making the Amsterdam Treaty. However, Germany’s foreign policy was not 
considered that of a normal member state of the CFSP in the 1990s because it 
concentrated more on ‘normative non-military issues’ (Rummel, 1996, p. 58). 
Although the policy of the reunited Germany was described as having characteristics 
including multilateralism and a focus on co-operative institution-building, human 
rights and international law, these characteristics were unable to offer definite 
objectives for Germany in response to international crisis. After Gerhard Schröder 
had been elected in 1998, the crisis in the Kosovo gave Germany a new incentive to 
clarify the role Germany should play in security and defence affairs. 
5.3.3 Germany’s Transformation in the Common Security and Defence 
Policy 
When the SPD leader Gerhard Schröder was elected Chancellor from 1998, the Red–
Green government formed by the SPD and the Green Party offered a favourable 
condition for Germany to define and transform the security role. The young 
generation of the Red–Green coalition government placed an emphasis on human 
rights and more focus on national self-interest (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000).  
Take German participation in the NATO mission, Operation Allied Force (OAF), in 
Kosovo as an example. The Green Foreign Minister asserted that this decision was 
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made according to a humanitarian consideration (Fischer, 1999); in other words, to 
utilise military means to protect values such as human rights became a considerable 
option for Germany. Because German participation in the OAF was the first time a 
military mission had been deployed outside German territory since the end of WWII, 
it was described as a watershed in German foreign policy and a defining moment 
(Miskimmon, 2009, p. 561). Since December 2001, Germany has also taken part in 
the NATO mission in Afghanistan: the International Military Engagement in 
Afghanistan (ISAF). The mission of ISAF was the first time that Germany sent its 
ground troops outside its territory to implement military actions. According to the 
Military Balance Report published by International Institute for Strategic Studies in 
2012, in 2011 Germany still maintained 5,150 troops for ISAF and offered a 
Headquarters (Military Balance, 2012, p. 120); also, during the period of the Libyan 
crisis, Germany had decided to take part in the AWACS mission in Afghanistan in 
order to share the work with NATO countries (Westerwelle, 2011d). 
The increasing participation in NATO and EU missions since the Kosovo crisis 
addressed a concern as to whether Germany would still be a civilian power following 
the end of the Cold War; also, people were concerned about whether Germany had 
begun to focus more on the pursuit of national interests than on maintaining 
multilateralist enthusiasm (Overhaus, 2004, p. 1). Regardless of these scepticisms, 
Miskimmon considered that since Germany still lacked the political will to undertake 
high-intensity military deployments since the participation that the Kosovo crisis had 
invoked, the principle of the use of force maintained continuity instead of producing 
change (Miskimmon, 2009). Similarly, Harnisch, Maull and Hyde-Price also argued 
that because the participation of Germany in Kosovo was shaped by norms and 
beliefs rather than material interests and did not change the commitment to 
multilateralism and the Western allies, Germany still maintained the role of being a 
civilian power (Harnisch & Maull, 2001; Hyde-Price, 2001).  
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The participation in Kosovo and the Afghanistan mission also strengthened the 
connections between Germany and NATO and showed the commitment to the 
Atlantic alliance. On the one hand, in terms of taking part in Operation Allied Force, 
the Schröder Government argued that the support to NATO and the West should be 
seen as a support for Western values (Erb, 2003, pp. 170–171); on the other hand, 
the participation in ISAF not only enhanced solidarity with America, but also was a 
further step to ‘normalise’ the use of force on the international scene (Gross, 2007, 
pp. 511–512). Besides, increasing demands from NATO and the EU also asked 
Germany to contribute more efforts to international crisis management operations 
and also pressed Germany to take more part in allied missions; these requests also 
led Germany to develop ‘shared goals’ and ‘collective mechanisms’ to achieve 
national goals (King, 2006, pp. 271–273).  
By and large, the Kosovo crisis was not only an important impetus for the EU to 
make more efforts on security and defence affairs, but was a more important event 
for Germany in adjusting its role on security and defence affairs. This was because 
this event pushed Germany to reconsider how to shape the future of the EU and 
how Germany should contribute to this future (Miskimmon, 2001, p. 93). If the EU 
would play a more important role in world affairs, it would not only need a coherent 
foreign policy, but also require credible capability to back up the foreign policy. 
However, whether to build greater capability especially needed the input of political 
will from all the ‘Big Three’, that is Britain, France and Germany. 
Indeed, although the ESDP had been established from the 1999 Cologne European 
Council, it did not ensure a new policy area would be fulfilled absolutely, because 
this still depends on whether the Big Three would implement their political will and 
how such implementation might lead other EU countries to follow them. When the 
ESDP was launched at the beginning, the leaders of the Big Three did offer strong 
political will to implement it, and therefore, the procedure for implementation and a 
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target of military capability were soon confirmed in the 1999 Helsinki European 
Council. As the development of the ESDP became more detailed and focused, the 
divergences of perspectives on security and defence affairs were becoming more 
obvious between Germany and other two countries. Germany still insisted on a 
civilian path, which was especially stressed by a German parliamentary member 
interviewed in this thesis (Henne, 2009). Therefore, although Germany made a 
commitment at the 1999 Cologne European Council to develop the ESDP, it was not 
fully committed to a military path. Henne argues that this is because the 
consequences of WWI and WWII made the German people prefer not to develop 
strong military force in the EU (Henne, ibid.). 
Therefore, rather than arguing that Germany has changed the terms for the use of 
force, military participation in the OAF and ISAF will be seen as a realisation of the 
commitment to the West and human rights since the concern for humanitarian 
issues is one of the essential elements in Germany’s foreign policy. Also, because 
these military deployments were undertaken under multilateral and institutional 
frameworks, they were still compatible with Germany’s long-term commitment to 
institutionalism and multilateralism. Germany did not adjust the principle of 
multilateralism and institutionalism. 
This argument was shared by two SPD MdBs in the interviews for this thesis. Hans 
Peter-Bartels argued that ‘Germany does not want to go special ways and does not 
want to go somewhere alone’ (Bartels, 2010). What he meant was that any military 
deployment of Germany would only apply to collective objectives by multilateral 
institutions. Rainer Arnold also emphasised that ‘we do not want to go anywhere 
alone’ (Arnold, 2009). Therefore, the deployment of Germany troops would only 
follow the decisions of the UN, NATO or the EU. Germany would not initiate a 
military mission ‘only for a German purpose’. Accordingly, once these military 
deployments were undertaken under multilateral and institutional frameworks, they 
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would be still compatible with Germany’s long-term commitment to institutionalism 
and multilateralism. 
To summarise, although Germany has become more ‘assertive’, it is still adhered to a 
framework of multilateral institutions (Denison, 2001, p. 161). Meanwhile, even 
though Germany adopts greater flexibility in the use of military forces, it does not 
actually prefer to play a military role. For example, in 2010, compared to Britain and 
France, which deployed around 31,000 and 15,000 armies abroad, Germany only 
deployed some 6,700 troops for multilateral operations (Military Balance Report, 
2011). However, although the lower amount signifies that Germany is not as willing 
as Britain or France to play military role and send German troops to carry out 
missions, Germany still makes substantial contributions when it comes to 
international policing efforts. Take German participation in the NATO mission KFOR 
in Kosovo as an example. In 2011, Germany contributed 1,451 troops for the KFOR 
policing mission, which was still the most important part in Europe (Military Balance 
Report, 2012). 
 
5.4 Germany and the Implementation of a Common Security and 
Defence Policy 
Since the NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Germany has started to deploy 
troops abroad to take part in military operations, but there is no significant sign that 
Germany has transformed itself into a robust military power. Actually, Germany still 
maintains a self-restricting principle in terms of the ‘use of force’. Even after the war 
against Iraq in which Germany co-operated with France in the EU more closely, 
Germany did not make any more commitment to improving military and civilian 
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capability in substantial ways. Unlike Britain, Germany seems to have a preference 
for reforming institutional frameworks of the EU and ESDP/CSDP, but it rarely 
presents a definite objective regarding what it can commit to ESDP/CSDP missions, 
especially ESDP/CSDP military missions. 
5.4.1 German’s Choice on the War on Terror 
Like Britain, Germany is also committed to the transatlantic alliance and has 
admitted the prominent role of NATO in European security. However, unlike Britain’s, 
the commitment of Germany to the transatlantic alliance and NATO was on the basis 
of the Westpolitik policy rather than emphasising the transatlantic special 
relationship. Therefore, Germany would not reject developing common security and 
defence capability in the EU so long as such efforts were undertaken within a 
multilateral framework.  
Since the development of the ESDP was compatible with Germany’s long-term 
commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism, when it held the presidency of 
the European Council in 1999 it behaved proactively to integrate the bilateral 
military co-operation of Britain and France under the St Malo Declaration into the 
multilateral framework of the EU (Overhaus, 2004, p. 555). The development of the 
ESDP offered Germany a platform to play a bigger role in coping with security crises 
within an institutionalised and multilateral framework, but it did not have to 
militarise itself. 
When 11 September happened in 2001, Schröder behaved actively and worked with 
Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair to seek public support to combat terrorism; in the 
war against Afghanistan, Germany offered 3,900 troops, an amount just next to 
Britain’s, and military assets as well (Golino, 2002, pp. 62–63, 65). The current troop 
contribution of Germany to the NATO mission ISAF in Afghanistan is about 4,818, 
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which constitutes the biggest German military deployment abroad at the present 
moment (see: ISAF introduction, NATO website). However, when the War on Terror 
extended to Iraq, the serious dispute over this issue led to ‘the biggest chill’ in 
relations between America and Germany since the end of WWII (Erb, ibid., p. 204).  
It was argued that the reason Germany did not choose to stand with America on the 
war against Iraq was the concern with domestic elections (Erb, ibid., pp. 204–240), 
but the humanitarian concern should not be ignored. This issue also divided the EU 
into two camps, and these divisions therefore undermined the co-operation 
between the Big Three. The result not only led Britain to become more inclined to 
America, but also made Germany put more concentration on the EU civilian 
missions.   
5.4.2 Germany’s Commitment to Implementing the CSDP 
The process of the institutionalisation of the CFSP, ESDP and the CSDP not only 
makes this system become mature and more capable, but has also anchored 
member states within this system. Henne had stated that the process of 
institutionalisation has helped Germany become more engaged in Europe (Henne, 
2009). The process of institutionalisation embedded Germany in the grand 
framework of the EU, but by taking part in this process Germany can also shape this 
framework. Accordingly, not only could the development of the ESDP and CSDP 
become a reliable framework of multilateral institution for member states to 
develop security and defence integration, but, through participating in the 
institution-building process, Germany would also be able to promote civilian ideas. 
For example, according to Irlenkauser’s analysis, in the European Security Strategy  
it emphasised the civilian aspects of security threats and defined principles for the 
use of force, things which stemmed from Germany’s concerns (Irlenkauser, 2004, pp. 
7–14). 
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Regarding military affairs of the EU, Germany still maintains a cautious attitude. All 
the CDU/CSU and SPD MdBs who were interviewed for this thesis expressed similar 
opinions. Although the SPD was considering a proposal to develop a European Army 
and had made a position paper in 2007, this proposal mainly focused on reforming 
existing frameworks of the ESDP in order to make it become more efficient and 
coherent. These suggestions included establishing European Air Transport, setting 
the Council of Defence Ministers, and building a European Parliament defence 
committee, a European Military Academy, and a Baltic Naval Headquarters (SPD 
Position Paper, 2007), which only involved institutional reforms rather than building 
up military capability. Accordingly, this proposal, although with an ambitious 
title, ’On the Way to a European Army’, it did not have a definite aim to build 
common force or development strong military equipment.  
In terms of battle groups, although none of the EU battle groups has been deployed 
up to now, Germany had committed to five EU battle groups since 2007 to 2011 
(Lindstrom, 2007, p. 88); another battle group will be prepared by France, Germany 
and Poland in 2013 (EUbusiness, 2011). The reason Germany is more willing to 
provide battle groups is that battle groups would only involve small-scale combat 
missions and would not last for too long a period. In the interview, Henne also 
mentioned that at the moment the EU is still unable to tackle a long-term mission, 
and it is not a German priority to develop military capability; he argued that since 
most serious security threats stem from political rather than military causes, the EU 
should focus more on political and civilian dimensions in the development of 
common security and defence policy (Henne, ibid.). Henne’s argument illustrates 
that participation in military missions does not change the civilian character of 
Germany. The reluctance to take part in military missions or utilise military means to 
resolve crises still affects Germany’s foreign policy.  
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Actually, although Germany is making progress in improving its military capability, 
including terminating the conscription system since 2011 and building a modern and 
professional military, these efforts have not met allies’ expectations. Germany aims 
to provide 10,000 troops and wants to participate in peace-building or peacekeeping 
missions, but Britain and France plan to deploy 30,000 troops (Ischinger, 2012, p. 57). 
Meanwhile, according to the latest Military Balance Report, the defence budget of 
Germany for 2012 is €30.9 billion, while France’s is €40.2 billion and Britain’s €39 
billion (Military Balance, 2012). This demonstrates that Germany still does not have 
enough political will to express its political weight in sharing military responsibilities 
with its allies.  
In the civilian perspective, Germany has less reservation about taking part in these 
matters, because doing so is compatible with the civilian principle. Therefore, 
Germany has played a more prominent role in civilian missions. For example, in 
Afghanistan, Germany had a German Political Project Office (GPPO), to assist local 
policing training, from 2002 to 2005 (Chivvis, 2010, p. 17). In Kosovo, Germany also 
offered civilian assistance to the mission EULEX Kosovo; in 2009 there were 141 
German staff deployed for the mission, but the amount was next to that of France, 
Italy and Romania (Chivvis, ibid., p. 35). However, Germany was still criticised for not 
being willing to play a more effective role in crisis management missions, especially 
regarding taking part in combat(Chivvis, ibid., p. 45). 
The lack of sufficient contributions of personnel to civilian missions might be 
because the administrative structure of Germany still lacks co-ordination. As Bartels 
explains, because Germany is a federal country, the federal government can only call 
for volunteers from the Länder (states) instead of compelling them to provide 
contributions; therefore, Germany is not like Britain and France, which have more 
authority to convene civilian contributions (Bartels, 2010). Moreover, Germany has a 
complex federal executive decision-making system for security policy. The 
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multilateral framework between the cabinet, the Federal Security Council, the 
Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry sometimes require the Chancellor to be 
more capable of improving co-ordination. Therefore, it was argued that a more 
coherent framework should be built in order to help the Chancellor to be more 
responsive to crises and fulfil commitments (Lothar, 2001).  
Regarding this issue, an inter-ministerial Action Plan was adopted in 2004 in order to 
improve cross-sector co-operation between government and civil-society levels on 
civilian crisis-prevention missions (Action Plan, 2004). However, this action plan did 
not really work as expected, and mainly became a forum for information exchange. 
Jacobs argued that this was because both Schröder and Merkel preferred to 
maintain the status quo of limited and ad-hoc co-ordination (Jacobs, 2011). 
Concerning Germany as a federal country, it would be difficult to improve 
inter-sector, inter-departmental or inter-ministerial co-ordination effectively, and 
usually more time is needed to co-ordinate with Länder and to gain their 
contributions to civilian missions. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The Westpolitik policy has contributed to transforming Germany to becoming 
committed to institutionalism and multilateralism. This commitment anchored 
Germany in NATO and the European Community over the period of the Cold War. 
Even after the reunification, Germany still maintained this commitment. The military 
participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan signified that Germany started to adjust 
itself to take more part in military operations led by NATO or EU. Although Germany 
is becoming more assertive and more comfortable in pursuing its national interests, 
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the processes of institutionalisation have embedded Germany in this multilateral 
and institutionalised framework; more specifically speaking, the processes of 
institutionalisation and integration have made German interests and European 
interests become compatible, especially because Federal Germany can be seen as 
having emerged from and grown up with the development of European integration.  
As the EU attempted to make more efforts to develop a credible security and 
defence role in the international scene, Germany also supported this grand direction. 
However, regarding strengthening the military context of the ESDP/CSDP, especially 
requested by Britain and France, Germany behaved hesitantly. Its defeat-history 
distanced Germany from military matters since the end of WWII; the commitment to 
institutionalism and multilateralism even strengthened its image of being a civilian 
power. Therefore, Germany’s commitment to common security and defence policy 
in the EU or even NATO should be viewed as coming from the commitment to 
multilateralism and institutionalism, and such participation should be taken as an 
accomplishment to this commitment.  
When the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009, the EU was slipping 
into a Eurozone crisis. As the crisis worsened, it occupied much of the attention of 
member states of the EU, especially France and Germany. The leading role in 
resolving the Eurozone crisis caused Germany to be praised as an ‘unquestioned 
master of Europe’ (Grant, 2011b). However, compared to its leading role in resolving 
economic issues, Germany’s role in military affairs is declining.  
The abstention from approving the decision made in UNSCR 1973 to implement a 
no-fly zone in Libya, and its refusal to take part in military actions in Libya, signified 
that Germany still lacked the political will to be committed to military operations by 
using force. Although Germany has sent abroad deployment since Kosovo, German 
armed forces rarely take part in combat; this stance not only undermines the utility 
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of German deployment, but also weakens the whole CSDP (Grant, 2009). Indeed, 
without German commitment to CSDP missions, the EU is definitely unable to form a 
common position or action, just as happened in the Libyan crisis.  
Actually, Germany can play a role in balancing the development of defence capability 
in the EU. According to Valasek’s argument, Britain and France have strong military 
capability and focus more on the military dimension of the CSDP, but other EU 
countries do not have such capability or strong intentions. Germany has the ability to 
develop a military role if it has the political will, and meanwhile has a special interest 
in the civilian dimension of the CSDP. Therefore, Germany’s support will contribute 
to the CSDP becoming more consolidated (Valasek, 2011b). Concerning Germany 
being the biggest economic power in the EU with the biggest population and the 
most influential politics, how Germany would define its military role is decisive for 
the development of the CSDP (Valasek, 2012). Besides, the necessity of enhancing 
CSDP capability is growing since America made the decision to retrench its 
participation in Europe or Africa. In response to this situation, Germany is also asked 
for more definite and substantial contributions to the military capability of the CSDP 
(Ischinger, 2012). However, the commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism 
will not automatically cause Germany to develop an active role in military affairs.  
The German case in participating in the security and defence framework in Europe 
has provided an illustration that how the institutionalisation process has embedded 
Germany in an institutional and multilateral framework and has made Germany 
continue to make efforts to construct this framework. The commitment to 
multilateralism and institutionalism also leads Germany to define itself as a civilian 
power and have a strict principle in terms of the use of forces, thus affecting German 
participation in military missions. The following chapters will discuss Britain and 
Germany’s roles in resolving the Kosovo crisis and the Libyan crisis, and analyse how 
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these two countries pursue national interests and implement their security 
commitments.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
The Implementation of the CFSP in Resolving 
the Kosovo Crisis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In 1946, Kosovo became one of autonomous provinces in the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia (SR), which was a constituent country of the Social Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Kosovo issue emerged from the territorial dispute between 
Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo because Albanians were the ethnic majority in Kosovo， 
but Serbs wanted to maintain a dominant position. This dispute became more 
serious in the late 1980s when the President of the SFRY, Slobodan Milosevic, 
amended the Constitution and reduced the autonomy of Kosovo. In response to this 
situation, the Kosovo Albanians unilaterally declared the independence of Kosovo 
from 1990 and tensions between the Kosovo Albanians and the government of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) gradually escalated. 
The Kosovo crisis in this thesis refers to the escalating conflicts between the Albanian 
opposite forces, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the Yugoslav government 
from 1998. Regarding this situation, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
1160 to impose an arms embargo against FRY on 31 March 1998 (S/RES/1160, 1998). 
On 23 September 1998, the UN Security Council adopted another resolution to call 
for a ceasefire in Kosovo and asked the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to 
have a ‘meaningful’ dialogue (S/RES/1199, 1998).  
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According to UNSCR 1199, NATO threatened to launch air strikes and then the 
government of the FRY agreed to sign the NATO–Kosovo Verification Mission 
Agreement on 15 October 1998 in order to establish an air surveillance system. This 
agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council on 24 October 1998 
(S/RES/1203, 1998). However, the situation in Kosovo became serious again at the 
beginning of 1999. After the Milosevic regime refused to sign a peace agreement 
with the Kosovo Albania leadership and stepped up military repression in Kosovo, 
the Secretary Council of NATO, Javier Solana, announced NATO would initiate air 
operations in the FRY in order to press the Milosevic regime to compromise (Solana, 
1999). The NATO mission Operation Allied Force (OAF) was therefore launched from 
23 March to 10 June 1999. The UN Security Council adopted the Resolution to 
deploy international civil and security missions in Kosovo under the mandate of the 
UN (S/RES/1244, 1998), and then the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
and the NATO mission KFOR started to operate from June 1999.  
The responses undertaken by the EU to the Kosovo crisis mostly concentrated on 
economic or diplomatic sanctions and did not control the fighting in Kosovo 
effectively. Although the EU had developed an institutionalised framework for the 
CFSP since the Maastricht Treaty, during the period of the Kosovo crisis the EU still 
lacked deployable capacity to resolve the situation. This frustrating experience 
encouraged EU member states to improve the capability of the EU to take part in 
security and defence issues.  
Because the Kosovo crisis has been considered as providing a crucial impetus for the 
EU to develop an security role in the international scene (Shepherd, 2009), and also 
because the NATO military mission OAF (Operation Allied Force) has encouraged the 
EU to develop complementary military capability (Cottey, 2009, p. 600), it is 
important to examine how the Kosovo crisis led to this reform. To develop military 
capability in the EU was not a conceivable issue before the Kosovo crisis because it 
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was too controversial an issue to be discussed (Duke, 1999), especially because it 
involved the solidarity of the transatlantic relationship. However, since the US also 
expected Europe to play a more important role in its own territory, it encouraged 
European countries to make determination for the development of a serious security 
role of the EU (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 56; Shepherd, 2009, pp. 515–
516). 
The Kosovo crisis had significance for both Britain and Germany. It was considered 
that the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair used this situation to practise ‘liberal 
interventionism’ (Daddow, 2009). In a speech made in Chicago in 1999, Blair 
defended the legitimacy of the NATO mission OAF by asserting it was a ‘just war’ 
(Blair, 1999c). Regarding the EU being incapable in the Kosovo crisis, Blair also urged 
the development of the ESDP, which had been considered a change in Britain’s 
foreign and security policy (Shepherd, ibid., p. 515). However, Blair’s pro-European 
attitude and support for the ESDP should be interpreted as originating from the 
intention to strengthen the transatlantic alliance (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, ibid.), 
because in the War on Terror against Iraq in 2003, Britain’s ambition regarding the 
ESDP had declined. Nevertheless, the framework of the ESDP has been established, 
and the institutionalisation process also launched. In other words, according to the 
historical institutionalist’s term ‘path dependence’ (Pierson, 2000), a path for the 
common security and defence policy in the EU has started. 
For Germany, the Kosovo crisis also signified a modification of foreign and security 
policy. German participation in the OAF was the first time Germany had intervened 
in a military combat mission outside NATO territory since the end of WWII, and this 
participation was a breakthrough for German participation in multilateral military 
missions. Also, what happened to the Balkans since the end of the Cold War also 
pushed Germany to rethink its traditional stance of the use of force (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan, ibid., Longhurst, 2004; Maull, 2000a, 2000b). Therefore, under the 
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multilateral and institutional framework of the EU and NATO, reflection regarding 
the use of force led Germany to transform its role on security affairs in the world. 
This chapter aims to evaluate the EU actions in resolving the Kosovo crisis. It will 
investigate how the EU utilised CFSP mechanisms to cope with the Kosovo crisis and 
analyse how the crisis affected the development of the ESDP. The role of Britain and 
Germany will also be discussed. It is because especially for Britain and Germany, the 
Kosovo crisis provided an opportunity to modify their policy on the development of 
EU security and defence integration.   
 
6.2 The EU in the Kosovo Crisis 
The three-pillar structure of the EU was supposed to bridge two competing models 
of institutional governance: the supranational system and intergovernmental 
co-operation (Andersson, 2008, p.124). The former was applied to the affairs of the 
Community, which had a supranational framework and made decisions on the basis 
of majority voting; the latter was applied to the CFSP and JHA (Justice and Home 
Affairs, renamed Political and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters since 2003), 
which had an intergovernmental framework and made decisions on the basis of 
unanimous agreement. 
The CFSP was considered to have a more coherent and rationalised policy process, 
stronger legal binding on member states, and a more authoritative decision-making 
process, and therefore provide greater autonomy to EU institutional actors than the 
EPC (M. E. Smith, 2004a, p. 177). Compared to the EPC, the CFSP maintained an 
intergovernmental basis but had an institutionalised framework, which enabled EU 
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member states and institutional actors to work at the European level. Therefore, the 
CFSP signified a compromise between intergovernmentalism and institutionalism in 
order to ensure participation from member states on the one hand and an efficient 
institutional framework on the other.  
The Amsterdam Treaty entered into force on since 1 May 1999 and provided some 
reforms for the institutional framework of the CFSP. However, when the EU started 
to address the Kosovo crisis in 1998, the Treaty was still at the stage of ratification. 
The CFSP mechanisms that the EU could apply in the Kosovo crisis were provided by 
the Maastricht Treaty. This section will explore how the EU applied the CFSP 
mechanisms in the Kosovo crisis and evaluate EU performance. 
6.2.1 Before the Kosovo Crisis: The CFSP Mechanisms 
The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, stated in the preamble that 
the EU aimed to fulfil a common policy for foreign and security affairs and eventually 
build common defence (the Preamble, The Maastricht Treaty). The procedures of 
common positions (Title V, Article J.2, The Maastricht Treaty) and joint actions (Title 
V, Article J.3, The Maastricht Treaty) were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty and 
were the main mechanisms for the EU to implement the CFSP. However, the 
Maastricht Treaty did not offer definite objectives for implementing the CFSP, but 
left this issue to be defined by the European Council and the Council of Ministers 
(Title V, Article J.8, The Maastricht Treaty). 
The Maastricht Treaty offered an initial institutional framework for EU member 
states to implement the CFSP. Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty indicated that all 
questions relating to security were included in the CFSP; however, it did not have 
clear instructions about how and when to launch this procedure, and EU 
supranational actors had no capacity to intervene in CFSP issues. Therefore, it could 
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only rely on the political will of EU member states to fulfil it. Theoretically, the EU did 
not have deployable capability until the Amsterdam Treaty integrating the WEU 
(Title V, Article J.7, The Amsterdam Treaty), which aimed to strengthen the security 
and defence dimension of the CFSP. However, even though after incorporating the 
WEU, the EU did not really develop corresponding capability for undertaking 
targeted missions. 
Compared to the EPC’s, however, the institutional framework of the CFSP was 
considered to contribute to enhancing security and defence co-operation (Sjursen, 
1998, pp. 99–101). The first common position decided by the Council was on 22 
November 1993, just three weeks after the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty, 
and was to reduce economic relations with Libya (Council Decision, 93/614/CFSP) in 
order to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 883 (S/RES/883, 1993). Since 
then, the Council adopted around 300 common positions and joint actions in the 
international scene until the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the large 
number of common positions and joint actions adopted demonstrated that EU 
member states had an ambition to establish a consolidated image for the EU, these 
common positions and joint actions mostly involved diplomatic and economic 
instruments. Because of a lack of deployable capability, no missions abroad were 
deployed by the EU before the establishment of the ESDP; therefore, the CFSP was 
criticised for being a weak institutional framework, especially when compared to the 
Community pillar (F. Cameron, 1998, pp. 59–76; Peterson, 1998, pp. 7–11; M. E. 
Smith, 1996, p. 2).  
By and large, the Maastricht Treaty provided a preliminary institutional framework 
for the EU to cope with CFSP issues. Although it did not have an efficient 
decision-making process and effective mechanisms, it at least offered a basic 
institutionalised environment for EU member states to negotiate and work together 
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under a common framework. However, this framework was not capable enough of 
tackling a serious conflict situation like Kosovo.   
6.2.2 The EU Role in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis 
The measures undertaken by the EU to resolve the Kosovo crisis were common 
positions and joint actions, which mainly concentrated on political solutions to press 
the Milosevic Government to make compromise on the Kosovo issue. As the 
situation in Kosovo deteriorated after mid-1998, the Council adopted a common 
position (Council decision, 98/240/CFSP) on 19 March 1998, which was to impose an 
arms embargo and travel ban against the FRY and listed senior Yugoslavia officials in 
order to press the Milosevic Government to end the violent suppression of Kosovo 
Albanians. More economic sanctions were adopted to press more political pressures 
against the Milosevic Government before the NATO mission OAF, including freezing 
the foreign financial assets of the FRY (Council decision, 98/326/CFSP), prohibiting 
new investments in Serbia (Council decision, 98/374/CFSP), a flight ban between the 
EU and FRY (Council decision, 98/426/CFSP), and more visa bans against Yugoslavia 
officials (Council decision, 98/725/CFSP). 
Although the EU attempted a peaceful solution for the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership, the political actions undertaken by the EU did not have much effect in 
pressing the Milosevic regime to make concessions. Compared to the strong stance 
taken by NATO in threatening to launch military operations even without a UN 
mandate, the EU could only rely on diplomatic measures, and also lacked association 
with NATO to cope with this issue. During the period of the NATO mission OAF, the 
EU still continued to impose more sanctions against the FRY, including a petrol ban 
(Council decision, 1999/273/CFSP), more economic restrictions and a visa ban on 
more officials of the FRY government (Council decision, 1999/318/CFSP). However, 
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these political measures did not have much effect in alleviating the conflict in 
Kosovo. 
Actually, the EU addressed the Kosovo issue from an early stage. By 1996, the EU had 
adopted 22 declarations, decisions and joint actions of the CFSP referring to Kosovo 
(H. Baker, Huberty, & Wohlmyer, 2006, p. 100). The large amount of Council 
decisions demonstrated that EU member states had an ambition to play an eminent 
role via imposing CFSP measures. Besides, the EU had imposed an arms embargo 
against the FRY one year before the NATO mission OAF. However, these efforts did 
not have much effect in controlling the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Therefore, 
it was considered that without the back-up of military force, it would be difficult to 
make progress on diplomatic efforts (Duke, 1999, p. 5; Latawski & Smith, 2002, p. 
217); that was the reason why the EU was unable to play an effective role in 
resolving the Kosovo crisis. 
Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty did not have procedures for the EU to develop or 
convene military forces; as a result, under the framework of the Maastricht Treaty 
the CFSP actually lacked a security and defence dimension. Although the Amsterdam 
Treaty integrated the WEU (Title V, Article J.7, The Amsterdam Treaty), introduced a 
High Representative (Title V, Article J.16, The Amsterdam Treaty) and also 
constructive abstention and QMV to the CFSP (Title V, Article J.13, The Amsterdam 
Treaty), these reforms did not work in resolving the Kosovo crisis since the Treaty did 
not enter into force until May 1999. 
Nevertheless, the EU was not totally incapable of tackling the Kosovo crisis. It 
exerted its influence and capability in another way, especially on a civilian aspect. In 
other words, although the EU failed to play a hard role, it became a significant actor 
to assist post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo. The first ESDP civilian mission to 
Kosovo, the EU Planning Team (EUPT), was launched in 2006 (Council decision, 
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2006/304/CFSP) in order to prepare future crisis management operations in this area. 
In 2008, the Council decided to deploy another civilian ESDP mission to Kosovo, the 
EULEX Kosovo (Council decision, 2008/124/CFSP), in order to assist the local 
government to enhance the system of the rule of law, especially in the fields of 
police, judiciary and customs.  
The EULEX Kosovo has been considered the ‘most ambitious’ civilian mission for the 
EU because it has been not only the largest civilian CSDP mission, but also the first 
integrated mission consisting of policing, justice and customs staff (Chivvis, 2010, pp. 
31–42; Gross, 2008, pp. 324–325). Moreover, the mission EULEX Kosovo has offered 
a learning approach for the EU because it covers a full spectrum of the rule of law 
which may improve integration between different components of civilian 
mechanisms (Ioannides, 2010, p. 45). Through the deployment of the EULEX Kosovo, 
the EU demonstrated its ability to cope with post-confliction reconstruction. 
However, the reason that the EU would contribute so much effort to Kosovo was out 
of geopolitical considerations (Anonymous, 2009); therefore, the achievement in the 
mission EULEX Kosovo cannot be simply concluded that the EU is completely capable 
of tackling civilian CSDP operations or CFSP missions.  
6.2.3 The Influence of the Kosovo Crisis on the CFSP 
The Balkans has been considered the back-yard of Europe, and therefore what 
happened to this region would be, so to speak, an examination to test the crisis 
management capability of the EU and also the effectiveness of the CFSP (Muguruza, 
2003, p. 234). However, although it seemed to have the determination to resolve the 
Balkans issue, the EU did not have applicable mechanisms to undertake security and 
defence affairs. The Maastricht Treaty included the scope of security and defence 
under the framework of the CFSP, but EU member states mainly utilised this 
framework for forming a common foreign policy because the common positions and 
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joint actions which had been made before the establishment of the ESDP only 
involved diplomatic measures and lacked military or security implications. This was 
because the Maastricht Treaty did not provide rules or procedures for EU member 
states to launch military actions. 
When reviewing the process of resolving the conflicts in Kosovo, the EU was unable 
to play a prominent role. Although the Kosovo crisis was considered a ‘wake-up call’ 
for the EU to fulfil its international responsibility (Soetendorp, ibid., p. 238), the EU 
lacked effective mechanisms to end the conflicts in Kosovo eventually. In the Cardiff 
European Council held on 15–16 June 1998, EU member states had addressed the 
Kosovo issue and threatened to launch ‘a much stronger response’ if Milosevic failed 
to undertake political solutions to resolve the Kosovo issue (Presidency Conclusions 
of the Cardiff European Council, adopted in 1998), but apparently the EU was unable 
to carry out this determination.  
More specifically speaking, it was not only a shortfall in crisis management capability; 
it was also a shortfall of the commitment of EU member states to tackle the 
international crisis. As has been indicated by Adam Roberts, although individual EU 
member states took part in the OAF, even including Germany, 85 per cent of the 
effective force for this operation was supplied by the US (Roberts, 1999, p. 119); 
therefore, to improve burden-sharing for the transatlantic alliance became more 
inevitable for the EU. The Kosovo crisis not only offered an impetus for the EU to 
reform its institutional framework in order to cope with crisis management, but also 
helped NATO expand its security role beyond traditional defence alliance (Cottey, 
2009). As a result, both the EU and NATO had an opportunity to transform their 
security role on the international scene.  
In summary, the lack of capacity to present an effective role when tackling the 
Kosovo crisis pushed EU member states to make a commitment to the ESDP. In the 
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1999 Cologne European Council, EU member states determined to enhance security 
and defence capability, and then in the 1999 Helsinki European Council, member 
states adopted military headline goal and planned to achieve it by 2003. From 2003 
to January 2012, the EU had undertaken 24 CSDP missions, 16 of which were civilian 
missions. This amount has signified that the EU has a special focus on civilian 
missions, even though it is able to call for military contributions from member states 
now. This result also reflects the fact that the divergences of EU member states 
about whether the EU should involve more military operations are still obvious. 
Considering the role of member states in this process, the next two sections will 
discuss Britain and Germany’s role in the Kosovo crisis.   
 
6.3 Britain’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis 
Tony Blair and the ‘New Labour’ government from 1997 to 2007 were once 
considered as having a different stance on British EU policy (Latawski & M. A. Smith, 
2002), because they had a more flexible and negotiable policy than the ‘old’ Labour 
Party and the Conservative Party regarding EU affairs. To integrate security and 
defence capability in Europe, Blair signed the St Malo Declaration with the French 
President, Jacques Chirac, in 1998 in order to strengthen European defence 
co-operation, which became the fundamental basis for the establishment of the 
ESDP. Besides the Chicago speech, in his address made in Warsaw Blair again called 
for developing the EU to become a ‘superpower’ (Blair, 2000). His proactive attitude 
made Britain play a leading role in developing the ESDP. However, Blair’s EU policy in 
his first term was more a flexible adjustment than a substantial shift, because the 
transatlantic alliance was still Britain’s priority during Blair’s leadership. The efforts 
he made to the ESDP had become an indispensable basis for the ESDP nevertheless. 
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6.3.1 Britain’s Participation in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis 
Tony Blair’s policy towards the Kosovo crisis was described as a practice of ‘liberal 
interventionism’ (Daddow, 2009, p. 548), which applied an interventionist approach 
to the implementation of norms, values or beliefs. According to the 1999 Chicago 
speech, Blair addressed the concern about the anti-humanitarian situation 
happening in Kosovo and also defended the NATO military operation OAF by arguing 
that, once NATO failed in Kosovo, it would be difficult to stop the next dictator (Blair, 
1999b). Although Blair’s proactive attitude towards the Kosovo crisis and NATO 
mission was considered as originating from a commitment to human rights and a 
consideration to avoid the government making another failure in Bosnia (Keohane, 
2000), it was also compatible with the principle in Britain’s foreign policy, the 
transatlantic alliance and British leading role in international issues.  
When Blair announced the decision in the House of Commons on 23 March 1999 
that the Labour government would contribute to the NATO mission in the FRY (Blair, 
1999c), he put the emphasis on a humanitarian consideration, and this stance gained 
the most support in Parliament, although few were concerned as to whether the 
NATO mission would really achieve the alliance’s objective in the end (Brazier, 1999; 
Tapsell, 1999), whether the NATO mission would cause a more serious human rights 
crisis (Benn, 1999; Campbell, 1999; Mahon, 1999), or whether ground troops should 
be deployed to complement air strikes (Mcnamara, 1999). Generally speaking, Blair 
did not encounter serious opposition in Parliament, and most MPs gave the 
Government support; even the Leader of the Opposition, William Hague, supported 
this decision (Hague, 1999), which Blair described as a ‘united view’ (Blair, 1999c).  
It is worth noting that in this debate there was no discussion about what role the EU 
should play in the Kosovo crisis; this was because the EU did not have the credibility 
to resolve a fighting situation like Kosovo. However, the unsuccessful experience of 
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the EU in resolving the Kosovo crisis also offered Blair an opportunity to shape a 
security and defence role for the EU. In the House of Commons on 26 April 1999, 
Blair reiterated the stance he made in the Chicago speech that he would support the 
development of stronger EU capability in order to strengthen the transatlantic 
alliance; he also indicated that through resource sharing, the EU and NATO could 
become compatible (Blair, 1999d). This policy gained support from the Conservative 
MP Ian Taylor, who argued that the EU should develop its own sufficient capability 
instead of relying on NATO or America, in case there should be a situation in which 
America would not become involved; Taylor also implied Britain should put more 
efforts in the EU in order to shape favourable policies for Britain (I. Taylor, 1999). In 
order to promote the ESDP, the Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon also explained that, 
through driving the development of the ESDP, Britain would be able to play a leading 
role in the ESDP and also strengthen NATO (Hoon, 1999). 
In summary, although Blair argued that the military involvement in the Kosovo crisis 
originated from a humanitarian consideration, it was also the result of pursuing 
national interests. It was argued that Britain had a proactive attitude to develop the 
ESDP owing to two motivations, influence and leadership; especially because Britain 
did not join the Euro, it had to find other grounds to avoid being marginalised 
(Latawski & Smith, 2002, p. 218). On the one hand, the contribution to the NATO 
mission in the FRY would consolidate the transatlantic alliance and also strengthen 
the NATO role in crisis management. Both were in Britain’s long-term interests. On 
the other hand, Britain’s international role would – not only for Britain, but also for 
Blair’s leadership – be strengthened by taking part in the NATO mission and leading 
the development of the EU. Therefore, the Kosovo crisis became a chance for Britain 
to break the EU taboo on developing military capability.  
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6.3.2 The Implications of the Kosovo Crisis on Britain’s Policy 
Blair was described as ‘the most instinctively pro-European Prime Minister since 
Edward Heath’ (Stephens, 2001, p. 67, cited in Geddes, 2004, p. 88), and also 
considered a young and ‘modernising’ leader of the Labour Party (Fella, 2002, p. 1). 
Therefore, Blair had to establish a distinctive and strong image which would 
consolidate his, and Labour’s, leadership. Moreover, foreign policy was usually 
viewed as Britain’s strength, because it had a qualified diplomatic service and 
capable military (Grant, 2002, p. 39); accordingly, if the Blair Government attempted 
to exert Britain’s influence, foreign affairs would be an ideal ground. 
In the process of resolving the Kosovo crisis, besides taking part in the NATO mission 
OAF, Britain also provided financial and technical assistance to Kosovo. According to 
the statement made by the International Development Secretary, Clare Short, in 
April 1999 the Government had allocated £20 million to humanitarian assistance for 
the Kosovo refugees and also contributed around £15 million for the EU to the 
mission in Macedonia and Albania; besides, Britain helped with local reconstruction 
in Kosovo (Short, 1999). 
The Kosovo crisis, being a ‘storm-cloud’, highlighted the fact that the EU was 
incapable of tackling crisis management situations, and therefore gave Blair an 
opportunity to reform the institutional framework of the EU (Howorth, 2007, p. 53), 
moreover shaping a leading role for Britain (Miskimmon, 2005, p. 103). Therefore, 
Britain’s promise to build up EU military capability was an important factor to 
underpin the development of the ESDP. In order to fulfil the military targets decided 
in the Helsinki Headline Goal, Britain made a commitment to offering 12,500 troops, 
18 ships and 72 combat planes to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 
(Miskimmon, ibid.).  
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Another implication resulting from the Kosovo crisis to Britain was that this event 
offered Britain an opportunity to become the ‘bridge’ between America and Europe. 
As he stated in the Chicago speech, Blair presented the prospect of being a bridge in 
the transatlantic alliance. In a speech made in Birmingham in 2001, Blair reiterated 
the prospect of bridging America and Europe by asserting that the UK had both 
economic and political influence and the UK–US friendship was also ‘an asset’ for 
European countries (Blair, 2001). What Blair had presented was an ambitious 
objective, because he attempted to be completely engaged in a ‘united Europe’ and 
also worked closely with America. However, this expectation faded when Blair chose 
to stand with America on the War on Terror, which demonstrated that, regarding 
military affairs, America was a more important partner for Britain (Miskimmon, 2005, 
p. 96). 
In summary, on the one hand, through playing a proactive role in the Kosovo crisis 
and being committed to OAF, Britain consolidated the transatlantic alliance; on the 
other hand, after the OAF, Britain drove the development of the ESDP which 
strengthened Britain’s leading role in this process. Along with France and Germany, 
it was the first time that the Big Three had a consensus to develop EU military 
capability, and then achieve substantial progress on the ESDP. However, what 
already happened to Britain in the War on Terror against Iraq already proved what 
Howorth had predicted in 2000, that because the US and the EU had different policy 
approaches to military affairs Britain had to ‘make a clear choice about belonging’ 
(Howorth, 2000b, p. 395). 
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6.4 Germany’s Role in the Kosovo Crisis 
Germany’s participation in the NATO mission OAF had attracted much attention 
because it was the first time that the Federal government had deployed the military 
abroad, and it also was the first challenge that the newly elected Red–Green 
coalition government had to undertake. Because of its geopolitical position 
compared to Britain, the deteriorating situation in Kosovo was a more serious issue 
for Germany. Besides, because of the significance in German’s foreign and security 
policy, OAF was described as still the high water in terms of the transition of German 
security and defence policy since the end of the Cold War (Miskimmon, 2009, p. 
561).  
6.4.1 German Participation in Resolving the Kosovo Crisis 
Regarding the first out-of-area NATO mission OAF, the SPD Chancellor Schröder and 
the Green Foreign Minister Fischer not only supported it, but also committed to 
taking part in the NATO crisis management mission KFOR (Erb, 2003, p. 168). Fischer 
supported OAF on the basis of protecting human rights, and his support was 
especially important for the Red–Green coalition government to participate in OAF; 
this was because the German Green Party had a pacifist tradition and rejected 
nationalism (Rudig, 1996, pp. 260–266). Although it was also indicated that between 
1992 and 2005 the Green Party had transformed itself into an ‘engaged pacifist’ 
organisation which accepted the limited the use of force (D. Brunstetter & S. 
Brunstetter, 2011), this transformation was a supportive factor for Germany to 
adjust the terms of the use of force.  
Fischer explained that the reason the coalition government decided to participate in 
military intervention in Kosovo was humanitarian considerations (Fischer, 1999). He 
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argued that the war in Kosovo had taken place since 1992 and had already caused 
massive casualties. He went even further to call it a new European Holocaust, and 
this was the reason why the Green Party was no longer a protest party on this issue. 
However, he also declared that he did not change the principles which rejected war 
and Auschwitz, genocide and fascism (ibid.). Fischer’s statement defended the 
stance of the coalition government that military intervention in Kosovo was not 
incompatible with Green traditions or with Germany. 
Schröder also expressed a similar concern for terminating the anti-humanitarian 
situation in Kosovo by arguing that Germany ‘cannot stand back and accept massive 
human rights violation’ (Schröder, 1999, p. 33, cited in Erb, ibid., p. 171). This stance 
was supported by the German public. According to a poll survey undertaken by Forsa 
in March 1999, 58 per cent of Germans believed German participation in OAF was 
compatible with the unified role of Germany in international politics, and 52 per cent 
of Germans agreed such participation should be continued even though German 
soldiers died in this mission (Forsa poll, 1999, p. 52, cited in Baumann & Hellmann, 
2001, p. 77). Therefore, 71 per cent of SPD members and 68 per cent of Green 
members supported Germany taking part in OAF (Erb, ibid., p. 174), by offering four 
Tornado aircrafts stationed in Piacenza (Longhurst, 2004, p. 71). 
Besides, Germany also took part in the NATO crisis management operation KFOR in 
Kosovo beginning in June 1999. This decision was approved by the Bundestag with a 
vote of 505 in favour and 24 against (Erb, ibid.) and the Bundestag promised around 
8,000 troops to take part in KFOR (Longhurst, ibid., p. 76). According to the latest 
military balance report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Germany 
still maintains around 1,451 troops and still contributes the most of all European 
countries to implementing the KFOR (Military Balance, 2012). 
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6.4.2 The Implications of the Kosovo Crisis on Germany’s Foreign Policy 
German participation in OAF attracted much attention because it had already 
renounced the use of force for the purpose of national interests for decades; 
therefore, this participation indicated an evolution of German foreign policy, 
especially for the concept of the use of force (Longhurst, ibid., pp. 69–73). The 
Westpolitik policy introduced by the first Federal Chancellor Adenauer had shaped 
Germany to embrace the commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism, and 
then transformed Germany into a civilian power. Because of the civilian principle, 
even since the end of the Cold War Germany rejected deploying troops to Iraq or 
Bosnia (Rummel, 1996, p. 53). Therefore, the most important implication of the 
Kosovo crisis to Germany was that it encouraged Germany to adjust the terms of the 
use of force. 
Besides, the Kosovo crisis also led Germany to support the development of the ESDP 
and to strengthen EU military capability. The former Defence Minister, Lothar Ruhl, 
had made a statement before the 1999 Helsinki European Council by calling for the 
modernisation of European armed forces and defence capability (Ruhl, 1999). He 
argued that the EU should improve the capability to deploy armed forces ‘not only 
within Europe, but also outside of Europe at greater distances from their home 
bases’, and therefore EU could really share a burden with NATO and enhance EU 
presence within NATO. Ruhl’s argument was based on the concern that the EU 
should be able to tackle security and military issues for the case if the US would not 
get involved. 
Nevertheless, the participation in OAF and the efforts to develop the ESDP should 
not be interpreted as meaning that Germany had changed the principle of being a 
civilian power. Actually, during the period of OAF, Germany did not give up 
diplomatic efforts to search for a peaceful resolution, since it undertook a ‘dual-track 
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approach’ which combined military commitment to OAF and diplomatic efforts in 
order to avert military actions; also, Fischer had called for a twenty-four-hour break 
in bombing in the FRY (Longhurst, 2004, p. 72). 
The continuing diplomatic efforts of Germany signified that, even though taking part 
in NATO military intervention, Germany did not ignore non-military options. As has 
been indicated by a German MdB, Germany supported the EU playing a more 
important role in military affairs instead of only depending on the US, especially in 
situations like the Balkans crisis, because Europe should be defended by Europeans 
(Arnold, 2009), however, Germany would also be thought to be very careful when 
considering military options (Bartels, 2010). Accordingly, German participation in 
OAF should not be considered a fundamental policy shift, especially because 
Germany still had restrictions about the willingness and ability to deploy 
high-intensity military missions (Miskimmon, 2009, p. 562). As a result, after the 
Kosovo crisis, Germany still considered it maintained the continuity of being a civilian 
power (Hyde-Price, 2000, 2001, 2004; Maull, 2000a, 2000b), and had a special 
interest in fostering the civilian dimension of the ESDP (Crevi, 2009, p. 22). 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The Kosovo crisis signified a transformation to the development of EU security and 
defence policy. This is because if the EU attempted to become more prominent in 
security and defence affairs, strong military capability would still be required (Silveira, 
2009). Since the two European Council held in 1999 in Cologne and Helsinki, the 
development of the ESDP has made some progress, especially in the aspect of 
building deployable capabilities to implement ESDP missions.  
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Besides the development of ERRF, the EU also aimed to have two battle groups 
stand by in order to provide rapid response for small-scale crisis management 
missions; each battle group consists of 1,500 corps and can be ready within five to 
ten days to deploy for a mission of 30 to 120 days (Lindstrom, 2007, pp. 12–16). Up 
to now, except for Denmark, all member states of the EU have contributed to form 
the battle groups. However, member states did not fully accomplish their 
commitment to offering battle groups. It was indicated by the Council that only one 
battle group had been confirmed for the first semester of 2012 (Council conclusions 
on CSDP, adopted 2011); this situation also occurred in 2009. Moreover, according 
to the schedule up to 2014, there are still not enough battle groups promised by 
member states (C. Major & Molling, 2011, p. 36). These shortfalls illustrate that even 
though member states of the EU have made commitment to enhancing CSDP 
capabilities, sometimes they do not have strong enough political will to maintain 
their commitment.  
In the civilian dimension, the EU also has an ambitious goal. It aims at developing 
capabilities for assisting with police missions, establishing the rule of law system, 
developing civil administration order, protecting civilians, contributing to monitoring 
missions, and supporting EU special representatives. For the purpose, the PSC has 
made a plan to develop such capabilities, endorsed by the Council on 13 December 
2010 (Council conclusions on Civilian CSDP capabilities, adopted in 2011). According 
to this plan, the EU will prepare around a dozen CSDP civilian missions, including 
inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector 
reform, and observation missions of varying formats, including in rapid-response 
situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3,000 experts) which could 
last several years. 
More specifically, this plan has called for contributions to these civilian operations, 
including a policing operation which aims to provide more than 5,000 police officers’, 
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and also ‘up to 1400 can be deployed in less than 30 days’; for the mission of 
strengthening the rule of law, member states have pledged to provide 631 
prosecutors, judges or prison officers; for the civilian administration mission, 
member states have committed to providing 565 staff; for the civil protection 
mission, 579 civil protection experts and 4,445 staff for intervention teams have 
been promised by member states; for the monitoring mission, member states have 
committed 505 personnel. However, the shortfall still exists in the civilian dimension, 
especially for policing forces (ibid.). 
For Britain, the Kosovo crisis was an opportunity to urge the development of the 
ESDP, and then shape a leading role of Britain in the EU and in the transatlantic 
alliance which would achieve the objective asserted by Blair to become a bridge 
between America and Europe. The institutional framework of the ESDP was also 
compatible with Britain’s principles on the development of security and defence 
integration in the EU, which were insisting on an intergovernmental basis and 
maintaining prominent role of NATO. However, the divisions on the War on Terror in 
the EU and in the transatlantic alliance signified this bridge strategy might not work 
when Europe and America had a serious dispute on the same issue and both of them 
were not negotiable. Therefore, Britain went back to its traditional stance of 
standing with America, and did not maintain an initiative role in promoting the ESDP 
and CSDP. In the process of resolving the Libyan crisis, the Cameron Government 
mainly relied on NATO or bilateral co-operation with France to undertake military 
intervention, and did not consider the EU as an option.  
For Germany, the Kosovo crisis was also an important opportunity because since 
then Germany transformed itself to become a ‘normal’ civilian power. In other words, 
Germany became less resistant to use military options in order to implement 
diplomatic objectives (Bulmer & Paterson, 2010). However, Germany did not 
abandon a civilian stance, even though it took part in the development of the ESDP 
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and CSDP. Germany still had special interests in strengthening the civilian dimension 
of common security and defence policy. Moreover, it maintained a critical and 
cautious attitude towards military options. Therefore, both in the ‘War on Terror’ 
against Iraq and in the Libyan crisis, Germany was hesitant or even rejected 
endorsing military actions. More discussion of Britain and Germany’s stance in the 
Libyan crisis will be presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
The Implementation of the CSDP in Resolving 
the Libyan Crisis 
7.1 Introduction 
Libya is a country located in North Africa and is bound on the east by Egypt, on the 
south–east by Sudan, on the south by Chad and Niger, and on the west by Algeria 
and Tunisia. Libya was governed by Muammar Gaddafi under the Libyan Arab 
Republic from 1969 to 1977 and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from 1977 to 2011. 
Inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt starting from the end of 2010, there 
were large–scale anti-government demonstrations in Libya from February 2011 to 
protest against the forty-two-year dictatorship of the Gaddafi regime. Since the 
unrest soon spread to the capital city Tripoli and caused turbulence, Gaddafi, the 
leader of this country, demanded to suppress the uprisings by violent means.  
In response to the violently suppression undertaken in Libya, the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) first made a press statement on 22 February 2011 to condemn the violence 
and use of force against civilians and called for the Gaddafi Government to make an 
immediate end of such violent instruments, have dialogue with the Libyan people, 
and lift restrictions on the media (SC/10180, AFR/2120). On 26 February 2011, the 
UNSC adopted the 1970 resolution and decided to undertake some measures to 
impose sanctions against the Gaddafi regime, including referring the situation in 
Libya after 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), imposing an arms embargo and travel ban, and freezing foreign assets 
controlled by the Gaddafi regime; besides, the resolution also calls for humanitarian 
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assistance in Libya and establishes a new sanctions committee in order to monitor 
the implementation of these sanctions and report to the UNSC (S/RES/1970/2011). 
Soon after the UNSCR 1970 was adopted, the Opposition in Libya formed the 
National Transitional Council (NTC) on 27 February 2011 in Benghazi, the second 
largest city in Libya located on the Mediterranean Sea. On 5 March 2011, the NTC 
announced itself to be the only legitimate government to represent the Libyan 
people and the state. On 10 March 2011, France became the first country to 
recognise the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Because the 
situation of violently attacking the Libyan citizens did not improve, one week after 
French recognition of the NTC the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973. Besides 
maintaining the sanctions in Resolution 1970, Resolution 1973 aimed to create a 
no-fly zone and ban all flights in the airspace of Libya. As a result, member states of 
the UN were requested to act nationally or through regional mechanisms to protect 
Libyan civilians and implement the no-fly zone (S/RES/1973/2011). Resolution 1973 
became a resort for the international community to launch military actions against 
the Gaddafi regime. Accordingly, a series of military interventions were launched on 
19 March 2011 through a multi-state coalition of America, Britain, France, Canada, 
Belgium, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Norway, and then NATO took over the 
responsibility for military actions from 31 March 2011 (mission name: Operation 
Unified Protector). After several months of confrontations, the NTC gradually 
controlled the situation and was given a seat in the UN General Assembly on 16 
September 2011. Since then the NTC, governed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, has obtained 
comprehensive recognition from the international community with the aim of 
building a constitutional democratic country with an elected government in Libya. 
The Gaddafi regime officially ended when the previous leader of Libya, Gaddafi, died 
in a conflict on 20 October 2011. 
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After the frustration caused by inability in the Kosovo crisis, the EU has, since 1999, 
when the ESDP was launched, contributed many efforts to developing military and 
civilian capabilities for crisis management. Besides, the Lisbon Treaty which entered 
into force since 1 December 2009 accepted some reforms for the CSDP in order to 
consolidate the existing institutional framework. The reforms included introducing 
new positions for the President of the European Council and the High Representative, 
and also establishing a body named the European External Action Service (EEAS) for 
assisting the High Representative’s work. The institutional framework of the CSDP 
thus becomes even more institutionalised since the role of institutional actors of the 
EU is accentuated. As a result, the Libyan crisis can be viewed as an opportunity for 
the EU to examine whether the institutional framework of the CSDP is able to tackle 
crisis management now.  
Compared to NATO which led military interventions during the period of the Libyan 
crisis, however, the EU had proved again that it was unable to cope with such crises 
via the mechanisms of the CSDP. On 20 February 2011, Catherine Ashton made a 
statement to condemn the violent repression in Libya (Ashton, 2011b); Herman Van 
Rompuy’s statement was made on 23 February 2011 and merely promised the EU 
would continue the neighbourhood policy of helping with this region (Van Rompuy, 
2011). Although both the High Representative Catherine Ashton and the President of 
the European Council Herman Van Rompuy made statements soon after the uprising 
spread to Tripoli and expressed their concern about the situation in Libya, their 
statements did not involve any substantial determination to intervene in the crisis. 
Indeed, except for implementing the UNSC 1970 Resolution, the member states of 
the EU could not form a coherent and consistent common position on whether to 
undertake rapid and robust actions to cope with this conflicting situation. Moreover, 
the EU could not even form a common position on whether to recognise the NTC as 
a legitimate government in Libya. 
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Actually, the division within the EU regarding the Libyan crisis can be easily observed 
from the different attitudes taken by Britain, France and Germany. On the one hand, 
because of geopolitical and economic considerations, France was not only the first 
country to recognise the NTC, but was also keen to intervene in the crisis via military 
means. Britain was also interested in offering military forces to intervene in Libya for 
the implementation of the UNSC 1973 Resolution, and this strong position might lift 
the reputation of the Cameron Government. On the other hand, Germany was 
reluctant to take part in multi-state coalition and did not contribute to military 
attacks of NATO. Moreover, when voting for the UNSC 1973 Resolution, Germany 
abstained from voting for the UNSC 1973 Resolution, which signified Germany did 
not favour military intervention in Libya.  
This chapter aims to evaluate the EU performance in resolving the Libyan crisis. It 
derives from investigating how the EU tackles this crisis and examining whether the 
reformed framework of the CSDP has influence on the capabilities of the EU to 
undertake crisis management operations. Besides, the role of Britain and Germany 
will also be discussed in this chapter. Especially because Britain and Germany have 
distinct attitudes from each other, it is important to explore why they have different 
attitudes towards this issue and how these differences influence the EU role in the 
Libyan crisis. 
 
7.2 The EU in the Libyan Crisis 
Since the 1999 Cologne Council decided to establish the ESDP, the military and 
civilian capabilities of the EU have been largely improved through the 
implementation of a series of headline goals. Although the missions of the 
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ESDP/CSDP largely depend on intergovernmental voluntary co-operation from 
member states, the EU has rapidly developed a high profile for crisis management 
operations. These missions are located in the Balkan region, Africa, the Middle East 
and Asia, and this signifies the ambition of the EU to become a global player. 
Accordingly, this section will explore whether the improvement of institutional 
frameworks and deployable capabilities contributes to the ability of the EU to cope 
with crisis management operations, and evaluate the performance of the EU in 
dealing with the Libyan crisis. 
7.2.1 The CSDP Mechanisms for Tackling Crisis Management Operations 
Before investigating the actions that the EU took in the Libyan crisis, it is essential to 
introduce the mechanisms that the EU can rely on in response to international crises. 
A series of reforms since the 1999 Cologne council until the Lisbon Treaty aims to 
create a more institutionalised and systematic framework for the CSDP and has 
enabled the CSDP to become more applicable to crisis management operations. 
According to the existing institutional framework of the CSDP, there is a set of 
mechanisms and procedures for the EU to tackle CSDP-related issues. 
Firstly, the decision-making bodies in the EU which are charged with CSDP-related 
issues can be separated into three levels: strategy-making bodies, 
suggestion/initiative-proposing bodies, and policy-supporting bodies. The 
strategy-making bodies include the President of the European Council and the High 
Representative. The new roles of the President and the High Representative 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are expected to enhance the capacities of the EU in 
response to external relations and international crises. Both of them can address 
CFSP and CSDP-related issues on behalf of the EU and represent the EU speaking 
with one voice on the international scene (Article 15, 18, The Lisbon Treaty). Since 
Herman Van Rompuy is appointed for the first President and Catherine Ashton is 
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appointed for the first High Representative, how they exert their authorities and 
responsibilities is decisive in determining the development and influence of these 
positions in the future.  
The suggestion/initiative-proposing bodies include the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) (Article 27.3, The Lisbon Treaty), the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) (Article 38, The Lisbon Treaty) and the Committee of Permanent 
Representative (COREPER) (Article 16.7, The Lisbon Treaty). They are built for the 
purpose of providing policy-planning suggestions and decision-implementing 
supervisions. The EEAS and the PSC especially are responsible for assisting the work 
of the High Representative and the Foreign Affairs Council; meanwhile, when crisis 
occurs, the PSC is charged with political control on the situation in order to avoid the 
EU being powerless in response to urgent situations.   
Besides, there are some policy-supporting bodies subordinated to the EEAS and PSC 
for crisis management situations or operations, including the Joint Situation Centre 
(SitCen), EUMC, EUMS, CIVCOM, the Civil & Military Planning Department (CMPD), 
the Political and Military Group (PMG), the Civilian Planning and Conducting 
Capabilities (CPCC), and the EU Operations Centre. These institutions are responsible 
for providing more detailed information and advice to help the EEAS and PSC define 
situations and make decisions; meanwhile, they also assist with carrying out or 
monitoring the implementation of CSDP missions. 
Secondly, regarding the instruments applicable to responding to crises, the Lisbon 
Treaty simplifies the names of common positions and joint actions to ‘positions’ and 
‘actions’, but they still belong to the scope of co-decision (Article 25, 28, The Lisbon 
Treaty). Accordingly, the High Representative and any member states can make 
proposals or initiatives referring to the CFSP to the Council (Article 27.1, The Lisbon 
Treaty); and meanwhile, if they require a rapid decision, the High Representative can 
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convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours (Article 30.2, The 
Lisbon Treaty). Qualified majority voting and constructive abstention are maintained 
but may not apply to the decisions with military or defence implications (Article 31, 
The Lisbon Treaty).  
The most important change in the Lisbon Treaty for the Council is that the Foreign 
Affairs Council is separated from the previous General Affairs and External Relations 
Council and becomes independent (Article 12.5, The Lisbon Treaty) and the High 
Representative will chair the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18.3, 27, The Lisbon 
Treaty). Although by and large the procedures for adopting a Union position or 
action do not have much change, the authority of the High Representative is 
enhanced. Also, the High Representative is also the Vice-President in the 
Commission (Article 17.4, 18.4, The Lisbon Treaty), and this dual responsibility will 
increase more possibilities to improve the coordination between the Council and the 
Commission.  
The institutional framework above provides necessary procedures about how to 
decide and implement a CSDP mission. In terms of deployable capability for 
implement common foreign and security affairs, as introduced in the Chapter three, 
the EU already has European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and two standby battle 
groups for military actions. When the crisis in Libya became serious, the EU actually 
had two standby battle groups; the one was from Netherlands, Germany, Finland, 
Austria, and Lithuania, while the other one was from Nordic countries (C. Major & 
Molling, 2011, p. 36). However, member states did not agree to deploy these 
battle-groups to Libya. Although EU battle groups have become ready for 
deployment since 2007, they have not been deployed to any crisis management 
situations so far.  
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In the civilian dimension, the EU also aims to prepare about 12 CSDP medium civilian 
missions and one major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts and could last for 
several years) at the same time. Besides, for policing operations, member states are 
asked to provide more than 5000 police officers and up to 1400 can be deployed in 
less than 30 days. There are other civilian staffs have been promised by member 
states for civilian CSDP missions (ESDP, Civilian Aspects, 2009). 
To summarise, the EU has already established an institutionalised framework for 
common security and defence policy because it has a definite decision-making 
procedure and hierarchical administrative system, and also it has deployable 
capability. This framework is supposed to make the EU become more responsive if 
the international situations are required. However, in the Libyan crisis the EU still 
lacked rapid, strong and consistent actions to resolve the situation and once again 
looked towards NATO for military crisis resolution. It signified that the present 
institutionalised framework is not capable of overcoming the divergences of national 
interests and security policies. As a result, it is useful to explore how the 
consideration of national interests affects the implementation of the CSDP on crisis 
management. 
7.2.2 The EU Role in Resolving the Libyan Crisis 
Generally speaking, the actions of the EU to the Libyan crisis were undertaken 
basically according to the UNSCR 1970 and 1973, and mainly concentrated on 
diplomatic and economic sanctions. Although during the period of the Libyan crisis, 
there were lots of discussions inside the EU via the European Council and the Foreign 
Affairs Council, the EU did not agree to have a crisis management operation in Libya 
till the end.  
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Since the Lisbon Treaty vests the High Representative with competence to 
co-ordinate different attitudes between member states and to propose initiatives to 
the Foreign Affairs Council, the High Representative plays a critical role in 
encouraging member states to adopt decisions for the EU to form positions and take 
actions. After the outbreak of the Libyan crisis, the High Representative Catherine 
Ashton made the first statement on 20 February 2011 on behalf of the EU to 
condemn the Libyan government, call for an immediate end to attacks against 
civilians and ask the Libyan government for national dialogue with their people 
(Ashton, 2011b). However, this statement did not make any promise that what 
actions the EU would take. A brief statement was made by the Chairman of the PSC 
Olof Skoog after a PSC meeting on 23 February 2011 while Skoog made a 
commitment that the EU would take further measures in Libya (Skoog, 2011). 
However, he did not make a definite promise about EU actions, either.  
Soon after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, on 28 February 2011 
the High Representative and the President of the Commission had a joint proposal 
for implementing the Resolution. The Council then adopted a decision to impose an 
arms embargo, a ban on exports of internal repression equipment, a travel ban and 
economic restrictions to the Gaddafi regime involved in violent repression against 
civilians in Libya (2011/137/CFSP). 
The speech made by Ashton on 9 March 2011 at the European Parliament argued 
that there were two immediate priorities of the EU, referring to the Libyan crisis. The 
first was to cope with the humanitarian crisis and assist with evacuating European 
citizens from Libya (Ashton, 2011c). Accordingly, the Commission allocated €30 
million for humanitarian assistance in Libya, and the EEAS assisted in the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism (MIC) from 23 February 2011 for the evacuation of EU citizens. 
The second priority was to end the violent situation in Libya and ensure the people 
who were violating international law would be prosecuted for their crimes. 
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Correspondingly, the EEAS sent a fact-finding mission to Libya led by Agostino 
Miozzo, Managing Director for Crisis Response, on 6–7 March 2011 to observe the 
local humanitarian situation and assess whether it would be necessary to deploy a 
CSDP mission to Libya. 
This speech had two implications. Firstly, because Ashton had sent a fact-finding 
mission to Libya, it implied she was considering deploying an EU mission in Libya. 
Secondly, the Commission was more responsive than the Council to address this 
problem because the Commission had a supranational framework and be easier to 
make decisions more efficiently.  
An extraordinary Council meeting was convened by Ashton on 10 March, and an 
extraordinary European Council meeting was also held on 11 March. However, 
neither of the meetings made a concrete promise that the EU would have a crisis 
management mission in Libya. In a brief statement made before the Council meeting, 
although Ashton mentioned there was a discussion about building a no-fly zone in 
Libya, she merely promised that the EU might impose economic sanctions against 
the Gaddafi regime (Ashton, 2011d). Concerning the UN Security Resolution 1973, 
the Council meeting on 21 March only concluded that the EU would implement the 
resolution ‘in a different way’ (Council Conclusions, 2011). Besides, the meeting of 
the European Council on 24–25 March 2011 was merely committed to ‘a political 
solution’ (European Council Conclusions, 2011). Accordingly, neither the Council nor 
the European Council adopted a decision to have a crisis management operation in 
Libya and insisted non-military measures to resolve this issue.  
A military operation (EUFOR Libya) was adopted by the Council on 1 April for 
humanitarian assistance (2011/210/CFSP). EUFOR Libya was set up for a small scale 
and short-term operation in order to assist evacuation tasks and ensure safe delivery 
of humanitarian resources. However, EUFOR Libya was a standby operation rather 
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than an autonomous action, because it would only operate under the request of the 
UN. The UN actually did not make such request till the end of the crisis. The stance 
that the EU would only have a military mission in Libya under the UN mandate was 
also made clear by Ashton, even though such a military mission was for a 
humanitarian purpose (Ashton, 2011e). 
More economic and diplomatic restrictions were adopted to implement the Council 
decision 2011/137/CFSP from March to August 2011; however, no crisis 
management operation had been decided. As the situation in Libya became calm, 
the UN Security Council accepted Resolution 2009 on 16 September 2011 in order to 
start a three-month reconstruction project in Libya named ‘UN Support Mission in 
Libya’ (UNSMIL) and exempted partly sanctions (S/RES/2009/2011). Following this 
resolution, the EU also started to lift part of the sanctions against Libya. 
To summarise, although the EU expressed deep concern about the Libya issue, it was 
unable to address crisis management in Libya. Although both Ashton and Van 
Rompuy reiterated the stance that Gaddafi had to relinquish authority, the EU did 
not have corresponding military actions to underpin its stance. What the EU did in 
the crisis in Libya was not different from what it did in the crisis in Kosovo, because it 
still relied on non-military measures. The EUFOR Libya was the only CSDP mission 
agreed by the EU for Libya, but it did not really carry out the responsibilities since 
the UN did not make such a mandate.  
7.2.3 Evaluate the Role of EU in the Libyan Crisis 
From the frustrating experiences in conducting the Kosovo crisis, in the 1999 
Cologne European Council and under the initiative of the German Presidency, EU 
member states made a declaration to develop ‘the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
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readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to 
actions by NATO’. Accordingly, three elements of this determination could be 
identified. Firstly, the EU should be able to undertake autonomous external actions. 
Secondly, such actions should be accompanied with credible military capabilities and 
appropriate procedures. Thirdly, such developments should not undermine the 
presence of NATO. The three elements could serve as criteria by which to examine 
whether the EU had achieved the objective of the Cologne European Council. 
In terms of whether the EU would be able to undertake autonomous external actions, 
it depended on two conditions, which were if there were proper procedures and if 
there were corresponding capability. As was mentioned in the previous section, the 
EU had established an institutionalised and organised policy-making process for 
implementing common security and defence affairs. Once the Council adopted a 
common decision, member states and EU institutions would be liable to implement 
the decision. Besides the capability contributions from member states, the EEAS, PSC 
and other policy-supporting bodies would have to provide political control, strategic 
direction and monitoring during the period of implementation. This framework 
ensured that the EU would have technical and administrative assistance in order to 
undertake a CSDP mission. 
Besides, regarding the relationship with NATO, the EU had made a joint declaration 
with NATO on 16 December 2002 in order to develop a permanent co-operation 
framework called ‘Berlin Plus’ for crisis management operations. The ‘Berlin Plus’ 
included three elements: allowing the EU access to NATO planning, having European 
command in NATO, and allowing the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities (EU–
NATO Declaration, 2002). Accordingly, a NATO permanent military liaison team has 
been built at the EU Military Staff (EUMS) since November 2005 and an EU cell has 
been set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for operations in Belgium) from 
March 2006. The ‘Berlin Plus’ aimed to build a co-operative and complementary 
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relationship between NATO and the EU and then avoid possible conflicts between 
these two institutions. 
Then, why did the EU still fail to play a military role in the Libyan crisis? Ashton was 
expected to play a proactive role and she considered herself able to do this. As she 
herself stated, one of her priorities as High Representative was to create a ‘new 
diplomatic service that is genuinely Europe on the ground’ (Ashton, 2011a, p. 5). 
Indeed, Ashton did consider a military option since she sent a fact-finding group to 
Libya at a very early stage of the crisis, but she could not persuade member states to 
accept such option in the end. What she did during the process of resolving the crisis 
was basically to reiterate that the EU did not support the Gaddafi regime any more, 
but the EU did not provide a more credible method for implementing this aim.   
Because the new High Representative was expected to accomplish a lot, when 
Ashton did not play this role as well as expected she was blamed more for her weak 
personality. When Ashton came to the European Parliament for the first time, she 
was criticised for her vague rhetoric and lack of ‘lucid presentation of priority’ 
(Traynor, 2010). Although it was definitely a difficult task to co-ordinate divisions of 
27 member states of the EU and form a coherent foreign policy, Ashton was still 
considered to be responsible for this result because she lacked diplomatic 
experience and ambition (Brady, 2012).  
Since Britain and France led a multi-state coalition for military intervention in Libya, 
this illustrated that at least these two leading member states favoured undertaking 
military actions in resolving the Libyan crisis. However, because Germany did not 
support a military operation in Libya, the Council could not consent to military 
intervention. The Libya case signified that Britain and France were more likely to find 
a similar stance on taking military actions, and the coherent political will of these 
three countries was still the crucial factor affecting whether the EU could play a 
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military role in crisis management operations. The next two sections will discuss the 
British and German cases in the crisis and analyse their positions and actions in this 
event. 
 
7.3 British Role in the Libyan Crisis 
Being one of the three largest contributors to defence affairs in the EU and also the 
crucial motor for promoting the development of the ESDP, Britain basically has a 
motive for playing an active role in security and defence affairs. Therefore, in the 
crisis in Libya, Britain took a proactive attitude towards military intervention. 
7.3.1 The Policy of the Cameron Government about the Libyan Crisis 
Referring to the emerging crisis in Libya, both Cameron and the Foreign Minister 
William Hague declared that the UK would take every step and action to resolve the 
situation. According to the speech made by the Cameron on 28 February at the 
House of Commons, four principles were concluded which guided Britain to define 
the policy towards the situation in Libya. Firstly, ensure the safety of British citizens 
in Libya. As Foreign Secretary William Hague stated that the safety of British 
nationals remained the top priority for the British Government (Hague, 2011a). 
Secondly, isolate the Gaddafi regime. Therefore, before the EU adopted the Council 
decision 2011/137/CFSP, Britain had decided to freeze the assets of the Gaddafi 
regime in the UK and impose an arms embargo. Thirdly, continue the humanitarian 
concern for Libya. This humanitarian resort was utilised by the Cameron Government 
as a rationale for undertaking military intervention. Fourthly, offer necessary support 
for the Libyan people for political reform (D. Cameron, 2011a).  
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For building a no-fly zone in Libya, Britain led the multi-state coalition with France 
from 19 March 2011. Although some MPs raised a concern that such military actions 
should have had support or involvement from the Arab League, this decision 
nevertheless received absolutely majority support in the UK Parliament. In a vote on 
21 March 2011, the House of Commons approved the decision to undertake military 
intervention in Libya in order to fulfil UNSCR 1973, with 557 votes in favour and 13 
votes against (Hansard, House of Commons, 2011).  
7.3.2 British Engagement in the EU in Response to the Libyan Crisis 
For resolving the crisis in Libya, Cameron co-operated with France soon and 
depended on NATO to take over military actions. He did not expect the EU to play a 
military role. As Cameron said in the Commons debate on 14 March, ‘the EU is not a 
military alliance and there is always hesitation about discussing military options’ (D. 
Cameron, 2011b). This statement meant that even after more than ten-year 
developments of building up military capability, the EU was not considered able to 
play a military role. Meanwhile, this statement also showed that EU member states 
usually did not have consensus about military issues and even did not want to 
discuss it. 
Since Cameron did not consider that the EU could play a military role in Libya, and 
also NATO had taken over military intervention from the end of March, Britain did 
not have to push the EU to shoulder this role. However, Britain expected the EU to 
increase sanctions against Gaddafi, because the collaboration of 27 EU countries 
should largely increase pressure on the regime. Regarding this issue, Britain had 
frozen £12 billion Libyan assets in the UK in March in order to implement Council 
decisions about economic sanctions against Libya. However, obviously the Foreign 
Minister Hague was not satisfied with the reserved position taken by the EU so as to 
ask the EU to take ‘bold and ambitious’ policies (Hague, 2011b). It seemed that, 
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although Britain recognised that the EU was unable to play a military role, it still 
expected the EU to become more influential in international situations.   
Britain expelled the Libyan Ambassador to the UK on 1 May 2011, and on 4–5 June 
2011, Hague and the International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell visited 
Benghazi where the base of the NTC was. On 27 July 2011, Britain agreed to 
recognise the NTC as the sole legitimate government in Libya and expelled other 
Libyan diplomats from the Gaddafi regime on the same day. This decision signified 
that the situation in Libya was gradually put under control by the NTC and that 
Britain was considering building the relationship with the new government in Libya.   
On the basis of the UN Security Council resolutions, there were three approaches 
that Britain undertook in resolving the crisis in Libya. Firstly, Britain depended on the 
multi-state coalition and NATO to undertake military actions. Secondly, Britain 
utilised the EU to impose political and economic sanctions. Thirdly, in order to 
consolidate greater consensus in international community, Britain also conducted a 
contact group which consisted of countries from Europe, North America, the Middle 
East, North Africa and Asia in order to find a diplomatic solution.  
It was clearly that except for imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions, Britain 
was unable to push the EU and also did not expect it to decide a crisis management 
operation in Libya. Although Britain admitted the sanctions imposed by the EU were 
important to isolate the Gaddafi regime, the non-military measures were not as 
effective as the military means in implementing the objectives of the Government, 
which was to terminate Gaddafi’s authority. Although the EU had developed 
frameworks to decide and implement crisis management missions, it was still 
difficult to form a consensus among 27 member states for such actions. Besides, 
because the Eurozone countries were occupied by economic difficulties resulting 
from the Greek debit crisis, they did not have enough political will to invest in an 
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expansive military action in Libya. Consequently, similarly to what Britain did in the 
crisis in Kosovo, it still depended on NATO to carry out the military operation. 
7.3.3 Evaluate the British Role in the Libyan Crisis 
It is significant to analyse the motivations that encouraged the Cameron 
Government to take a proactive and strong attitude towards the Libyan crisis. This 
thesis has argued that besides a serious concern with the anti-humanitarian situation 
in Libya, there were at least five factors affecting British policy on this issue. Firstly, 
the Government was swayed by a geopolitical consideration. As Cameron argued, it 
was not in Britain’s interest to see ‘a failed pariah state festered on Europe’s 
southern border’ (D. Cameron, 2011b). Since Libya was located on Europe’s southern 
border, an unstable Libya would be a potential security threat to the Mediterranean 
area and the European continent. Also, it would have an impact on the 
implementation of EU neighbourhood policy.  
Secondly, the Cameron Government did not view the Libyan crisis as a single event. 
The situation in Libya was critical as regards its neighbourhood region, especially 
Egypt and Tunisia. Because both of these countries had just undergone a revolution 
and were still engaged in a reconstruction process, their transitional governments 
were too vulnerable to bear external pressures. If the situation in Libya had 
continued to deteriorate, it might have resulted in instability in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
possibly Algeria or other countries around this region, and have caused a more 
serious regional crisis. 
Thirdly, the Cameron Government viewed this issue as an opportunity for this region 
to complete political reform. The Government considered that what happened in 
North Africa might spread to other regions and especially inspire the Middle East to 
take up peaceful movements for political change. As Cameron again stated, it was in 
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Britain’s national interest ‘to see the growth of open societies and the building 
blocks of democracy in North Africa and the Middle East’ (D. Cameron, ibid.). Hague 
also stated that if the countries of the Middle East area turn into democracies with 
open economies, ‘the gain for the British security and prosperity will be enormous’ 
(Hague, 2011c). Therefore, assisting Libya and other North Africa countries to 
establish a democratic and constitutional regime was considered to help peaceful 
transformation in the Middle East, and this transformation was compatible with 
Britain’s national interests.  
Fourthly, Britain could increase its influence as a great power via demonstrating the 
political will and capability to resolve the Libyan crisis. For example, the Conservative 
MP James Morris offered his support to the government intervention in Libya 
because he considered that Britain ‘must be as flexible and co-operative as possible 
to protect its national interest’ and such effort would balance the unipolar influence 
from America (J. Morris, 2011). It is also considered that the military intervention in 
Libya demonstrated British ambition to ‘maintain an activist role’ on the 
international scene (Harvey, 2011). Although Britain did not intend to challenge the 
American power and still emphasised the UK–US special relationship, it still had the 
ambition of being a great power. 
Fifthly, people considered that Cameron might follow Tony Blair’s statement in the 
Chicago speech in 1999 about the doctrine of ‘liberal interventionism’ because 
Cameron also called for more international intervention, endorsed by the UN, in 
order to ‘spread peace, prosperity, democracy and vitally security’ in his first speech 
to the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2011 (d'Ancona, 2011; Swaine, 2011). 
Accordingly, Cameron also expressed interest in improving human rights or other 
values through coercive measures; however, a warning was given by a journalist Con 
Coughlin that Cameron’s attempt could cause an opposite result (Coughlin, 2011). 
Although it was still unclear whether Cameron was really following Blair’s ‘liberal 
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interventionism’ and how it would affect the Conservative–Lib Dem Government to 
shape foreign policy, this stance had attracted some attention and discussions in 
British domestic politics. 
These factors had inspired Britain to play a prominent role in the Libyan crisis, and 
Britain had already demonstrated its ability to resolve the issue and achieved its 
objectives indeed. However, it is important to raise the question of why the EU, even 
with the strong support from Britain and France, could not take ‘bold and ambitious’ 
measures in response to the Libyan crisis. Since the European Council and the 
Foreign Affairs Council generally act with unanimity, especially on the issues with 
military and defence implications, whether member states can reach consensus 
would become an indispensable foundation for the EU deciding on a military 
operation. Therefore, it is important to investigate why Germany was opposed to 
military intervention in Libya and whether this opposition was consistent with 
German commitment to EU common security and defence.   
 
7.4 German Role in the Libyan Crisis 
The decision to develop the ESDP was supported by the German Presidency in the 
1999 Cologne European Council. However, compared to Britain and France, the 
driving force from Germany to develop the ESDP was not as pre-eminent as Britain 
and France. By defining itself as a civilian power, Germany behaved prudently and 
hesitantly in the face of military issues. The ‘tamed power’ inclination (Katzenstein, 
1997) encouraged Germany to follow an institutionalism and multilateralism 
tradition and ensured the institutionalised progress in European integration. 
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However, even though Germany did not have much military ambition, Germany still 
maintained commitment to multilateral military operations.  
Take the NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan for example. The air strikes 
launched by NATO on 30 March 1999 against the FRY were the first time that 
Germany took part in a military operation of NATO since it joined NATO. Not only 
providing aircraft, Germany also offered air bases in its territory for the operation. 
Besides, since December 2001, Germany has been taking part in the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan, the International Military Engagement in Afghanistan (ISAF). It was the 
first time that Germany sent its ground troops outside its territory to implement an 
international mission, and Germany is still playing a leading role within the ISAF in 
northern Afghanistan (see: German Engagement in ISAF, 2012). These two examples 
signify that Germany is not aloof itself from implementing military responsibility, and 
is also willing to play a role in a military mission if that is necessary. 
According to the latest Military Balance Report, in 2011 Germany still maintained 
5,150 troops in Afghanistan for the mission ISAF; also, during the period of the 
Libyan crisis, Germany decided to deploy an AWACS mission to support ISAF; in KFOR, 
there were still 1,451 Germany troops deployed there in 2011 (Military Balance, 
2012). Moreover, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, Germany has abandoned the 
conscription system and is transforming its military to become more modern and 
professional. These contributions signify that regardless of its civilian character, 
Germany is trying to fulfil military commitment if it is required. Then, why did 
Germany behave so reluctantly regarding military intervention in the Libyan crisis? 
In the crisis in Libya, Germany neither took part in the multi-state coalition nor 
contributed to the military actions of NATO; moreover, Germany did not favour the 
joint proposal made by Britain and France of establishing a no-fly zone, and then 
abstained in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Compared to the 
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proactive attitude of Britain and France to resolve the Libyan crisis with strong and 
effective measures, the attitude of the German government was relatively cautious 
and conservative. 
7.4.1 The Policy of the Merkel Government about the Libyan Crisis 
Regarding the emergence of the Libyan crisis, to evacuate German nationals was the 
top priority of the government. In the interview invited by Deutschlandfunk on 25 
February 2011, which was also the day before the UN Security Council Resolution 
1970 was adopted, the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle declared that 
the Government would ‘take every possible step’ to evacuate German people and 
foreigners, including by military means; however, Westerwelle also promised that 
military means would only be applied to the evacuation task in this case 
(Westerwelle, 2011a). Utilising military means to implement this task at least meant 
the German government was very concerned about this issue. 
Another priority of Germany was to impose sanctions on the Gaddafi regime due to 
its seriously violating human rights in Libya. The German President Christian Wulff 
had censured Gaddafi by describing him as a ‘psychopath’, ‘terrorising his own 
people’, and such behaviour was ‘terrorism by the state’; Wulff also urged the EU to 
‘prove its capacity to take action and make constructive offers’ (Wulff, 2011). In the 
same interview mentioned above, Westerwelle also made a complaint that the EU 
had been too hesitant about making a decision on Libya, but meanwhile he rejected 
a military option for resolving the situation in Libya (Westerwelle, ibid.). This 
statement offered an important reference by which to understand how Germany 
conducted the policy on coping with this issue. Because in the interview Westerwelle 
did not promise the possibility of imposing an arms embargo on Libya, this implied 
that Germany had been careful about undertaking actions which have military 
implications.  
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The German position on resolving the Libyan crisis became clearer as the situation 
became more serious. The government would be committed to placing more 
sanctions on the Gaddafi regime, but it would not promise military intervention. 
Therefore, although asserting that Germany would be ‘a strong advocate for robust 
sanctions’ against Libya, it did not consider alternatives other than imposing political 
and economic restrictions on Gaddafi and his government (Westerwelle, 2011b, 
2011c). One of the reasons Germany did not promise a military mission, as 
mentioned by Westerwelle in these statements, was that Germany worried such 
action might invoke criticisms from the Arabic countries.  
Regarding the proposal of establishing a no-fly zone, Westerwelle considered it 
would result in more problems because it involved military intervention, and that 
was what Germany resisted (Westerwelle, 2011c.). Because Germany made it clear 
that it would not send German troops to Libya, this meant Germany would neither 
join the multi-state coalition nor take part in NATO mission. In order to share the 
burden of NATO, Germany decided to deploy AWACS surveillance planes and crews 
in Afghanistan. This decision was like a political exchange for obtaining 
understanding from Germany’s allies with the decision of avoiding involvement in 
military operations in Libya. As the Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière stated, the 
decision to approve the deployment of the AWACS mission was a ‘political sign of 
our solidarity with the alliance’ (Maizière, 2011). This brief statement implied that an 
increased German contribution to the mission in Afghanistan should fix relations 
with Germany’s allies if Germany’s rejection of taking part in military action in Libya 
had made them unhappy. A similar intention was presented by Westerwelle 
(Westerwelle, 2011d).  
It was doubtless that Germany was concerned with the anti-humanitarian crisis in 
Libya and paid great attention to the situation change, but meanwhile Germany also 
saw that what happened to Libya was a process of revolution in the North African 
215 
 
region. Therefore, out of concern about the reactions of the whole Arab world, 
Germany took a more prudent and cautious attitude to military options. In the 
statements mentioned above, Westerwelle repeatedly stressed that military actions 
might cause an unexpected outcome and resulted in a more serious crisis.  
Besides, Germany had a special concern about civilian causalities resulting from 
military operations. By defining itself as a civilian power, Germany preferred to avoid 
involving a strong military role and this principle has been embedded in German 
foreign policy. Therefore, it usually favoured civilian resolutions rather than military 
options. Since the Merkel Government considered the enforcement of no-fly zone in 
Libya could not absolutely avoid civilian causalities, such a decision had to be made 
very cautiously.  
In the process of resolving Libya, Germany played a supportive role and focused on 
its position on providing humanitarian assistance and imposing more sanctions on 
the Gaddafi regime. Regardless of those efforts, the Merkel Government was 
inevitably criticised as being incapable of taking effective measures with speedy 
actions to stop the continuing violence in Libya or drive out Gaddafi.   
7.4.2 German Engagement in the EU in Response to the Libyan Crisis 
German disapproval of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 had caused another 
division in the EU since the Iraq war. However, in the War on Terror against Iraq, 
France and Germany had a united position, but this time they split. Although both 
the French President, Sarkozy, and the British Prime Minister, Cameron, did not to 
publicly complain to Germany about its disapproval of Resolutoin 1973, possibly 
because military intervention in Libya was a sensitive issue, the lack of solidarity 
among EU member states was nevertheless exposed.  
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The British Labour MP Mike Gapes indicated that there were four groups in the UN 
Security Council on resolving the Libyan crisis. The first contained Britain and France, 
which advocated military intervention in Libya from a very early beginning; the 
second was America, which also supported military intervention but was not as 
enthusiastic as the first group; then the third group consisted of four countries in 
Africa and the Middle East which basically supported the military intervention; and 
the fourth group included China, Russia, Germany, Brazil and India (Gapes, 2011). 
Accordingly, Germany was assigned to the group which traditionally did not choose 
to stand by the West. Gapes’s statement implied that Germany was considered not 
to have fulfilled its commitment to co-ordinate with its allies on this issue. 
In order to decrease the impact of the abstention for Resolution 1973, Germany 
provided larger support to impose more sanctions against the Gaddafi regime. In the 
Council meeting on 21 March and the European Council meeting on 24–25 March, 
Germany promoted extending the sanctions to more persons, and also oil companies,  
related to the Gaddafi regime (2011/178/CFSP). It was a small change in the German 
policy towards Libya, because one month previously, in the interview with 
Deutschlandfunk, Westerwelle still did not want to promise that Germany would 
launch oil sanctions (Westerwelle, 2011a) 
Germany did not support NATO or a multi-state coalition, but it supported the CSDP 
mission EUFOR Libya made by Council decision 2011/210/CFSP. Nevertheless, EUFOR 
Libya did not oppose the non-military stance held by the government. This was 
because EUFOR Libya aimed for a humanitarian intention instead of combat missions. 
Meanwhile, because EUFOR Libya would only operate under a mandate of the UN, it 
would have a stronger basis of legitimacy. 
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7.4.3 Evaluate the German Role in the Libyan crisis 
As stated by German Foreign Minister, peace policy is still one of the top foreign 
policy principles of the Merkel Government (Westerwelle, 2010). Although the 
‘peace policy’ is a vague term, Westerwelle explained that German foreign policy still 
maintained a multilateral approach and preferred non-military means for issues 
including non-proliferation, disarmament, and humanitarian tasks, and areas 
including the Middle East, Iran and the Balkans (Westerwelle, ibid.). However, 
Germany did not abandon its commitment to develop the CSDP. One of five 
operation headquarters for military missions of the CSDP is located in Potsdam. In 
June 2011, Germany also made a commitment to preparing another EU battle group 
in 2013 with France and Poland. Meanwhile, since 2010, Germany has advocated 
again for building an EU permanent operation headquarters for the CSDP (Hynek, 
2011). These efforts have demonstrated that Germany is committed to the 
institutionalised framework of the EU, even for military objectives; however, when 
addressing security and defence situations, civilian methods are still preferable to 
military measures.  
Evidence can be found in the process of resolving the Libyan crisis, where Germany 
largely depended on economic and political sanctions to restrain the Gaddafi regime. 
Nevertheless, imposing sanctions was not an effective approach to halt violence or 
deprive Gaddafi of authority immediately. Political solutions usually take more time 
to have influence and change the situation. Also, former German Defence Minister 
Volker Ruhe mentioned that the disapproval of the no-fly zone was ‘a serious 
mistake of historic dimensions’ because it eroded the long-term tradition originating 
from Adenauer to commit to Western allies (Ruhe, 2011). Accordingly, regardless of 
whether Germany was willing to take part in a military mission, the disapproval of 
the no-fly zone was considered an unnecessary move.  
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Nevertheless, the policy of no military intervention in Libya had gained support from 
the German public. According to a poll survey conducted after the German regional 
election on 20 March 2011, 61 per cent of the German people agreed with the policy 
of no military intervention in Libya (Rousseau, 2011). Another poll survey conducted 
by Harris Interactive for the Financial Times in June 2011 also demonstrated that the 
German people did not support extending military intervention by NATO in Libya 
(Blitz, 2011). The result that showed less than 20 per cent of Germans said that they 
would support the bombing of non-military targets or the deployment of ground 
troops from Germany.  
To summarise, compared to Britain, Germany did not choose a military option to 
resolve the Libyan crisis owing to its civilian tradition, humanitarian concern, and 
consideration about the potential risks of such options. Therefore, Germany insisted 
on a political resolution in Libya and only committed to economic and diplomatic 
sanctions against the Gaddafi regime. The lack of German support on military 
intervention this time not only signified it was still difficult for EU member states to 
form consensus on controversial issue in a short time, but also highlighted the fact 
that much divergence about security and defence affairs still existed among EU 
member states. Besides, Germany’s stance also matters – after all, it is one of the 
leading member states of the EU.   
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Since the previous leader of Libya Muammar Gaddafi died on 20 October 2011 and 
ended the dictatorial regime of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and NATO finished the 
operation in Libya at the end of October 2011, Libya formally began a new stage to 
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undertake political reform. Reviewing the process of resolving the Libyan crisis, the 
Western countries have contributed major efforts to stabilise the situation, not only 
on the military side but also on the civilian side. However, regarding whether to have 
a military resolution in Libya, Germany had a different opinion from Britain and 
France, so that such a decision was not adopted by the EU. Then, what impact would 
the divergence among member states have upon the development of security and 
defence integration in the EU? Also, will the failure to decide on a joint military 
mission in Libya decrease the military role of the EU in the future? 
As in the crisis in Kosovo, the EU merely depended on non-military measures in 
resolving the Libyan crisis. However, the situation in Libya was different from the 
situation in Kosovo. It was because the EU had developed deployable procedures 
and capability since the Kosovo crisis, but was still unable to resolve such a crisis. 
Although the CSDP has developed a set of more applicable procedures and 
instruments with a gradually institutionalised framework, member states 
nevertheless have a dominant role in the decision-making process. Because the 
decision-making process in the CSDP is basically based on unanimity and consensus, 
especially on the matters which have military implications, regarding very 
controversial issues or uncertain situations, member states may not determine an 
ambitious project. The Libyan crisis took place in a context where the local 
environment was very unstable and any crisis management intervention there would 
inevitably have to be prepared for combat against violent forces; therefore, member 
states of the EU found it was still difficult to have consensus about whether to adopt 
a military option to control the situation even with a developed CSDP.  
If it is the objective to manage crisis from the very early beginning, however, it 
inevitably has to run the risk of uncertainty. Since joint disarmament operations and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management are two of the five types of CSDP 
missions that the EU aims at undertaking, it cannot avoid the uncertainty and risk 
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involved in completing such missions. Therefore, the problem this time is not about 
whether the EU has developed enough capabilities to undertake CSDP missions but 
is more about whether EU member states have developed the consolidated political 
will to fulfil this ambition. An institutionalised framework may help with such 
consolidation, but such an effect is still limited. Especially, the divergent responses of 
Britain, France and Germany to resolve the Libyan crisis actually demonstrate that 
the EU has not formed such consolidation.  
In fact, compared to economic issues, nation states overcome more difficulties in 
converging on security and defence policies and take longer to overcome their 
divergences. Take Britain and Germany for example. Although both of them are 
committed to the missions in the EU and NATO, they have very different traditions 
and attitudes towards military involvement. On the one hand, Britain had a glorious 
imperial history all over the world and doubtless it still has an ambition to play an 
important role in military affairs; on the other hand, Germany has embraced civilian 
and non-military principles for more than half a century, and the public is used to 
resist military concepts. Since the development of the CSDP only begins from the late 
1990s, it is not surprising that member states of the EU have not accumulated 
enough consensus about whether and how to conduct a military action in response 
to an urgent crisis. 
The divisions among member states in the Libyan crisis inevitably undermine the 
profile of the EU of forming a single voice on the international stage. Although EU 
member states will not just abandon the efforts to develop a common and security 
policy because of this frustration, they will have to make consensus and have a 
clearer definition about what they really expect to achieve and what they really can 
do. Although member states now have recognised that the EU has a prominent role 
on the international stage and in building an organised and institutionalised 
framework for achieving such an ambition, they still require more specific mission 
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targets for achieving this ambition. Unlike the situation in Kosovo, this is not about 
lacking an institutional framework, but about whether EU member states have 
enough political will to work this framework well. 
Nevertheless, frustration at the Libyan crisis could be an impulse for member states 
to develop more consolidated concepts. Also, in response to American retrenchment 
and possible decreasing of its focus on Europe, the EU has to enhance defence 
capability in case there were a situation where the EU needs to get involved but the 
US does not want to. Although because of the Eurozone crisis, European countries 
are attempting to cut defence budgets dramatically, as Heisbourg suggested (2012), 
the austerity of defence budgets and American retrenchment may also push them to 
work out a more economic efficient approach to spend defence budgets, which may 
possibly promote the development of common defence.  
For example, Britain and France have agreed to build a joint military force and share 
equipment and nuclear missile centres since November 2011; other countries of the 
EU are also working on other plans for defence co-operation. Although such 
co-operation is outside the EU framework for now, it still has the possibility of 
becoming a foundation for the EU to develop a more consolidated security and 
defence policy. As Ben Jones (2011) has argued, the close military co-operation 
between Britain and France has a chance to form ‘a new engine for European 
defence’, although it may also imply that Britain and France will leave the framework 
of the CSDP straightaway (O’Donnell, 2011b). Which direction the future 
development of security and defence integration of the EU will be taken is a 
question which it is too early to answer since the British–French military 
co-operation has just been launched and it takes time to examine what impact this 
co-operation will have upon the CSDP. More importantly, the German attitude is 
crucial. If Germany is more committed to military issues, the British–French 
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co-operation framework will become a foundation for further developments of the 
CSDP.  
To summarise, there are some lessons that EU member states can learn from the 
Libyan crisis. Firstly, member states of the EU have to reach consensus on which 
situations the EU will contribute to military operations in. Once member states have 
reached consensus about conducting a military operation, the existing institutional 
framework of the CSDP can provide credible support to fulfil such a decision. Besides, 
member states need to form a more definite objective about how to carry out a 
military role. A definite objective will help member states to define the situation, so 
as to decide whether to intervene. Moreover, the EU requires more reliable 
mechanisms to resolve the situation when deadlock happens. To achieve this 
objective, it may be not necessary to establish a new framework, but the new 
President and the High Representative have to play a more decisive role in 
co-ordinating different opinions of member states. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
Conclusion and Evaluation 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Deriving from a concern over whether an institutionalised framework would 
contribute to security and defence integration in the EU, and whether the 
institutionalisation process of forming a common foreign and security policy shapes 
the national interests and policies of member states, this thesis has investigated how 
the historical process of institutional developments of a EU security and defence 
policy has been driven, and examines the role of Britain and Germany in this process. 
Four research questions have been addressed in Chapter 1, and the answers are 
presented below. These questions are: ‘How did the development of security and 
defence integration emerge from the grand European integration project?’, ‘What 
characteristics of the institutional frameworks for EU security and defence 
integration can be recognised?’, ‘What are the dynamics between member states 
and EU institutions in the development of an institutionalised EU security and 
defence framework?’, and ‘How effective is this framework?’. In sections 8.2–8.5, 
these questions will be answered individually. 
As was introduced in Chapter 2, institutions are considered to promote and shape 
collective actions by offering rules of games. Therefore, an institutional framework 
would attract actors to participate in and work for common objectives. Moreover, 
keeping on practising institutions will not only contribute to further 
institutionalisation, but will also help actors become embedded in these frameworks. 
It will result in mutually strengthened consequences. However, does this 
consequence also happen to the process of developing security and defence 
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integration in the EU? What does the process of institutionalisation contribute to the 
formation of a common EU security and defence policy? 
 
8.2 The Implications of Institutional Developments of a Common 
Security and Defence Policy 
Reviewing the historical process of forming a common security and defence policy in 
the EU, Chapter 3 aimed to answer how this framework developed and what 
characteristics of this framework can be identified. Chapter 3 has illustrated that 
how security and defence integration in Europe started from basic and informal 
political co-operation, and then developed an institutionalised framework since the 
Maastricht Treaty. This is an institutionalised framework, but also maintains 
intergovernmental features.  
The efforts of undertaking security and defence integration in the EU started much 
later than economic integration, but developed an alternative differing from a 
supranational approach. When the EPC was launched in the 1970s, it did not have 
legal status, nor did it have a formal framework. Although it provided a flexible 
environment for member states to develop an intergovernmental model and 
examine how to make this model work, the EPC had limited influence upon political 
integration because of an informal and loose framework.  
As was outlined in the 1970 Luxembourg Report, the objectives of the EPC included 
improving mutual understanding, co-ordinating positions of member states and 
promoting common actions. If the EPC was considered as being a platform to 
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improve mutual understanding between member states, it did offer a working place; 
if the EPC was expected to form common positions and actions, it did not work as 
well as expected. Although the foreign ministers of EC member states met regularly, 
they did not meet frequently. Two to four meetings per year would not really 
improve convergences. Nevertheless, from the experiences of developing the EPC, 
member states gradually explored how to refine an intergovernmental approach in 
order to achieve further political integration, and this process became an 
indispensable foundation for the establishment of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty.  
The Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty offered an 
institutional framework for member states to conduct foreign affairs, security issues 
and even a common defence policy. Within this framework, there were procedures 
for making common positions and joint actions and regulating relations between 
member states and EU institutions. The framework of the CFSP created by the 
Maastricht Treaty was the first institutionalised framework for member states to 
achieve the aspirations for political integration, although it still had shortfalls. It was 
because the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty did not offer a context about CFSP 
missions, nor did it have a permanent intermediate position which could help 
co-ordination between member states and the EU. This work was conducted by the 
rotating presidency of the Council, and therefore, it largely depended on ambitions 
and capabilities of different member states. The situation had not been changed 
until the Amsterdam Treaty which introduced a High Representative to work for the 
purpose. The shortfall in capability was exposed clearly when the EU responded to 
the crisis in Kosovo. Consequently, the ESDP was established at the 1999 Cologne 
European Council, which became a framework for the EU to build capability for 
security and defence missions.  
Nevertheless, the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty signified that an initial 
institutionalised framework for conducting common foreign and security affairs was 
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built and accepted by member states. This framework presented two characteristics, 
intergovernmentalism and institutionalism. An intergovernmental framework was 
maintained to ensure each member state had equal legal status during the 
decision-making process; an institutionalised framework was developed to improve 
co-ordination and coherence between member states and EU institutions, and also 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness of common decisions. As member states and 
EU institutions continued practising this framework, the path of 
intergovernmentalism and institutionalism had been strengthened. It is not only a 
learning process, but also a process of institution-acceptance. If member states 
believe institutions can achieve their national interests, they will offer more support 
to further institutionalisation of this framework.  
Investigating the institutional developments from the EPC, CFSP, ESDP to CSDP in this 
thesis, we can find that Britain and Germany also have different extents of 
expectations towards institutional developments in this policy area. This is because 
both of them had or still have a belief that a more institutionalised framework is 
compatible with their national interests and will contribute to achieving their 
objectives. During this process, Britain and Germany also have chance to become 
clearer about what they expect from this framework and then shape this framework 
to be compatible with their expectations.  
Nevertheless, the institutionalisation process of EU security and defence integration 
has produced a different extent of influence upon Britain and Germany. Britain has 
been closer to intergovernmentalism, while Germany has a stronger inclination 
towards institutionalism. These two inclinations are not incompatible as both 
countries could still work together, even if they take different approaches, but these 
differences inevitably affect their engagement with the EU framework. Their 
different attitudes are associated with historical reasons, the states’ status in the 
international community, and different definitions of national interests. These 
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factors determine what commitment they would like to make to the institutional 
framework which is oriented towards the development of a common security and 
defence policy. 
 
8.3 Britain: Still a Reluctant Actor in the EU? 
Chapter 4 has investigated the British role in the process of institutionalising a 
common security and defence policy and examined whether this process affects 
Britain’s preferences and national interests. Although absent from the initial stage of 
economic integration, Britain participated in the EPC when the EPC started to 
operate. This meant that Britain did not have to accept an established framework, 
and this was a favourable condition for Britain to participate in the process of 
shaping the framework of the EPC. 
Because no member states knew at the beginning how the EPC would become and 
how far it would go in the end, member states had to try to learn what would be the 
best options for them and for this framework. Britain’s principles about the form of 
political integration in the EU were also formed through this process. Accordingly, 
Britain’s two principles, which are insistence on intergovernmental framework and 
maintaining the primary presence of NATO in Europe, are gradually developed in this 
process. These two principles are not new to Britain because they are consistent 
with Britain’s traditions of foreign policy, but they become more definite when the 
institutional framework becomes more detailed and focused on security and defence 
dimensions.  
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The worldwide view inspired Britain to play a global role, especially in the early 
post-war years. This world-view perspective had been adjusted when Britain’s global 
influence declined since the 1950s and then made Britain become more engaged in 
Europe. However, Britain still wanted to maintain an independent role in the process 
of European integration and rejected to expand the supranational framework to the 
policy areas outside the Rome Treaty. This stance has made Britain insist on 
intergovernmentalism because it would ensure that Britain maintains its 
independence in the decision-making process and would not be contravened by a 
decision made by the majority.  
The support for NATO originates from the UK–US special relationship. As was 
introduced in Chapter 4, the special relationship has been a crucial element in 
Britain’s foreign policy since WWII, and therefore maintaining the solidarity of the 
transatlantic alliance has been Britain’s priority. Although even a pro-European 
leader like Blair, who attempted to conduct a ‘bridge strategy’ which would make 
Britain occupy a key position to connect America and Europe, when he had to make 
a choice between them, still chose to stand with America. It signified that the UK–US 
special relationship was irreplaceable.  
Meanwhile, because it insists on the primary role of NATO in European security, 
Britain will not support the EU in developing an independent military role if this 
would undermine the presence of NATO. Therefore, Britain’s commitment to the 
common security and defence policy is conditional and not fully engaged. For Britain, 
the security role of the EU is also limited. It does not expect that the EU would 
become as effective as NATO when undertaking crisis management operations. As 
Cameron said in the process of resolving the crisis in Libya, he did not consider the 
EU as a military alliance. Although Britain has attempted deepening defence 
co-operation with France, this co-operation is developed on a bilateral framework 
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and there is no sign so far that it will become a foundation for the EU to move 
towards the deepening of its common security and defence capabilities.  
The isolated sentiment of Britain is not only presented on common security and 
defence affairs, but also expressed in the whole structure of the EU. Because Britain 
did not join the initial stage of forming the ECSC and common market, it accepted a 
framework which had been decided by other countries. Moreover, Britain’s 
unfavourable attitude towards the deepening of integration that diminished its 
influence in the EU after it had joined in 1973. Although in the field of political 
integration Britain has full autonomy to shape an institutional framework, this 
isolated sentiment is hardly alleviated.  
This absence also resulted in the consequence that the institutionalisation process 
had limited influence upon Britain. Therefore, Britain adopts a flexible strategy when 
taking part in developing the common security and defence policy. On the one hand, 
when this development is compatible with Britain’s objectives and national interests, 
Britain will support it. Take Blair’s advocacy for building the ESDP and enhancing 
military capability of the EU as an example, it was because this proposal 
underpinned Blair’s prospect which aimed to consolidate the leading role of Britain 
in European integration, and make Britain a bridge between America and Europe. On 
the other hand, when Britain has a better choice, it will go for the alternative – as 
happened in the process of resolving the crisis in Libya, when NATO and America 
could provide support for military actions, and Cameron just utilised NATO 
framework instead of calling for EU participation.  
Nevertheless, the institutionalisation process from the CFSP to CSDP helps Britain 
make clear that what it can expect from the EU when conducting security and 
defence affairs; also, Britain would realise that, if it has the political will, it can play a 
leading role in further institutional developments. For example, Britain had inserted 
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the two principles in the CFSP, ESDP, and CSDP and ensured that these 
developments maintained intergovernmental framework and would not undermine 
NATO. Moreover, if Britain aspires to enhancing its global influence, the EU is still a 
possible platform for it in playing a balancing role between two continents.  
 
8.4 Germany: Still a Civilian Power in the EU? 
Germany has presented a distinct picture from the case in Britain. Reviewing the 
historical process of German participation in European integration in Chapter 5 has 
signified that the institutionalisation process has a much stronger influence on 
Germany, and therefore, Germany has a much more committed attitude towards 
European integration than Britain. Each time Germany attempted to pursue more 
political space and national interests, it would make more commitments to 
developing institutions. Adenauer’s Westpolitik policy started German engagement 
in institutionalism and multilateralism. This commitment not only embedded 
Germany in the West, but also contributed to stability, prosperity and peace in West 
Germany. 
When Brandt pursued the Ostpolitik policy, he also ensured that Ostpolitik would not 
undermine German commitment to Western institutions, and contributed more 
efforts to reform the EC, including the launch of the EPC. When Helmut Kohl secured 
German reunification, Germany became even more committed to European 
integration, and therefore the European Union was established. This process 
demonstrated that each time the institutional framework of European integration 
had major reforms, Germany played a crucial role and offered an indispensable 
impulse. Meanwhile, because the institutionalisation process of European 
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integration is strongly associated with Germany’s destiny in Europe, German 
interests and the institutional developments of European integration are fully 
compatible. To quote Kohl’s words, Germany and European integration can actually 
be viewed as ‘two sides of one coin’.  
The continuing commitment to institutionalism and multilateralism has also resulted 
in another consequence in Germany. Germany has transformed itself to become a 
civilian country since the end of WWII, and after its influence increased, it became a 
civilian power. Because of defining itself as a civilian power, Germany does not 
consider that building up its military is a priority to achieve its interests. It would 
rather search for diplomatic and economic options. Therefore, although Germany 
participated in the NATO mission in Kosovo and Afghanistan, it did not give up 
non-military efforts for a peace resolution. Also like the response to Libya, the 
Merkel Government insisted on a political solution and rejected sending any troops 
or involving itself in military actions led by Britain and France and supported by 
America and NATO. German abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 
actually in a way marked a retreat from the position which had been adopted under 
the Red–Green coalition, which was full acceptance of German international 
responsibility rather than abstention. 
This does not mean that Germany is not committed to developing a common 
security and defence policy. Germany supported the British–French proposal to 
develop the ESDP and supported it in German Presidency in the Cologne European 
Council. Besides, Germany also contributed towards implementing ESDP/CSDP 
missions, especially civilian ones. In terms of EU battle groups, from 2007 to 2011 
Germany had committed to five, while Britain had two and France had three. 
Moreover, Germany will prepare another battle group with France and Poland for 
the first half of 2013, and also has proposed building permanent headquarters for EU 
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crisis management operations. The evidence shows that Germany is committed to 
the institutional framework of the ESDP and CSDP. 
Besides, Germany is transforming its military. The conscription system terminated in 
2011, and Germany has aimed to build a more professional and modern military 
structure which would not only increase efficiency in defence spending, but also 
improve German participation in multilateral military operations. It signifies that 
Germany is trying to alleviate hesitance and reluctance to undertake military 
operation, and share more burdens with allies if that is necessary. 
It is important to mention that, regarding security and defence issues, Germany 
nevertheless has a civilian focus, and therefore civilian measures and non-military 
options are Germany’s first choices when facing a crisis or urgent situations. 
Germany is still cautious about military actions and doubts whether they represent 
the best way of achieving political outcomes. In other words, Germany is committed 
to the ESDP and CSDP, but is not fully committed to military operations. Different 
situations would lead to different considerations on a case-by-case basis. For 
example, the crisis in Kosovo was described by German Foreign Minister Fischer as a 
holocaust, and therefore Germany decided to participate in military intervention. 
The crisis in Libya was defined as a process of political reform, and therefore 
Germany preferred a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy and did not support military 
intervention in Libya at a very early stage, although it was a controversial decision 
and widely criticised in the German Bundestag. 
The influence of the institutionalisation process of European integration on Germany 
is much stronger than on Britain. However, Germany is committed to developing and 
implementing the institutional framework of the ESDP and the CSDP rather than 
supporting the EU to play a strong military role. Therefore, as regards the context 
about what a common security and defence policy should be and when it should be 
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applied, Germany sometimes has different views from other member states. At least 
in the crisis in Libya, Britain and Germany have not reached a consensus about 
whether this was a crisis management situation in which EU military mechanisms 
should get involved. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that if the EU is expected to 
play a role on security and defence affairs, it cannot merely rely on civilian 
mechanisms. Especially with crisis management situations, if the EU is expected to 
conduct these situations it cannot avoid undertaking military mechanisms, and it 
needs the support of Germany.   
 
8.5 The Impact of Institutionalisation for the Future of the CSDP 
This thesis has concluded that the framework for undertaking common security and 
defence affairs in the EU has become increasingly institutionalised. Especially in the 
Lisbon Treaty, a diplomatic service has been created. The EU now has an organised, 
bureaucratic team which can offer administrative resources for EU institutions to 
prepare and implement the CSDP. Besides, the EU has built up military and civilian 
capabilities. Although these capabilities still need to be improved, these presences 
would avoid the EU from inaction. However, even though it is an institutionalised 
framework, it also has an intergovernmental characteristic. Therefore, it requires 
member states to maintain their political will to implement this framework. If the 
implication of the Kosovo crisis is that an institutionalised framework was necessary 
for the EU to build up capability and conduct security and defence affairs, and then 
the lesson from the Libyan crisis is that even an institutionalised framework has been 
developed, political will is still the most important issue to affect the achievements 
of the CSDP.  
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The Eurozone crisis led EU countries to cut defence spending, and this result is likely 
to affect the contributions of member states to common security and defence affairs. 
However, this could be the impulse for further defence co-operation as well. As was 
mentioned in previous chapters, defence austerity may promote defence 
co-operation between member states in order to achieve more efficiency defence 
spending. Besides, as was stated in a speech to the Australia Parliament in 
November 2011 by the US President Obama, the US is cutting its defence budget 
except to the Asia Pacific because this area is a top priority for America over the 
coming decade. Since Obama has declared that the US will put more focus on Asia 
instead of Europe, this decision may become a new impulse for EU countries to 
consolidate political will and improve their capacity to defend themselves.  
The institutionalisation process from the EPC, CFSP, ESDP to CSDP does affect and 
shape the behaviours and policies of member states; however, this process is also 
affected and shaped by member states. Therefore, the factor of national interests is 
nevertheless crucial to affect whether this framework can work effectively. An 
institutionalised framework can promote mutual understanding and 
consensus-building, but this does not mean that this framework will definitely 
produce this outcome. Besides, the institutionalisation process requires long-term 
practice and then it is possible to affect member states. Member states spent more 
than twenty years on the EPC before they accepted the CFSP, and this illustrated 
that political integration would be an even more long-term process to be achieved. 
The development of the ESDP and CSDP has been just over ten years, and member 
states are still working to make this framework become more capable in order to 
fulfil the expectations of member states. Especially regarding security and defence 
issues, which are at the heart of national sovereignty, the objective of forming a 
common security and defence will not be achieved rapidly and likely to be 
determined by state preferences for the foreseeable future. 
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Appendix A: 
Interview Invitation Letter 
Dear Mr /Miss XXX: 
I am writing this letter to kindly request a 30-minute interview for PhD research. 
I am doing a Doctorate at the School of Government & International Affairs in Durham 
University in the UK. The topic of my thesis is to investigate EU security and defence 
integration and explore how member states and EU institutions interact with each other in 
the institutionalisation process. I have chosen to examine Britain and Germany. In order to 
collect firsthand information on this topic, my research requires interviews the people who 
work for this area. 
I learned that you have participated in these fields for a long time. Due to your great deal of 
experience and knowledge for this topic, I would like to request an interview with you. If you 
would be kind enough to have an interview on this topic, please contact me for arranging an 
interview. In the case where you would like to take part in my research but your schedule 
prevents a face-to-face meeting, I would be grateful if you could spare some time for a 
telephone interview. 
I look forward to a reply at your earliest convenience. 
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Yours sincerely, 
Wei-Fang (Florence) Chen 
PhD student in the SGIA, Durham University 
Email: Confidential 
Phone: Confidential 
Address: Confidential 
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Appendix B: 
Anonymous Interview 
Anonymous, Senior staff in the Civil-Military Cell 
Date: 17 November 2009 
Time: A.M. 09.30-10.15 
Place: Avenue de Cortenbergh 150, European Union Military Staff in Brussels 
Record device was not permitted in the interview. 
The interviewee asked to be anonymous in the thesis. 
 
Q1. How would you describe the institutional framework of the CSDP? 
 Efficient and effective implementation of the CSDP largely depends on 
whether member states have political will or not. The present institutional 
framework of the CSDP has provided procedures for operations. However, 
how to coordinate different opinions and policies amongst member states 
will affect results of negotiations. Since unanimity is necessary in the 
decision-making process of the CSDP, to have co-operation from all member 
states is needed to make decisions in the CSDP. Although member states 
know that they have to build consensus for making decisions in the CSDP, 
sometimes some member states have strong positions, so are difficult to 
make compromise. If member states have political will to do something, it 
will be very easy to make a decision. It is case by case.  
238 
 
 In the civilian aspect, the main challenge is to provide enough police. The EU 
is undertaking 10 civilian missions at the moment, and member states are the 
major source to provide police, judicial officials, and other professional staff. 
They are not full-time employees for the EU, so they have to suspend their 
job for a while if they are going to support EU missions. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to find sufficient, qualified and willing staff to take part in the CSDP 
missions. 
 In the military aspect, the main challenge is money. It is very expensive to 
afford a military operation, and member states have to pay for it if they are 
going to participate in. Like the CSDP mission in Chad, the EU deployed 3,000 
forces. Such is a big cost. 
 It is important to have a comprehensive plan for CSDP missions. It is 
necessary to integrate overall approaches, and merge civilian and military 
dimensions. A comprehensive project for CSDP missions is our next objective. 
Meanwhile, we have to resolve the financial problem of the CSDP. At the 
moment, common costs are very limited and only used for routine and 
administrative matters. The expenses of CSDP missions are shared by 
member states. Therefore, an expensive mission will decrease the interest of 
member states to take part in. 
Q2. How would you evaluate the military ambition of the EU? 
 I do not think it is necessary to do that. Because we already have the NATO. If 
we develop a strong military force in the EU, it will cost too much, and will 
become a duplicate of the NATO. I do not think we will have more benefits if 
we develop an EU force. The EU has to rely on member states and made 
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decisions case by case. Member states will not agree to deploy forces to a 
place where they are not going to be involved. We have established the CSDP 
since 2000 and it is operated by joint wills of member states. The operation 
of the CSDP does not merely depend on voluntary co-operation of member 
states but is also referred to political reality in the EU.  
 Whether member states agree to involve in a situation depends on their 
political wills and capabilities. Africa was colonised by European countries, 
and still has relations of political, economic and historical interests with 
Europe. These special relations between Africa and Europe increase political 
wills of the EU countries to take part in African affairs. Balkan is also priority 
for the EU because of geopolitical relations. Moreover, the member states 
with more political resources and higher GDP will be more capable and more 
willing to devote in an CSDP mission. (For example, Germany afforded 23 per 
cent of expenses of CSDP missions.) Although six EU countries: Finland, 
Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, Cyprus, and Malta are not NATO members, they 
fully support CSDP missions. France, Belgium, and Germany are also keen to 
devote in CSDP missions.  
Q3. How would you describe the process of take a CSDP mission? 
 The UN is the most important partner for the EU to undertake international 
missions. Therefore the EU keeps good connection and close relationship 
with the UN to discuss how to cooperate with each other when respond to a 
crisis situation. How to keep a closer co-operation with the UN and support 
UN missions are very important to the EU. 
 After a mission is finished, CSDP bodies (like our cell), have to evaluate the 
mission. It is a learning process. Politically speaking, successful experiences 
from missions will encourage member states to devote more efforts in CSDP 
missions. For example, the establishment of a ‘Battle Group’ in the CSDP is 
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learned from previous experiences. How to keep the EU learning from CSDP 
missions is also crucial for the development of the CSDP. 
 EU countries have different concerns about security affairs. For example, 
Finland devotes its defence forces in three aspects: defend territory, 
undertake civilian operations, and participate in international crisis 
management. Unlike Finland, Sweden does not devote defence forces so 
much in protecting its territory, but contribute more efforts in international 
crisis management. Because every EU countries have different concerns 
about security affairs, it is not easy to make a common decision for employ a 
CSDP mission.  
Q4. How do you address the problems of implementing CSDP mission? 
 When there are many independent participants take part in the same area, it 
is difficult to make decisions because of the lack of shared views/objectives 
amongst different participants. 
 It is difficult to have an extremely efficient procedure in the CSDPbecause of 
the lack of over-arching body to make coherent decisions.  
 Although how to cooperate together, coordinate procedures, and implement 
more efficiently are time-consuming, they are very important issues for the 
EU to undertake security integration. 
 There is no international mechanism yet to incorporate all participants. Even 
within the UN, there are independent units/agencies instead of a whole team. 
It is difficult to establish a consolidated system. 
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Q5. How would you evaluate the performance of the CSDP?  
 It is very difficult to build a more efficient and consolidated decision-making 
process because there are too many participants taking part in this process. 
 Political will with member states to integrate security affairs is not enough; 
therefore CSDP bodies have to continue to produce papers to persuade 
member states to agree further integration or devote more resources to 
CSDP missions.  
 The European Commission cannot play an active role nor has more authority 
in the decision-making process.  
 Decisions about whether to deploy military forces in an area have to be made 
decisions by member states.  
 Intergovernmental approach is still the best way to undertake CSDP affairs. 
Because member states take part in CSDP missions voluntarily, they will have 
stronger promise to finish the missions. 
 But, in my opinion, the influence of the CSDP upon the public is very little. 
CSDP is not a big issue for European people, because the decisions and 
implementations of the CSDP are dominated by political elites instead of 
general public people. 
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Appendix C: 
Rainer Arnold’s Interview 
German MdB for the Social Democratic Party since 1998 and is also the Spokesman 
for the SPD on defence affairs since 2002 
Date: 7 September 2009 
Time: P.M. 13.00-13.30 
Phone Interview 
Record device is available in the interview. 
Q1. How would you describe the SPD role when taking part in security and defence 
integration in the EU? 
 My party the SPD has been driven to deepen European security policy. We 
just produced a paper for building European army. That is the vision which 
we are trying to make in the Bundestag. We did that step by step for many 
parts. Like one part would be build army. We and the EU work together for 
this. We are consolidating on this issue in order to cooperate. It will save a lot 
of money because no country can have an army to do everything. There is 
already working in the aerospace sector. We also want to do this on land 
troops and navy. In my opinion, the SPD is stronger in forwarding this issue. 
Other parties in the Bundestag see more problems and they discuss the 
problems more than they actually move. Although there is a vision it will not 
end in ten years. It will take a long time. 
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Q2. How would you describe the present security environment for the EU and 
evaluate whether the institutional framework of the CSDP is capable of tackling 
security challenges? 
 All the key threats identified by the document European Security Strategy 
have much depth and weight to cope with except for the organised crime 
because you cannot fight against organised crime with military means. For 
Germany, Afghanistan is the most important issue. Of course not only for 
Germany but also for the NATO. If we fail in Afghanistan, it will be terrible for 
Pakistan. There are also issues in African, like the Horn of Africa or Africa as 
the whole.  
 For example, in my opinion it is known what has to be done in Afghanistan, 
but many states do not act following the knowledge. Everybody knows what 
should be done in Afghanistan now, but many states do not do enough. 
There are forty two states having military forces in Afghanistan but only 
eighteen states with civilian tasks. 
 The experience in former Yugoslavia with NATO arms up to now does work 
and the strategy in Kosovo is going well. We think we have solved the 
problem in Kosovo with the NATO. Of course the situation in Afghanistan is 
different, but the NATO is the only organisation capable of solving this 
problem.  
 The EU still cannot tackle these problems without the help of America either 
in financially or strategically. The EU does not have enough financial support, 
member states do not have enough troops, and they do not have enough 
hardware and they are not politically determined enough. Also, it is our 
target to get the same weight with America.  
 The EU has operation head goals. Although there are some other minor 
forces, like the German-French brigades, they are rather small operation 
forces.  However, there is no alternative for the EU to replace the present 
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voluntary co-operation from member states. If German troops are sent to 
somewhere, it has to be decided by the parliament. The Lisbon Treaty also 
asks military operations have to decided and agreed by all of the member 
states of the EU. It is not only from foreign politics but also from defence 
politics. You can only imagine that this may be changed when the European 
Parliament has enough power to decide it, but at the present the European 
Parliament is not very powerful. 
 For every member states, they have different cultures. For example, France 
and England still think they are superpowers. But as you know, England is not 
a superpower anymore but this thought is still deeply in their mind. France is 
the same. It is of course to make all the member states to gather together 
and get them to follow one strategy. The French and English see their armies 
as national means; they would use their armies nationally. For Germany, we 
do not want to go anywhere alone; we will only go with such as NATO ISAF or 
KFOR or other international operations. 
Q3. How would you describe German participation in the development of security 
and defence integration in the EU? 
 The most important objective for Germany is to build trust with the East 
European partners; as long as they do not trust us, they will be more likely to 
do along with NATO rather than with EU. We have operation headquarter in 
Potsdam and this headquarter can lead EU missions. Also, Germany can 
suggest what the EU can do or develop together. One example is developing 
the strategy for air transport by the EU together because it is very expansive 
and satellite system as well. It is very important since not many countries can 
actually do this. Maybe England and France can, but not other European 
countries. 
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 We have not had a poll about whether the public is opposed European 
military, but if the German public is asked: do we want to be engaged more in 
the EU military or more in the NATO, Germany will probably vote for the EU. 
However, in my opinion, as long as the European Parliament is still very weak, 
I do not want such power is concentrated by Brussels and make Belgium 
become head of Europe and deploy German soldiers to somewhere. At the 
moment, German soldiers can only be deployed by the Bundestag, and it is 
very important key in our politics. We will not give away to Brussels as long as 
the European Parliament is still in a very weak position.  
 At the moment, in the field of security and defence affairs in the EU, Brussels 
is still very weak and Brussels has no right to decide these affairs. We need 
some time for the European public to see and recognise it is European 
politics, not only from one or some states in Europe. Once people can 
recognise and accept it, people will decide to give the European Parliament 
more power concerning the security and defence policy in the EU.   
 The Lisbon Treaty is still on the process of ratification. After it enters into 
force, it will need couples of years to practice. Therefore, within this period, 
we probably will not have other project to reform the EU. In my opinion, a 
supranational framework for the CFSP and CSDP may be possible but it 
probably will not happen when I am alive. For future generations, it is 
possible, but it will be a very very long way. However, it is a vision there. At 
the moment, we are working on small and concrete steps for this vision. It 
can be very small steps. As long as the direction is right, we do not care about 
even only small steps can be made.  
 In my opinion, the Balkan crisis makes European countries find out they were 
unable to solve European problems on their own and drive European 
countries to develop security and defence capabilities. It is the EU has to 
make Europe secure; not Russians or Americans. It is not a competition to 
NATO or to America, although American politics intends to split Europe into 
Central Europe, East Europe and the rest of Europe.  
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 In my opinion, German people have no deficit to European identity. We are 
Europeans. Germans will have a common identity to Europe via successful 
experiences in European integration. If the success can be seen, it will 
strengthen the identity from Germans to Europe and the EU.  
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Appendix D: 
Hans-Peter Bartels’s Interview 
German MdB for the Social Democratic Party since 1998 and is a member in the 
Defence Committee 
Date: 2 March 2010 
Time: P.M. 15.00-15.25 
Phone Interview 
Record device is available in the interview. 
Q1. How would you describe the German policy when taking part in security and 
defence integration of the EU? 
 Germany has a special history and the citizens of Germany are more distant 
to use military power than the UK and the US are. They are very anti-war and 
do not want to be seen that Germans like war because of WWI and WWII. In 
Germany, our people do not love military. 
 Germany does not want to go special ways and does not want to go 
somewhere alone. Germany does not mind to act with other countries 
together. Since Germany needs to be a partner of Europe and our 
constitution says Germany is willing to be part of multilateral system for 
peace. We are on member of three peace systems: the UN, NATO and EU. 
We want to take part in all their actions where and when we can. But we do 
not like to take military actions.  
 The SPD has a political vision to unify different European armies to one EU 
army in the future, maybe in next twenty years. Although the CDU/CSU does 
not say they want to have this, I think they will not make opposition against 
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this. Mrs Chancellor said: I don’t know, maybe it is a good idea. I think it is 
not a very controversial issue in Bundestag. We said we want a European 
army in the future and the people from the CDU/CSU do not oppose to that.  
Q2. How would you describe the development of the CSDP? 
 The EU is capable of taking some military operations independently, but it 
depends on how big the mission is. Like the problem in the Balkans, the EU 
will be asked firstly to solve this problem but we cannot do all of this.  
 We are now in Kosovo for a NATO mission KFOR which had 65000 troops at 
the beginning in 1999. Now there have 10000 troops. On the other side, a 
civilian side, we have European civilian mission to help Kosovo. Germany 
provides judges, general administrative staff, polices and civil experts. There 
is more than one thousand civilian staff from EU states in Kosovo now. The 
KFOR was important, but now it is not as important as the beginning. We 
have to do more on the other side, like ruling of law and the EU can do this. 
 Germany is a federal country. We have sixteen states (Lander). The federal 
government can call for Lander to call for volunteers for civilian mission, but 
the federal government cannot force Lander to provide those people. This 
situation is more complicated in Germany than in Britain because British 
government only has one level.  
 For the CSDP, the question is not about if the EU has capabilities or not. It is 
more about common planning in armed forces. We have national planning, 
but we do not have realistic EU planning. Each mission has different 
situations and need different capabilities. We have to know what each 
mission needs and then member states of the EU will offer capabilities. It is 
not a real problem for the EU to do military works without Americans. But it 
is a more political question about will the EU do it well and in what situations 
the EU should make intervention. Each political crisis has military option and 
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other options. I think Europe will be able to act with military, but we will 
want to solve the problem with other options first, like diplomatic solutions, 
economic sanctions. For us, the use of military power is the last option and 
we will do that on the first minute. Maybe it is the difference between 
philosophies of international politics between the US and European thinking.  
 You can have institutional reforms, but the EU is not a state, not like the US 
or a country which has an entity on its own. I think member states will always 
have conflicts with EU institutions but it is much better than that we 
European countries have conflicts with each other. In the EU we can always 
get consensus. Maybe it takes much time to make progress, but in the EU we 
can have European discussions and European process.  
Q3. How would you describe the relationship between the NATO and the CSDP of 
the EU? 
 We are very carefully to military options, but we want Europe to be able to 
do military things instead of only the US. We must have capabilities for 
European actions. Before that we only had the NATO. We need the EU to 
have independent military capabilities, but the EU cannot do this for against 
the NATO. In Balkans, the EU use Berlin-plus to work with the NATO. It is an 
exercise for the EU to develop more capabilities. I think it is also interest in 
Americans that Europe becomes capable to do these missions.  
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Appendix E: 
Steven Everts’s Interview 
Personal Representative for Energy Policy of the SG/HR Javier Solana 
Date: 6 November 2009 
Time: A.M. 9.00-9.20 
Place: Justus Lipsius Buildiing, Headquarters of the Council of the European Union in 
Brussels 
Record device is not permitted in the interview. 
 
Q1. How would you describe your work involving in the CSDP? 
 I have worked for the Javier Solana in this position since 1st January 2009. 
Before this, I worked in the private office for Javier Solana. The work of our 
office mainly focuses on external issues. Internal energy issues are conducted 
by the Commission. Our focus in the area is world-wide, and our target is to 
keep the channels safe to deliver gas or patrol. 
 There are two difficulties in tackling energy issues in the EU. The one is that 
the EU states have various starting positions and priority areas. We have to 
coordinate different opinions and interests and it is very though. The other is, 
although the Europe is an open market for energy business, energy issues 
could be a political issue as well. Inside the Europe, it is a free market, and 
energy companies are independent from local governments. However, 
energy companies have to keep good relationship with local governments, 
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and sometimes, local governments controlled the business of energy which 
will make situation even tougher.  
Q2. Would you describe the framework to implement the CSDP? 
 I think we do not obtain enough resources to do our work. The situation to 
tackle the energy issue outside the Europe is more difficult than that is inside 
the Europe. Most resources and attentions were occupied by the Commission. 
The Council only played a supportive role, not an active role, for member 
states to tackle the energy issue. However, although the present institutional 
framework does not give us enough power and resources, it does provide 
flexibility for us to do our work. Also, after the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Council will have greater consistency and coherence to tackle 
energy affairs. 
Q3. How would you describe the relationship between member states and the EU 
in the CSDP? 
 I think the intensive interactions amongst EU institutions and member states 
are able to shape common ideas and values for them. Although the decisions 
in the field of the CFSP are basically made by consensus and sometime it is 
difficult to make consensus, a common sense has been gradually built up in 
the EU in the process of institutionalisation in the CFSP. Besides, according to 
the speech by Javier Solana, the process of institutionalisation should have 
affected behaviours and policies of member states.  
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Q4. How would you evaluate the development of the CSDP? 
 I don’t think the spill-over effect will happen in the field of CFSP. The 
spill-over effect in the European Economic Community started from 
functional co-operation. There was a necessity to build an internal market, so 
we had to remove internal tariffs and carried out other regulations. Then we 
had to tackle monetary stability, so we developed an EMU mechanism and 
created Euros. All these affairs were interconnected and had functionally 
connected. But the European countries did not set a goal to develop a 
common trade policy, because it was a too vague picture. The integration in 
the field of economic affairs started from a very specific and functional point 
inside the Europe, and it was for resolving internal problems. However, the 
effect of security integration will be expressed outside the Europe. In the 
field of CSDP, we only have ambitions, but we have no specific goals and 
necessity to develop an external foreign and security policy. To pursue a 
common security policy is not a functional affair, so the spill-over effect will 
not happen within the CSDP. I would like to say, in the field of CSFP, it is still 
in the process of policy-learning.  
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Appendix F: 
David Heathcoat-Amory’s Interview 
British MP of the Conservative Party from 1983 to 2010 and was also the Foreign 
Minister in 1993 
Date: 14 July 2009 
Time: A.M. 11.30-12.00 
Place: MP David Heathcoat-Amory’s parliament office in the Westminster Building, 
London 
Record device was unavailable in the interview. 
 
Q1. How would you describe the Britain’s policy in the development of the CSDP? 
 The development of the European security policy shall be based on 
intergovernmental co-operation; our conservative will not support for a 
supranational framework for European security policy. Security policy has to 
be decided by our member states, our governments. 
 The UK has universal interests, and the EU is one part of these interests. The 
EU is mainly a link to connect the UK and the World. Because we Britain have 
universal interests, we will not only focus on European affairs. It is important 
for Britain to maintain the special relationship with America, which is the 
most important one. And then we look after our British Commonwealth 
because we still have interests and connections in the Commonwealth. For us, 
the EU is more like a link to connect the UK and the world. 
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 There are many approaches or ways to for us to reach co-operation. We 
don’t only depend on the EU institutions and we don’t think the EU 
institutions will always reach co-operation. 
 Actually in the EU, only the UK and France are able to deploy troops or 
military forces. Germany is not unreliable factor. They are not committed 
enough to deploy military forces.  
 The CSDP is one part in the Britain’s foreign and security policy. We will 
participate in and help it, but we will not put all our efforts on it. We Britain 
decide our foreign and security policy independently; we don’t have to 
depend on the EU to implement our policy.  
 Our Conservative Party takes a more critical thinking towards the European 
security policy. If we win the general election next year and form our 
government, we will not follow the Labour party’s policy.  
Q2. How would you evaluate influence of the development of the CSDP upon 
member states? 
 I don’t think the institutional developments of the EU will improve or 
enhance common identity of member states towards the EU in the end. We 
should have consensus first and then we establish institutional framework of 
the CSDP. Institutional framework should go after consensus. We should not 
build a framework first and then ask member states to form common identity. 
It is a wrong way. Besides, I think the enlargement of the EU will increase 
diversities amongst member states and these diversities may undermine the 
existing consensus before the enlargement.  
 I think the EU has to pay more attention on the isolated sentiment between 
the Headquarters in Brussels and the public. Especially for the UK and Ireland. 
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Q3. How would you describe the relationship between NATO and the CSDP? 
 I think the NATO is the primary military mechanism for European security; 
the EU shouldn’t and will not replace the military role of the NATO in Europe. 
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Appendix G: 
Andreas Henne’s Interview 
Political Assistant of Security Policy for Mr. Bernd Siebert, who is a CDU/CSU MP in 
the German Bundestag since 1994 and was a spokesman for defence policy from 
2005-2009 
Date: 25 August 2009 
Time: A.M. 10.00-10.40 
Place: MP Bernd Siebert’s parliament office in Unter den Linden, Berlin 
Record device is permitted in the interview. 
 
Q1. Could you describe your work in the Bundestag? 
 I was a police officer then I joined in the Army in 1986 as a general staff 
officer. After the general staff course finished, I served in Kosovo war. After 
that, I worked in the Ministry of Defence in Boon and Berlin, and then I was 
‘hijacked’ for this job here, for the defence policy, foreign affairs, and security 
issues for the CDU/CSU.  
Q2. Could you describe the policy of the CDU/CSU to the CSDP? 
 It’s very interesting. Tomorrow we will have an appointment with French 
colleague to talk about the aspect of security affairs in Europe. The France 
position is that we need a strong European pillar in NATO. They are looking 
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forward more engagement in NATO because they think France is not heavy 
enough for the role that Sarkozy wants. 
 For France, they need more influence and security methods in the world, and 
I think they see the NATO is the best way to get more influence. Now they 
wish we (Germany) will be a strong partner for France to support them to 
become heavier in the NATO. In fact, for us, NATO first is ok, and after that is 
European security policy and European bases. Our aspect is NATO should be 
the best security engagement of Germany.  
 At now, I think the greatest problem is organised crimes in Europe. We use a 
European police structure to cope with this problem and with little bit 
military forces to protect our south frame to North African area. But from my 
point of view, in Italy and Spain, they are still having serious problems to fight 
organised crimes. I think the most serious security threat in Germany comes 
from political issues, not military issues. We are middle of the Europe so we 
do not have border problems. When we look to the east, there is Poland 
between Germany and Russia; when we look to the south, there are other 
countries between Africa and Germany. We are a continent state and it is 
quite comfortable to stay here. But we cannot shift all issues to our 
neighbours, and we have to help with them. So we have sent some police 
forces to Brussels to coordinate organised crimes issues, but not for military 
matters. 
Q3. How would you describe Germany’s policy in the CSDP? 
 In Germany, we have a problem in general. WWI and WWII pissed off our 
people very much and they hate wars. That is the reason why I think we 
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should look at on civilian aspect more than on military aspect for conflict 
management issues. In Germany, I think, people might support European 
forces, but they are not friends for strong armies. When you ask Germans 
whether they like strong armies, they will answer: ‘NO’. We do not need an 
army for fight. Also, I think we will not have a strong German army or support 
a strong European army and so on. Leaders in our party would like to have 
more power on their own hands, so they would not like to shift some power 
to the Europe, EU, or other European joint common projects and so on. I 
cannot see who in my party will support a strong European army. The EU 
security policy is more like political matters than military issues. I think to a 
strong European army will not be efficient because we (European countries) 
have different interests, nationalities, and political situations. 
Q4. How would you describe the relationship between Germany and the EU 
regarding the CSDP? 
 Germany has some people in Brussels to deal with common security affairs. 
They meet up frequently to prepare meetings and create policy plans, but in 
fact, basically it is head of governments to lead the way to decide European 
issues. The job of institutions in Brussels is producing papers. Important 
security policies are made in Deutscher Bundestag or in Paris, not in Brussels. 
The EU has a structure to make common security policy, but this structure 
could not work probably. Security policies are still the policies of chiefs of 
executive, like Merkel, Sarkozy, and Gordon Brown. 
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Q5. How do you evaluate the implementation of the CSDP? 
 I think it is not easy to stabilise a country or make good governance. We can 
see the situation in Somalia. The first engagement was not so successful. I 
think Afghanistan is another good example. Now we (the EU) are not so 
concentrating on military aspects. We need a comprehensive approach. For 
example, we are successful in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When military mission 
is nearly in the end, the EU, as a civil power, will help local government to 
rebuild the country. From a German point of view, we look on civilian aspect 
more than on military aspect. 
 It is a common problem in the EU structure that the power to make decisions 
is controlled by member states. The EU is not really a democratic system. The 
European Parliament is not strong enough to against member states or to 
influence the decision-making process. Tomorrow we will have a Bundestag 
meeting to discuss the Lisbon Treaty and laws of the EU. Our opinion is that 
we must hold the most power and competence in Bundestag and not shift 
too much competence to the European Parliament. 
 The performance of the CSDP was Very well. Take the mission in Congo for 
example. After the mission was completed, the situation in Congo became 
unstable as before. They had an election, but they are having civil war again. 
It is not a good result, I think. Atlanta is a more successful mission, and we 
have some good results on it. We spoiled pirate’s jobs, and we keep a secure 
corridor for civil ships. But as I said, we do not have enough power to do this 
for a long time, and we need American’s help. We need India and China’s 
help as well, I think. Although India and China are not our allies, they are 
great nations in world market. I think they must help us to tackle the pirate 
problem. 
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Q6. How would you describe the Franco-German relations in the CSDP? 
 From our point of view, in the European continent, France and Germany are 
the two strongest partners and two strongest countries. We are also the 
motive of some developments in the EU and European security policy. When 
we have the same way, we think European continent will follow us. From our 
point of view, when we have a strong European security pillar, Italy, Spain 
and so on will follow us. When we have a strong NATO pillar, it’s the same 
way. I think we need security capabilities in the EU, but the problem is that 
there will become double-headed with NATO capabilities. The main problem 
is we do not have enough units and military parts to support both. Only 
supporting the EU or the NATO, always the same. There are two heads, one 
EU head and one NATO head. When we are in a NATO mission, we use the 
NATO head and do the NATO job. It is the same in the EU. We have a Congo 
mission in 2006, which was an EU mandated mission, but we used NATO 
forces to do it.  
Q7. How would you describe the relationship between NATO and the CSDP? 
 I think it is the British position to make EU security capabilities become a 
junior part of NATO. It could be worked. But from our position, we are not a 
junior part of the NATO. We are a member of the NATO. I think it is a parallel 
relationship between the EU and NATO. The EU, of course is more on the 
European focus and more about European security matters. If we have 
capabilities to do this in the EU, we should do it in the EU. If we have not 
enough capabilities, then we need NATO. For example, in Balkan, Europe 
cannot do the job without America and NATO in Kosovo war. We are not able 
to cope with that alone, and then we need NATO or America. It is a German 
perspective. From our history, it is very necessary to have a strong 
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relationship with the USA, and we are also a good partner with France and 
the Great Britain. Of course, after 2005, the relations were not good because 
of the Iraq War. But I think we are on a good way now and will become 
better. Mr. Schröder and Mr. Bush had good level of communication, and I 
think Mr. Obama and Mrs. Merkel have good communication as well. This is 
the reason that I cannot say which is more important. But the EU and NATO 
are necessary. 
 Our problem is we are not able to build up another structure which is parallel 
to the NATO structure. We have created the NATO already, so that were are 
not able to create a second similar structure. 
 Take the mission in Somalia for example. The problem is how long the 
support will last. If it is half year, we can do it. But in fact, such as the mission 
in Somalia, we are using NATO-headed forces. Atlanta will be transferred to a 
NATO mission because we cannot afford it. We think we need a UN mandate 
and NATO forces to do this job. We need power of the NATO and the power 
of Americans. It is quite clear. When we want to handle this problem, 
perhaps we must have an aerial operation in Somalia, but Germany is not 
able to cope with this problem. We do not have enough air forces, enough 
army forces, but most of them are engaged in Afghanistan. We have some 
ships though, because we need ships for the mission in Afghanistan. But it 
will be too much for Germany if it last for a long time. This is the reason why 
we need the NATO. For a long-term engagement, we need the power of the 
NATO. Germany has a strong relationship with Americans. They help us now, 
and we hope they can also do that in the future. 
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Q8. How do you think the process of institutionalisation in the EU affect the 
participation of Germany in EU affairs? 
 In fact, I think the process of institutionalisation in the EU will encourage the 
participation of Germany. It helps Germany to be more engaged in Europe. 
Although we are not as good as France or Britain to push our interest to EU 
structures, the present structures in the EU are really good for Germany to 
find compromises. From our point of view, through the process of pushing 
European and German interests in these structures, we can find compromises 
with other states. From our history, because we are in the middle of Europe, 
we must find compromises with our neighbours, not resort to conflicts to 
deal with problems. 
 I think these structures also help other member states to be more engaged in 
the European integration. However, the problem is Britain has different point 
of views on many issues, such as financial crisis, Afghanistan issues, and Euro 
matters. We really have no idea what they want. I think the UK should have 
more engagement in the Europe, because it is a more successful approach for 
the UK than keeping a special relationship with the US. In fact, Britain and 
America have disputes in some areas, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, on 
business issues. Britain does not have the power of Euros to secure their 
financial system. I think they will have really serious problem in the near 
future. When we look at Ireland, they have support from the EU, so the hit to 
the financial system in Ireland was not so hurt. I think the EU should be 
attractive for the UK. You must feed cows first then get milk back. You have 
to pay something to the EU, and then you can ask something back. So I think 
the UK should be more engaged in the EU. 
 
263 
 
Q9. Do you think the CSDP shall be reformed to be more effective? 
 I do not think so. As I mentioned before, security affairs are not the priority 
for German to be engaged in the EU. We only look at business, trade, and 
inner security matters, such as police issues. Military and security issues are 
not our priorities. It is not the best way we should have. We are only looking 
for compromises, and this structure produces compromises, Germany is one 
of the EU states, and we have some profits from the EU. From the German 
side, the system now is good. It is not necessary for Germany to support an 
institutional reform for military and security affairs in the EU. 
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Appendix H: 
Paul Keetch’s Interview 
British MP for the Liberal and Democratic Party from 1997 to 2010 
Date: 24 November 2009 
Time: P.M. 10.30-10.50 
Phone Interview 
Record device is available in the interview. 
Q1. How would you describe the existing institutional framework of the CSDP? 
 Any form of European foreign, security or defence policy has to be credible 
which means it has to be able to match the literature of the words with the 
abilities to deploy the forces on the ground and do the job you want to do. 
That is true when you are talking about anti-piracy operations in Africa or 
when you are talking about the peacekeeping missions in Balkans. 
 One of the problems is being with the European forces deployment. The EU 
does not actually match the abilities to necessary fights and keep peace on 
the ground. We have seen the example on Afghanistan where certain 
European forces have restrictions on military activities they can perform in 
war situations. The reality is it may be going to be war situations. If you are 
going to keep the peace, you need to have ability to project forces sometimes. 
And at the moment very often the European forces do not have that ability.  
 The EU has to keep reassessing the security situation in Europe. The forces 
that have your disposal need to be as mobile flexible as possible to meet the 
challenges can change, even when you are involved in an operation. Iraq is a 
good example of this whereby you start in a high extensive warfare that two 
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armies are fighting with each other, so you have to be very quickly to move 
to a situation and an urgency operation. It is certainly that the UK did not 
change our posture quickly enough in Iraq to meet those change 
circumstances. So, you know, what is required on the ground can change 
daily and you need flexibility to do that. Certainly the security objectives of 
the EU and the concerns they have should also be changed quickly as well.  
Q2. How would you describe the British policy towards the security and defence 
integration in the EU? 
 So I think the British government would want to see is that is there going to 
be an EU peacekeeping mission. That mission is backed up with forces if 
required to make the mission work.  
 We support the EU to develop such capabilities as long as there is no 
duplication as what the NATO is doing; also as long as it does not in any way 
try to pretend that it is a replacement for NATO. I do not see the European 
Common Security and Defence Policy as being a replacement to the 
transatlantic alliance. I see it as being an ability for Europe to act if necessary 
alone when the United States would not or could not want to get involved in 
such peacekeeping missions. I do not see the CSDP as a replacement for the 
transatlantic alliance and I did not see that any EU forces as being any kinds 
of replacement for the NATO. 
 No sensible government is going to be committed to armed forces open 
endedly to support any EU operations no matter where it might be. We are 
not going to do that and there is no sensible government would do that. 
Every mission has to be looked down its merits and every country has the 
right to say: yes, we want to participate in that mission or we do not. From 
my point of view, the key and absolute imperative is that mission has to be 
credible. I mean it has to have military capabilities to do what you expect to 
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that mission to do; but certainly I would not be committed to supporting any 
EU mission whatever it is and I do not believe any British politician would.  
 You cannot force any countries to participate in military operations. The EU 
would have to persuade countries that whether there is a military mission we 
are supporting. If we are going to send British troops to support a particular 
mission, we have to be convinced that those troops are properly led and 
properly equipped and the troops are going to be with properly led and 
properly equipped to do the tasks we ask them to do.  
 I will certainly be very cautious about the development of the CSDP military 
forces. A lot of evidences we have suggest that European missions are not 
prepared to go as far as it ought to be. The fact is if you are going to keep the 
peace, you have to be prepared in certain circumstances to fight. That is 
unfortunately a factual thing. If you are trying to keep the peace between 
warring groups and make the groups not fight again, the EU has to be 
prepared if there is necessary to be engaged in conflicts with the groups to 
regain the peace. Sometimes peacekeeping requires an ability to fight. 
Therefore, it is not just about policing or being nice to people; you do have to 
have the capabilities if it is required to impose peace or in order to keep the 
peace. Sometimes, European nations have not always been prepared to do 
that.  
 For Britain, terrorism is certainly the most serious security challenge at the 
moment and the most key important security objective for the UK 
government is the protection of the UK homeland from terrorist attack. That 
is why we are in Afghanistan and that is why we continue to look very 
carefully at anti-terrorism operations in the UK. We need participation of our 
friends in Europe.  
 I think the EU and its institutions support the UK government to fight the 
terrorism. But I think in the EU you need to see that individual member states 
need to participate in that security as well. Some of them do very well.  
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 There is no EU intelligence service and certainly the British intelligence will 
not be prepared to share with the EU or every EU countries. That will be 
ridiculous. I think it should be retained as an independent intelligence service 
and nation by nation and state by state. In the end, the anti-terrorism 
operations will be done by those states cooperating with other nation states. 
Where that changes is where the EU decides collectively that it wants to send 
the forces or troops or ships to the Horn of Africa for anti-piracy. The EU can 
do that, it should be able to do that, and it has to have the ships to do that. 
That is kind of things that the EU should be cooperating to do more.  
Q3. How you evaluate the efforts of the EU to develop a strong CSDP? 
 I think some countries in the world have got historical reasons to be 
concerned about war fighting operations. Germany and Japan are two 
examples and they are reluctant to put their own forces to conflict situations. 
Other countries just have generally passive approach to these issues and they 
will not choose to fight. That is fine and great, but do not expect other 
countries to be more robust, like Britain.  Do not expect us to send our 
troops and sacrifice our troops if you are prepared to do that.  
 The principle is I absolutely support the EU to develop such capabilities. What 
we need to see is how it is working in practice. The EU has to develop more 
co-operation, needs to train more and needs to have greater interoperability 
between the forces there. It needs certainly to support logistic terms. I mean 
if you combine all the European armies together, it will be bigger than the 
United States armies; therefore, we need be serious about logistic supports, 
the communications between various forces, training together, getting to 
know each other and working together. Once that begins to happen, I think 
the EU forces will become more credible and it has to do that by working 
together in the fields. That is why I am so disappointed with some European 
268 
 
countries which are not polling their weights in the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan. 
 You can have the best institutions and the best procedures, but if individual 
soldier on the ground is not prepared when there is necessary to fight, then 
the whole thing collapses. Therefore, yes, you need institutions and you also 
need political acceptance from politicians or sometimes they will put their 
soldiers in harmed way.  
 I do not believe that the EU will have an independent European army and we 
are not support that.  
 What kinds of missions have to be done by the EU or by nation states does 
depend on different situations. Like the anti-terrorism actions in Birmingham 
of Manchester, these actions should be done by the British government 
rather than the EU. If there are links to other countries, like the United States, 
Germany or other countries, yes we should be talking to those governments. 
But that is not something that the EU has ability to get involved.  
 The CSDP will work where the EU countries want to work together. But I do 
not think the practice of the CSDP will affect the British security and defence 
policy. Britain can decide by itself when it decides to be got involved the 
situations it wants to get involved. The British government decided to go to 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the British government decided to do some NATO 
missions. These decisions are not affected by the EU decisions.  
 The national security and defence policy of the UK and the security priorities 
of the UK may not be the same to the priorities of every member states of 
the EU. The CSDP can only be a common European foreign policy when all of 
the nation states agree to it. When they agree to it, then there has to have 
mechanisms to bring military forces to support that. I have no objection 
against that at all. But it is not Britain’s job or France or Germany’s job to 
push that policy to that direction. I think if there are some countries are 
trying to do that, they will get resistance from other countries.  
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Q4. How would you describe the relationship between the NATO and the CSDP of 
the EU? 
 The NATO is an organisation that includes the United States and Canada. It is 
conceivable that it may be at some point in the future there will be a mission 
that the EU might want to do which the NATO would not want to do. So 
therefore it is perfectly logic for that an EU ability to deploy peacekeeping 
forces if it wants to do; separating from what the NATO wants to do. But that 
does not mean it is a replacement of the NATO peacekeeping abilities to do 
that.  
 Take anti-terrorism for example. It does not to be the EU role and it still 
remains the priority of national governments. I would not want to the British 
anti-terrorism policy run by the EU or run by the NATO that the British 
government does. Yes, we cooperate with other EU partners and we 
cooperate with the EU institutions, but very often the anti-terrorism issues 
are done by state issues. 
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Appendix I: 
Riina Kionka’s Interview 
Personal Representative for Human Rights (CFSP) of the SG/HR Javier Solana 
Date: 3 November 2009 
Time: A.M. 11.00-11.20 
Place: Justus Lipsius Buildiing, Headquarters of the Council of the European Union in 
Brussels 
Record device is not permitted in the interview. 
 
Q1. How would you describe your work involving the CSDP? 
 I have worked in this office since January 2007. Before I came to here, I have 
worked for the affairs of human rights for a long time. I am now is personal 
representative for the Secretary General and High Representative.  
 In the present institutional framework, there are two heads in the Council: 
Secretary General and High Representative. It means I have two bosses, and 
we are in charge of different aspects to carry out human rights affairs. 
However, once the Lisbon Treaty is in operation, it will merge these two 
positions, and it will make the work become easier. The Lisbon Treaty will 
make a big change in the institutional framework in the Council, and there 
will definitely have a section for human rights, I am not sure whether I will 
still be the head of this section or there will have a new head though. This 
institutional reform will increase consistency and coherence of the Council, 
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and then it will contribute to fulfilling the common values and goals, such as 
human rights, in the EU.  
Q2. How would evaluate the efforts of the EU to protect human rights in the 
framework of the CSDP? 
 The affairs of human right in the EU will become more important and prior 
after the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. There are two reasons. The first 
reason is that human right is one of the four values that the Treaty on the 
European Union committed to protecting in the field of the CFSP (the other 
three are democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms). The 
commitment to protect the value of human rights has been codified in the 
Lisbon Treaty. In other words, it has been written down already, so the 
commitment is a text with legal status now. The second reason is in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, it also states that to promote human 
rights is one of the prior missions in the EU. Citizens are able to complain to 
the EU through domestic channels. Human right is definitely one aspect of 
European security policy as well, although the EU has other focuses for the 
CFSP, such as economic or political issues. 
Q3. How would you evaluate the performance of the EU to promote human rights? 
 The issue of human rights has not obtained enough attentions. We do not 
have enough political resources. In my opinion, besides developing the 
economic power, we also have to focus on other fields of policies and keep 
good connection with member states. Since in most situations, the EU is still 
a stable and capable approach of tackling conflicts and crisis situations. 
Therefore, we have to be patient towards the development of the CSDP and 
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cannot give up, although it takes long time to achieve our objectives. It is still 
a long way to go. 
Q4. How would you describe the relationship between member states and the EU 
regarding the CSDP? 
 I think we have to educate people to be more familiar with the policies and 
developments in the EU. Once they do so, the isolated feeling will be 
improved. Also, they should have greater sense of responsibility towards the 
European integration. The issue of isolated feeling is a dual responsibility. The 
one is the EU institutions and member states have to educate the European 
people; the other is the general public have to pay more attentions to the EU 
affairs, at least, be keener to vote for the European Parliament. 
 However, I do not think we have to enhance authority of the European 
Parliament. There will be no mechanism in the institutional framework of the 
EU to balance the power of the European Parliament. It does not exist in an 
organic connection between the European Parliament and the Commission, 
the European Parliament and the Council, or the European Parliament and 
member states. When the authority of the European Parliament becomes 
over-weighted and deviated from common expectations, there will be no 
instrument or mechanism to make it stop. As the result, if the European 
Parliament becomes too dominant while there is no mechanism to balance it, 
it will cause a crisis that is the lack of democracy in the decision-making 
process in the EU. 
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Appendix J: 
Pierre Séailles’s Interview 
Policy Coordinator in the Relex A4, Security Policy Unit in the European Commission 
Date: 25 November 2009 
Time: P.M. 18.30-19.10 
Phone Interview 
Record device is not available in the interview. 
Q1. How would you describe the present institutional system of the ESDP to 
undertake security and defence integration? 
 The unity is still limited. The framework of the CSFP is still limited to 
undertake military missions.  
 Progress is quite limited. It is disappointing.  
 Member states are the main factors to influence the operation of the CFSP. 
The operation of the CFSP largely depends on the co-operation of member 
states. 
 In many occasions, member states can lobby the EU to accept their national 
interests. 
 Because decisions have to be made by unanimity, member states can easily 
block the decision-making process. It makes the whole system become fragile. 
This decision-making process did not change in the Lisbon Treaty.  
 In general, Europeans do not fully trust the EU. Euro-sceptic. 
 Although since 1993, regular meetings between member states and the EU 
have made some progress and the CFSP has been changed a bit, the change is 
not significant, it is more coordinated than before though.  
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Q2. In your opinion, how would you evaluate the present institutional framework 
of the CSDP capable of coping with the challenges of the present security 
environment? 
 I think the security environment and the security challenges to the EU are not 
very different since then. However, member states are too ambitious, but 
sometimes their ambitions are not realistic. Meanwhile, the political will of 
member states is an important factor to affect the operation of the CFSP. 
 The present CSDP framework has a right combination to combine military 
and civilian instruments. However, in Afghanistan, we deployed too many 
military forces, but too less civilian instruments. I think the present 
institutional framework is ok, although the political will of member states is 
still not sure.  
 To launch a CSDP mission needs a clear, reasonable and realistic mandate. It 
is very important. At present, to develop fully independent military 
capabilities is not achievable. It is very important to have a clear and realistic 
mandate to undertake EU missions. 
 I think strong military forces are not always necessary for the EU. We have to 
find right tools but we do not have only one standard for the purpose. No 
mission is the same, since every mission has different conditions and 
objectives. We have to find right combination of military and civilian 
instruments in right time. That is why we require a planning unit to make 
right decision. Planning must be very careful. From the last week, we start to 
plan for a crisis management unit, but it is still in an initiative stage.  
 My work involves CSDP missions. We provide suggestions and make 
proposals about what contributions the EU may offer, but the final decision 
will be decided by the Council. The Council will also decide how to implement 
missions. The Council and the Commission have very different procedures to 
implement decisions. 
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 In reality, it is rather important whether the Council support a CSDP mission. 
However, traditionally and theoretically, the Commission does not favour an 
intergovernmental framework. Both the PSC and COREPER are Council bodies. 
The COREPER directly belongs to member states, but the PSC plays larger role 
in the CSDP. Therefore sometimes these two bodies may have some 
competitions with each other, although things are much better now. 
Officially speaking, a supranational framework may be helpful, but it has to 
be decided by the public, maybe a referendum in the EU. Because the 
matters of the CSDP are very close issues to national sovereignty, it is difficult 
to develop a supranational framework for the CSDP. Nevertheless, an 
intergovernmental framework is better than nothing.  
 The EU has to improve capabilities for the CSDP, but the political will of 
member states is still the capital. European countries are decreasing defence 
budgets because not many security threats are not perceived by member 
states and European citizens, the European public are not feeling necessary 
to push their governments and political parties to change policies.  
Q3.  How will you evaluate the relations between the EU and NATO? 
 The Berlin Plus works for the co-operation between the EU and NATO. 
However, this co-operation only occupies small portions in the CSDP missions. 
At the present, only in Bosnia and Herzegovina the EU and NATO have 
co-operation via the Berlin Plus. Until now, there is still no sign that a 
proposal will be made to improve this mechanism. 
Q4. How will you evaluate the long-term development in the EU for security 
and defence integration? 
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 It is possible to form common culture in the CSDP. We are not developing 
institutions and mechanisms only for common political positions and 
common military actions. Keeping on practice the CSDP will help to build 
better institutional framework and help member states to learn from the 
past; meanwhile, practice can contribute to improve understanding and 
acceptable of member states to conduct the CSDP.  
 The Lisbon Treaty is a milestone for the EU since the Maastricht Treaty so 
that there will be no new treaties in the EU at least within ten years. 
 Of course the Lisbon Treaty will improve the implementation of the CSDP. 
However, since the Treaty has not entered into force yet, it is not clear how 
much it will improve to the CSDP. The Lisbon Treaty creates an External 
Action Service; however, in my opinion the extent of the Treaty to improve 
the framework of the CSDP is still limited.  
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Appendix K: 
Reis Alda Silveira’s Interview 
Head of Unit in the General Secretariat – DG E VIII – Defence Issues (Defence Policy 
and Capabilities Unit) 
Date: 5 November 2009 
Time: P.M. 15.30-15.45  
Place: Avenue de Cortenbergh 158, Office of the Unit on Political and Defence 
Capabilities in Brussels 
Record device is not permitted in the interview. 
Q1. How would you describe your work involving the CSDP? 
 My work basically involved in all of the processes in the field of the CSDP, 
including agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-implementing. Our 
work is separated into two parts; the one is routine affairs, and the other is 
making papers and proposing proposals for ministerial meetings.  
Q2. How would you describe the development of the CSDP? 
 In the field of defence and security, the decisions are made on the premise of 
strict compromise from member states. Various opinions and positions 
amongst member states have to be negotiated and compromised, and then 
decisions can be made. As the result, shaping common ideas or pursuing 
common values through informal connections is not plausible in the field of 
defence and security policy. 
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 However, the decision-making process in the field of the CSDP is not merely a 
forum for intergovernmental negotiations. Member states, EU institution, 
and technical experts are all fully associated with each other, and we work 
and share information together. I think the policy-making process in the field 
of the CSDP is an arrangement between intergovernmental forum and 
supranational system.  
Q3. How would you evaluate whether the development of the CSDP affected 
member states’ policy? 
 In my opinion, I do not think the process of institutionalisation of the CSDP 
will affect EU states to make security policies. ‘Spill-over’ will only happen in 
the Community. As I just said, the decisions of the CSDP are made on the 
premise of compromise of member states, so decisions are involved in 
various positions and interests amongst different member states. Basically 
speaking, member states play dominant roles in the decision-making process, 
and retain most of the competence to make decisions. Because the decisions 
of the CSDP are made by EU countries according to their different positions 
and interests rather than the consequence of ‘spill-over’. EU states are more 
influential to affect the institutional development of the CSDP than EU 
institutions. The process of institutionalisation only has limited influence 
upon the way that EU states define and pursue their security policies and 
interest. 
Q4. What is your opinion about strengthening military role of the EU? 
 I think the EU should do that. Strong and centralised forces will support a 
coherent and credible European security policy. If the EU wants to be more 
279 
 
prominent in security affairs, strong security forces of the EU are required. 
However, member states are not prepared to accept such a plan for building 
strong military forces. It will take time for member states to make consensus 
for building common forces. We have to do that step by step to make 
progressive result. 
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Appendix L: 
Brian Toll’s Interview 
Programme Manager of the DG External Relations (CFSP Operations) in the European 
Commission 
Date: 2 December 2009 
Time: P.M. 14.00-14.40 
Phone Interview 
Record device is not available in the interview. 
Q1. How would you describe the present institutional system of the CSDP to 
undertake security and defence integration? 
 The Maastricht Treaty built a three pillar structure for the EU. In my personal 
view, the spotlight is focused why the three-pillar structure is gone since the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
 At present, most missions of the CSDP encounter the problem of 
‘under-staffed’. Most civilian missions do not have enough staff to implement 
missions. More police forces are required for CSDP missions. However, it is 
difficult to persuade civilian staff of member states to contribute to such 
missions, because some of them do not belong to any governmental 
department. They are detached from governments.  
 Besides, working level is another problem. Especially on the situation to carry 
out an out-of-area mission, people are required to have enough language skill 
for communication. Although the EU will call for contributions, it is 
implemented on the basis of voluntary participation from member states. 
Sometimes Switzerland and Turkey make some contributions to the civilian 
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operations, but in most situations such contributions come from member 
states.  
 The EU has arranged many training programmes for better implementation 
of civilian missions of the CSDP. For example, in Kosovo we have large 
training programmes which involve the Council and the General Secretariat. 
Since every state has different training standards for their civilian staff, 
training programmes can help those staff to be integrated into civilian 
missions.  
Q2. In your opinion, how would you evaluate the present institutional framework 
of the CSDP capable of coping with the challenges of the present security 
environment? 
 Basically, the Council and the General Secretariat will define situation. The 
Commission help to identify potential problems in order to reduce mission 
costs for the EU.  
 There are four levels in the framework of the EU involving deciding a CSDP 
mission. The top level is the High Representative. Under the High 
Representative are crisis management operation commanders (they are also 
under the Secretary General). They are responsible for providing devices and 
supports to implement CSDP missions. The third one consists of policy units 
which are responsible for suggesting right amounts and right people to 
implement missions. Then the Council Secretary will provide political 
information and intelligence and assess levels of risks. The PSC, the EU 
Military Committee and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities are the 
three policy planning bodies related to the CSDP missions the most.  
 The Commission also take part in external relations, especially on the 
financial aspect. The Commission has full financial responsibilities and 
involves in everything about money. Although the Maastricht Treaty 
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constrained the role of the Commission to actively take part in the CFSP, the 
Commission does a less but better job to help the implementation of the 
CFSP and CSDP. 
 The Council is responsible for the EU to define a security strategy for the EU. 
The Commission may have some influence, but does not have decisive power. 
At the present the EU does not have a universal rule about under what 
conditions it will intervene in a situation. There is not an overall framework 
for CSDP missions. It is case by case and depends on different situations on 
each case. Each mission has specific procedures, needed information and 
requirements. 
 Under the Lisbon Treaty, there will be an External Action Service. Once the 
Treaty enters into force, this institution will help to improve the coherence of 
the CSDP. The Commission is charged with all the affairs related to the 
Community; regarding the affairs related to the CFSP and CSDP, the 
Commission only plays a role for advice and monitor. The Commission is 
happy to help with the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP. In my opinion, 
there is no major conflict between the Commission and the Council to cope 
with CFSP and CSDP affairs. 
Q3. How would you evaluate the present institutional framework of the CSDP? 
 The most serious problem for the implementation of the CSDP is still the lack 
of available people for it. The EU is still not having staff and human resources 
on its own. Whether to cope with a crisis needs to be decided by the Council. 
Budget is also an issue.  
 In my opinion, I am not very satisfied with the implementation of the CSDP 
up to now. Many CSDP missions are launched, but not all of them have good 
performance. The mandate to a CSDP mission needs to set an end date, clear 
structure and definite objectives. For example, in the mission in Georgia, the 
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EU requires to have better strategic planning. Political strategic planning 
needs to be done more. The EU should be more careful and have much more 
serious thinking about these things before launching a CSDP mission, 
including how to achieve objectives, how to implement, and when and how 
to move out. For example, before deciding a CSDP mission, the EU has to 
know whether it will be a long-term or short-term mission and it depends on 
whether the situation is complicated or not. These factors are important to 
decide whether the EU will complete a CSDP mission successfully.  
 Besides, the successful implementation of CSDP missions depends on the 
political will of member states. Planning unit has to ensure the EU will have 
enough people to carry out CSDP missions.  
 Generally speaking, the EU has major influence upon economic affairs. The 
NATO plays a better role on military affairs. The Commission does not involve 
military affairs of the EU. In the field of the CFSP and CSDP, member states 
should increase their involvement, identify what the resources can be utilised, 
and assess situations more precisely. 
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